




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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301



6 MAR 1965

Dear John:

We are now in the process of re-evaluating Department of Defense command and control capabilities. As a part of this process, we initiated a study of the requirements for command and control support to the President. Although this was primarily an "in-house" effort, a certain amount of advice and information was obtained from non-Defense sources including your agency. The study focus was mainly on our own responsibilities for presidential support, but, of course, it was necessary to consider the roles played by others as well. In view of this we would appreciate having the benefit of your comments on the report, particularly those parts of it which impact on CIA support for the President or on interagency relationships. A copy of the report is attached.

Sincerely,

Attachments

Honorable John A. McCone

Director, Central Intelligence

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

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**Department of Defense**  
**COMMAND AND CONTROL**  
**SUPPORT TO THE**  
**PRESIDENT**



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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMAND AND  
CONTROL SUPPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

INTRODUCTION

Establishment of the Study

This Study was prepared in response to a memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Subject: "Conceptual Approach to the NMCS," dated 27 February 1964, included as Annex A). In the memorandum, Mr. Vance indicated:

"As an initial step in re-evaluating Department of Defense command and control activities, . . . , I desire that an appraisal be undertaken of the requirements for command and control support to the President during crisis situations. This appraisal will furnish the standard against which Department of Defense capabilities and plans, particularly for the National Military Command System (NMCS), can be compared to insure that our conceptual approach to command and control is valid, effective, and understandable."

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Policy guidance for the Study has been provided by Mr. Solis Horwitz, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), and by Lieutenant General David Burchinal, USAF, Director of the Joint Staff. Terms of Reference for the Study were issued by Mr. Vance and are included below as Annex B.

The Study effort has been chaired by Rear Admiral Paul P. Blackburn, Jr., Chief, Joint Command and Control Requirements Group, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Shortly after establishment of the Study, an Advisory Group was formed consisting of:

J-5	Lt. Gen. Paul Emrick, USAF
ODDR&E	Mr. Fred A. Payne
OSD (COMP)	Dr. A. C. Enthoven
OCA	Maj. Gen. John B. Bestic, USAF
J-3	Maj. Gen. Ferdinand J. Jager, USAF
DIA	Brig. Gen. Lincoln A. Hall, USAF
OSD (ISA)	Brig. Gen. John W. Vogt, Jr., USAF

#### Conduct of the Study

This report has been prepared by:

RAdm. Paul P. Blackburn, Jr., Chairman (JCCRG)  
Mr. Herbert D. Benington, Deputy Chairman (JCCRG)

Col. Darrel J. Freund, ODDR&E  
Col. James N. Hickox, JCCRG  
Col. William L. Read, OSD (OMP)

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The following provided consultation and criticism:

Col. Jack R. Brown, OSD (COMP)  
Col. James F. Clark, DIA  
Col. Ernest J. Saliba, J-3  
Col. James E. Tyler, OSD (ISA)

The report is based for the most part on studies conducted by four working groups during the first three months of the Study effort. These working groups considered the Terms of Reference as they related to four situations:

- |                            |   |
|----------------------------|---|
| 1. General War             | Col. William H. Barnidge, JCCRG<br>Col. Jack R. Brown, OSD (COMP)<br>Cdr. Jack L. Eubanks, J-3<br>Lt. Col. David J. Schmerbeck, JCCRG<br>Cdr. Harold F. Wenzel, J-3 |
| 2. Minor and Severe Crises | Col. James N. Hickok, JCCRG<br>Cdr. William L. Read, OSD (OMP)  |
| 3. Day-to-Day Operations   | Lt. Col. Robert N. Ives, JCCRG<br>Cdr. Harold A. Willyard, JWGA   |
| 4. Cuban Missile Crisis    | Col. Darral J. Freund, ODDR&E<br>Mr. Carl Perhacs, JCCRG  |

Many informal contacts were established with the White House, CIA and the State Department and these proved invaluable.

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Organization of the Report and Relationship to the Terms of Reference

The attached report consists of seven chapters:

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Title</u>
I	Crisis Support for the President.
II	Department of Defense Support for the President.
III	NMCS Relationships with CIOs and Service Headquarters.
IV	The NMCC.
V	Presidential Needs During Intense Crisis and General War.
VI	The Role of the NMCS Alternates.
VII	Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations.

The Terms of Reference indicate the following specific objectives  
straight:

- a. "The information which the President will require  
in order to reach decisions during crisis situations...."
- b. "The statutory advisors or others with whom the  
President may wish to confer directly...."

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- c. "The scheme for establishing alternate decision-making groups...."
- d. "The types of decisions that will be made...."
- e. "Staff required to support the principal statutory advisors...."

Chapter I considers these needs from the President's point of view. Chapter II focuses in greater detail on the contribution of the Department of Defense. Chapter III describes the interplay of the NMCS, the CINC Command Centers, and the Service Headquarters Centers in providing information and staff support, and in implementing decisions. Chapter IV considers the role of the NMCC in crises short of general war, the types of decisions to be supported and the associated staff responsibilities, and the NMCC's function of serving the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Chapter V concentrates on the President's needs for general war and for intense crises just short of general war. Chapter VI considers the role of the NMCS alternates in supporting the President, his advisors, and Alternate Decision Groups that do not include the President. It analyzes the staff requirements at the alternates in support of these National Decision Groups as a function of situations that

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may be faced and presidential decisions that will be needed. Finally, it compares a number of alternate configurations of the alternates.

The Terms of Reference direct "The analysis ... of the principal types of political and military incidents. . .," "The development of scenarios for different types of crises, . . . and "The testing of analytic conclusions against historical situations." Annex C summarizes war games, scenarios, and actual crises that have been considered by the Study Group. In order to analyze command and control needs, the Study has found it useful to categorize crises and conflicts as follows:

- a. Day-to-day operations - this condition includes normal daily operation and the planning for and management of minor crises. Under this condition normal organizational arrangements obtain.
- b. Severe crisis - this condition includes crises that are far short of general war (in that many states of escalation seem available to all parties engaged in the crisis) but that are of sufficient intensity that the attention of National decision-makers and portions of their staffs is markedly

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diverted from their day-to-day concerns and focused on management of the crisis.

- c. Intense crises - this condition includes crises that are on the brink of general nuclear war in that the use of widespread strategic nuclear strikes has become a plausible option for one or more parties to the crisis.
- d. General war - this is the condition after the Soviet Union or the U. S. has initiated widespread strategic nuclear attacks. Within the general war situation, the Study considers two phases: The strategic weapons exchange phase and the follow-on phase.

Chapter I indicates the need for this categorization and analyzes the effect of various types of crises on decisions that will face the President and on the advisory staff support that he and his principal advisors will require. Chapter V analyzes the various ways in which an intense crisis could escalate to general war, the role of warning under different situations, and the effect of different types of escalation and general war on the support needs of the President and Alternate Decision Groups.

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**TOP SECRET**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**CHAPTER I - Crisis Support for the President**

The President's Role During a Crisis	I-1
Presidential Requirements	I-3
Presidential Decision-Making	I-6
Factors in Crisis Management	I-11
Very Intense Crises	I-17
Command and Control Implications of Intense Crises	I-21
Survival of the President Versus the Presidency	I-25

**CHAPTER II - Department of Defense Support for the President**

DoD Crisis Support Functions	II-1
DoD-White House Interface	II-3
Information Support vs. Advisory Staff Support	II-4
Advisory Staff Support	II-5
Information Support	II-10
Relevance	II-13

**CHAPTER III - NMCS Relationships with CINCs and Service Headquarters**

The CINCs and the NMCS	III-1
The Service Headquarters and the NMCS	III-5

**CHAPTER IV - The NMCC**

Patterns in Crisis Management	IV-1
Manning, Organization and Functions of the NMCC Today	IV-5
Functions of the Current NMCC	IV-6
Emergency Functions of the NMCC	IV-11
Present Normal Manning of the NMCC	IV-13
Augmentation of the NMCC Staff	IV-15
Relationship Between the Joint Staff and the NMCC	IV-16

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Relationship Between Intelligence and the NMCC	IV-19
NMCC Support for OSD	IV-21
The Relationship of the NMCC to Other Agencies	IV-25
Operational Concepts for Future Development of the NMCC	IV-26
Operational Implications for the Development of the NMCC	IV-29
Physical Arrangements	IV-31
Evaluation	IV-33
Exercising	IV-35

## CHAPTER V - Presidential Needs During Crises and General War

The Need for Relocation Short of General War	V-4
The Use of Alternate Decision Groups During Crisis	V-11
Situations That May be Faced at the Alternates	V-19
Centers for Protecting the President	V-29
The No-Warning Situation	V-36

## CHAPTER VI - The Role of the NMCS Alternates

Functional Roles of the Alternates	VI-2
Operational Criteria for Alternates	VI-5
Personnel Capacity at an Alternate	VI-12
The President or the Presidential Successor plus his Immediate Advisory Staff	VI-12
Communication and Staff Support to the Presidential Group for Intense Crises	VI-13
Direct Staff Support to the Presidential Group of an Alternate Successor Group for General War	VI-15
Personnel for Operation of the Alternate	VI-16
Personnel for Reconstitution, Mobilization and Direction of an Extended War	VI-16
Evaluation of Individual Alternates	VI-29
The Fort Ritchie Complex and the ANMCC	VI-30
National Emergency Command Post Afloat (NECPA)	VI-37
National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP)	VI-40
Proposed NMCS Facilities	VI-43
Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC)	VI-44

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

National Mobile Land Command Post (NMLCP)	VI-51
Evaluation of Best Combination of Alternates	VI-53
Summary Conclusions	VI-68

CHAPTER VII - Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

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CHAPTER I

CRISIS SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT

The President's Role During a Crisis

In the foreseeable future crisis management in the U. S. Government will increasingly focus at the Presidency. There are several reasons for this. Primary is the fact that contemporary crises are symptomatic of and directly related to the world power picture. They cannot be handled in isolation or treated on the basis of local issues. They must be dealt with by men who are broadly and currently informed and who have the authority to direct the course of the nation. Inevitably, these requirements bring such matters close to the President.

The capability of modern communications is another fact which tends to move crisis management into the presidential orbit. Modern technology has made it possible for the President to be informed to a level of detail previously unknown on problems and issues far away. Similarly, it has enabled him to communicate directly and immediately with U. S. representatives anywhere and hence to control them closely. Moreover, this capability has a secondary effect also in that the

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possibility of presidential control gives rise to the presumption in foreign minds that most U. S. actions in a crisis are White House directed. Faced with the probability that any U. S. crisis actions will be attributed to him, the President naturally tends to direct those actions to a far greater extent than was the case in earlier times.

Finally, there is the obvious fact that the consequences of a crisis miscue are far greater now than previously. No President in the nuclear age feels at liberty to remain apart from situations containing risks of escalation. The American public is conscious of the risks involved in crises and expects top level attention to such problems. No matter how much the President would prefer to give free rein to subordinate officials, the very nature of our times drives him into personal involvement with crisis decisions.

The nuclear reality under which we live has brought with it an increasing recognition of the merit of a national policy of limited objectives, attained by the commitment of limited power. In recent years this trend has produced the concept of "controlled response." Although usually used in connection with U. S. SIOP options, the phrase is equally apt for lesser levels of conflict. Indeed, it is accurately descriptive of our normal cold war conduct of foreign affairs. For the

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concept of controlled response simply calls for the consideration of thrusts by an adversary on a case-by-case basis. In each instance, the U. S. reaction must be carefully calculated in order to achieve U. S. objectives while preventing an inadvertent chain reaction and while providing positive deterrence to the possibility of uncontrollable escalation. It seems clear that for the foreseeable future the President will reserve unto himself the ultimate responsibility for interpreting hostile actions against the U. S. and that of determining what the U. S. reaction will be. Undoubtedly, there will be delegation of authority to implement decisions once they have been made, but those decisions related to escalation, as well as close control of the operational probing which may precede them, will inevitably be personal responsibilities of the President.

#### Presidential Requirements

In order to meet his responsibilities in international crisis management, the President needs extensive support. In its broadest terms such support could be categorized as follows:

- a. Warning and Alert -- Knowledge that a crisis exists or that one is expected.

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- b. Descriptive Information -- Summary information on the nature of the crisis, identification of friendly and hostile elements, and a complete updating as the situation develops.
- c. Analysis -- The possible effects of the crisis on U. S. and Free World interests and in those countries involved whose interests (military, political, economic, etc.) may be inimical to the U. S., including the nature of U. S. commitment involved.
- d. Enemy Intent and Capabilities -- Anticipatory studies concerning possible future moves by the enemy or by forces hostile to U. S. interests.
- e. U. S. Alternatives -- The development of possible military, political, diplomatic, psychological and economic courses of action by the U. S. together with an analysis of their anticipated effects and consequences.

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- f. Communications Facilities -- The capability to communicate rapidly with heads of foreign governments, and appropriate U. S. diplomatic and military representatives, and the capability to disseminate his decisions for implementation.
- g. Counsel -- The availability of presidential advisors for consultation.

Responsibility for the provision of this support for the President is divided among various executive departments and agencies. The lines of cognizance are not distinct, and often responsibility for a given category is shared interdepartmentally. The following general statements apply:

- a. The warning and alert function is performed jointly by Defense, State, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
- b. Informational support is a function of Defense, State, CIA, and OEP in their respective areas of cognizance.

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- c. The analytical function, the appraisal of the enemy actions, and the development of alternative courses of action are accomplished by individual agencies or by various combinations of persons from the State and Defense Departments, from CIA and from the White House Staff.
- d. Communications are furnished the President by State, CIA and Defense, as well as commercially, except that during a general war this is predominantly an NMCS function.

Presidential Decision-Making

Before focusing on the DoD portion of crisis management support for the President, it will be useful to examine briefly the way White House business is carried on.

Reduced to its elements, the Presidential decision-making process is not unlike other categories of decision-making. Much concerning it can be inferred from observation of White House affairs and most of the remaining gaps are filled by the writings of presidential intimates, of political analysts, or of the Presidents themselves. This

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is not to imply that something, which is rather obvious in concept, is simple in execution. Rather, it is to say that however complex the problem, however grave the consequences of an associated decision, and however crushing the weight of personal responsibility, the mechanics of the presidential decision process remain simple. There must be (1) information, (2) analysis, (3) development of alternatives, (4) recommendations, and (5) there must be the decision itself.

Beyond these basics, it must be understood that presidential decision-making is a highly individual process. One President may want to participate personally and directly with interested parties in even the preliminary steps toward the decision. Another may prefer to leave such matters to his staff and participate himself only in the development of alternatives and the choice. A third may reserve only the choice for himself. To assist him the President may include, in addition to his statutory advisors, others in whose judgment, experience or special knowledge he has confidence. These advisors may function within a wide variety of organizational structures. They may be carefully organized and chartered as is the National Security Council; they may be less formally assembled as in the case of the Executive Committee during the Cuban missile crisis; or they may communicate

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privately and individually with the President. Within this larger body of advisors, the careful observer will discern an inner circle of particularly close personal associates of the President. This "Presidential Group" usually includes the White House staff as well as a few government officials of cabinet or sub-cabinet rank. Its membership is neither fixed nor formal. Admission is limited to those few persons who, in addition to their other qualifications are chosen by the President to share his most sensitive confidences. Within the Presidential Group there may be and usually is an organizational division of interest, but for the most part, its members function at large. Typically, presidential problems are dealt with by the Group on an informal basis with each member involved viewing the problem from the broadest possible perspective rather than as a specialist or an advocate. Sometimes a problem may require the application of special knowledge or experience. In such instances, mission-oriented task forces are often formed including, in all likelihood, one or more members of the Presidential Group.

In reality there is no uniquely "Presidential" decision-making process; but rather there is a presidential level of decision-making within which each President functions according to his personal work habits and

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desires and according to the amount of time available. In this arena, the highest councils of our government are held, the various departmental and agency views are heard, divergencies are aired, and decisions are made. Ideally, in the preparation of these views, departmental advocacy is assiduously subordinated to the broadest conception of the national interest. However, inevitably, individuals often may tend to think within their own organizational frames of reference. For this and other reasons divergencies of view will appear. At the presidential level these are heard, argued, and resolved and national policy decisions are forged.

Considering the varied inputs into White House decision-making, the view is sometimes heard that this process would be facilitated by the establishment of a National Command Center. The usual conception of such a center is one of a combined command post and situation room in which inputs would be received from supporting agencies and departments and integrated into one picture for the President and his advisors. The staff would be composed of individuals expert in the functions of one or several agencies. The President would spend most of his time during crises in the center, making his decisions there, and disseminating them

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from there. Although the concept is certainly highly applicable to other management situations -- it is essentially what the alternate sites provide for the President during general war -- the NCC does not fill the bill for support to presidential decision-making in crises short of general war. The amorphous and dynamic character of the presidential decision-making apparatus suggests a far less regularized support. Presidential decision-making is normally consultative. It is better served by the conference table than the situation room. Moreover, presidential advisors are in turn supported by their own staffs within their own departments. Most of the policy alternatives, analyses and recommendations which they offer for White House consideration are prepared by these staffs. Necessarily, this support reflects information which was introduced at the departmental level. Thus when the President hears analyses and alternatives from advisors, he is in effect receiving information support with it, and he is receiving it in the form which is most useful to him and with which he is most familiar.

Therefore, an NCC in an information support role would duplicate facilities which already exist and which are more appropriately placed at the Department level in the decision-making support structure.

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Moreover, unless carefully controlled, the NCC as an advisory device in the support of the President could easily fall into a role which would place it in direct competition with the cabinet and other principal advisors.

Decision-support for the President in situations short of general war should maximize flexibility. Not only does this requirement militate against an elaborate NCC, but it materially affects the manner in which departmental systems support the President. An expanded discussion of this will be found in Chapter II.

#### Factors in Crisis Management

This study has analyzed many specific situations and the implications they have for command and control support. These include actual crises such as Suez, Berlin, and Cuba; war games that have been conducted by the Joint War Games Agency dealing with Berlin, East Germany and Southeast Asia; exercises of the NMCS such as the HIGH HEELS series for general war and the KEY CHAIN exercise for contingency operations; scenarios developed by several agencies for analyzing force needs and interactions for various levels of crisis; and finally, actual war plans of the Unified and Specified Commands and

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NATO where these plans anticipate threats and possible responses.

Annex C to this study provides some specific references to these studies.

From this analysis it is apparent that each crisis presents some unique demands for command and control support. The variety of these demands stems from the particular character of the crisis with respect to a number of interrelated factors:

- a. Each crisis has its own set of timing factors.

Major decisions regarding initiative or response can be needed in minutes or hours (e.g. Gulf of Tonkin or Berlin); in days (Korea or Hungary); in weeks (Cuba or Laos) or in months (South Vietnam). As indicated below, timing may be determined by military or diplomatic factors or a combination of these. An important aspect of timing is that it determines the number of advisors who can be brought to bear on the crisis, the completeness of the analysis and advisory support, and the volume of factual data that can be marshalled

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in support of the decision making process. Most of the remaining factors discussed below similarly affect these support elements.

- b. The degree and nature of diplomatic consultation and negotiation needed during a crisis is even more complex and varied than the timing factor. In some cases the U. S. may choose to act as one member of a multilateral alliance and the U. S. commitments can unfold no more quickly than the alliance is prepared to move. In other cases the United States moves independently and merely informs its allies. Diplomatic considerations affect the extent of the information exchange needed between the Department of Defense and other executive departments such as State and CIA. This exchange must take place at several levels between each department.
- c. The scope and level of conflict contemplated or underway when the crisis develops affects the

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nature and extent of command and control support. If the crisis has not developed to the point that extensive military commitments have been made, then the President and Presidential Group may want detailed data on very small scale military operations such as reconnaissance flight or a particular blockade encounter. This information can be obtained directly from the CINC's; little staffing and analysis is possible at the Washington level before it is first presented to the Presidential Group. However, if widespread military operations are underway such as was the case in the Korean war or could have been the case if the Cuban missile crisis had escalated, then considerable information from the theatre must be collected, collated, analyzed and presented.

- d. The appropriateness of preplanned military responses to a particular crisis will determine the extent of replanning that must be accomplished before forces can be deployed or committed. In some of the Berlin

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confrontations, extensive preplanning on the basis of earlier experiences had simplified the staffing process to one of deciding the options to select and the timing of their use. In contrast, in the Cuban missile crisis extensive replanning was required for the blockade, for air strikes and for invasion. Where such replanning is needed, much of the staffing is performed by the Unified and Specified Commands. But Washington level staffing is still needed to aid the development of broad strategic guidance for the CINCs; to integrate operations and logistic support that will affect several CINCs; and to review the CINC's plan in terms of appropriateness, flexibility and risks.

- e. To the extent that a crisis has high escalatory potential, the President and Presidential Group will be concerned that staff analysis and planning have developed a number of options of increasing scope, that these options leave room for enemy withdrawal, that execution of these options will demonstrate U. S. goals

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and objectives to the enemy as precisely and unequivocally as possible, and that the enemy in his response to U. S. commitments will be forced to reveal his objectives. Such careful planning as well as its review will demand a profound awareness of operational, intelligence, and diplomatic factors.

- f. The degree to which highly significant intelligence and diplomatic information is closely held by senior officials will have a major impact on the size and composition of staff support during crisis planning. Of the crises considered by the Study Group, the Cuban missile crisis and the Cypriot negotiations are but two examples of situations where early application of extensive staff support was precluded by stringent security directives applied within the Executive Branch.

In summary, command and control support must be developed to be able to cope with an almost infinite variety of crises. Of these,

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we have so far actually experienced only a small number. Only once since World War II have U. S. forces been actually committed to battle on a large scale, and that experience was more than a decade ago. Since that time there have been significant changes in weaponry, in alliances, in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and in command organization and technology. It is not surprising that each new crisis produces its own surprises.

Very Intense Crises

Increasing emphasis must be placed on the conduct (and, accordingly the command and control support) of very intense crises that are short of general nuclear war, but where the crisis is sufficiently intense that one of the parties may be considering the use of strategic strikes against other parties as an early necessary step in escalating the crisis.

If both the Soviet Union and the U. S. continue to increase their nuclear weapons stockpile and to improve their capability to protect and deliver these weapons, the likelihood of widespread nuclear exchanges will lessen. Notwithstanding this, crises can develop and escalate, lines can be drawn, and conflict can spread so that one or the other nation

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with its back close to the wall must, in its desperation, increasingly consider the use of strategic nuclear attacks. The development of protected strategic forces by two sides would not make the use of these forces impossible but it would relegate such use to last resort status. As this option becomes less viable, the greater will be the inventiveness of a threatened side in discovering options that, although short of widespread strategic attack, also serve to remind the other side that the nuclear brink is approaching.

There are many plausible scenarios that have been developed in support of the above assertion that greater emphasis must be placed on developing capabilities for the conduct of the very intense crisis. Any development of a scenario which leads to a general war usually has a preliminary intense crisis. However, in many of such analyses, since the object is to examine the general war situation, the penultimate crisis gets quick and perfunctory treatment and the real scrutiny is reserved for the general war phase. But if strategic forces develop in the directions indicated above, national decision makers in real life may be far more concerned with the preliminaries. Indeed, the hope of staving off general war may rest heavily on skillful handling of intense crises. Planning of command and control must increasingly consider the penultimate crises.

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Situations that could lead to very intense crisis might include:

- a. Unexpected strong Soviet support of a major Chinese aggression in Asia following a United States commitment to counter the Chinese.
- b. A strong, unprecedented Soviet initiative in Berlin backed up by a series of clear ultimata that are successively enforced.
- c. A Soviet denouncement of U. S. offensive naval or air presence near the Soviet Union, backed by ultimata demanding its withdrawal.
- d. A popular revolution in one of the satellites supported by the U. S. with the expectations that the Soviets would not interfere; followed by dissension within or overthrow of the existing Soviet government and the threat of Soviet support to the old order in the satellite. More generally, crisis situations which lead to dissension within the Soviet leadership and erratic changes of Soviet objectives.

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- e. A rapid Soviet build-up in East Germany and Czechoslovakia followed by a weak, disunited NATO response.
- f. A Soviet-supported but strongly indigenous Communist revolution in a NATO power.

Such crises could unfold in many directions. On the one hand, they could quickly lead to broad diplomatic negotiations and summit meetings accompanied by a relaxation (temporarily at least) of military alert and tension. On the other hand, they might lead to the early and widespread use of nuclear weapons. But in between these two extremes, it is easily conceivable that the above situations might lead to high states of alert of strategic forces on both sides; limited nuclear or non-nuclear engagements between U. S. and Soviet forces, such as attack on U. S. reconnaissance aircraft or on Soviet ships masquerading as trawlers; attacks by Soviet submarines on U. S. naval or merchant ships with consequent antisubmarine measures by the U. S.; escalating or igniting of minor tension areas throughout the world; changes of government and policy within the NATO alliance, or by neutrals or Soviet satellites; declaration of mobilization and revocation of arms control agreements; promulgation and activation of civil defense measures;

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U. S. or Soviet threat or actions to takeover of neighboring inimical regimes such as Cuba or Turkey. Some of these actions might be unilaterally undertaken by either power; some could clearly take place independent of the wishes of either power; some might result or cease after tacit or overt negotiation. The intense crisis might unfold over several days or over several months. It might seem to be relaxing but then flare up with renewed intensity.

Command and Control Implications of Intense Crises

Although the possibility of a strategic exchange of nuclear weapons is extremely remote, it has nevertheless commanded considerable attention from those who have been concerned with future command and control requirements. Corresponding attention must be given to the possibility of a world that has escalated to the nuclear brink but not beyond, and to the unique command and control needs of this situation.

It is becoming increasingly recognized that the outbreak of a general war would very likely be preceded by a prolonged period of dynamic, volatile and intense crisis. During this period, the safety of the President is most threatened. This is the period when an unprotected President and Presidential Group could be attacked without warning by a small scale strike designed to paralyse national command and timed

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for consumation at the moment when the main weight of the attack was being detected by BMEWS or other warning apparatus. (Submarine-launched or extended range missiles might be used in such a precursor strike.) In addition, the intense crisis is a period that maximizes other dangers including unauthorized and accidental launches by highly alerted Soviet Forces and catalytic attacks by third parties. In short, protection of the President should not depend on the President's seeking haven after the onset of a general war. Rather, the President and Presidential Group must be located in a protected facility during the intense crisis and be able to manage the crisis from this center with the same effectiveness as if they were located in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

There are two general approaches to the problem of protecting the President and his capability to act from nuclear attack. First, he may travel to a protected center outside the Washington area. This is the approach which is embodied in the present system of alternates within the NMCS. Throughout this report, such action by the President or others to seek shelter outside Washington has been termed "relocation." The second approach is that of providing an easily accessible hardened

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facility in Washington from which national command could be exercised. This approach underlies the Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) proposal which is now under consideration.

The Terms of Reference indicate that, "it is extremely unlikely that the President would leave the Washington area during a crisis situation which could result in a nuclear exchange." Discussion between members of the Study Group and individuals who have worked closely with the President confirm the historical truth of this assumption and the widespread belief that it will continue to be true in the future. The factors that inhibit relocation are predominantly political and include effects on both governments and publics of the U. S., Allies, and enemies.

Only a Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) will avoid the problems associated with relocation of the President during intense crisis. A DUCC can be readily accessible and utilized inconspicuously. However, a DUCC cannot be available for more than five years. In the interim, some of the NMCS alternates and other sites (such as High Point) should be capable of supporting a relocated President and Presidential Group during both intense crisis and general war. Specific

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advantages, roles and priorities for these centers are elaborated in Chapters V and VI. Also, if a DUCC is built, alternate centers will continue to be required in order to continue to provide redundancy, flexibility, and protection against the contingency in which the President might be away from Washington at the time of an attack.

A second unique command and control need during an intense crisis is the capability for rapid secure voice and record communications between the President and his advisors and other Heads of State and their advisors; also, between the principals in Washington and the major commanders in the field. The need for communications (preferably secure) between the Heads of State will particularly apply to our allies, but communications with neutrals, newly established governments, potential enemies and actual enemies, might be equally important.

A third need during an intense crisis is the capability of handling great volumes of data at the Washington level. This stems from the possibility that numerous and widespread military clashes, conflicts or potential conflicts may develop. Although this widespread military activity will demand more delegation to the Unified and Specified Commands than has been customary during lesser crisis, it will still be essential to assess,

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replan, reallocate and monitor at the Washington level.

Finally, during an intense crisis, the management of intelligence resources and the utilization of intelligence by others may be significantly modified. For example, one party to the crisis might allow extended reconnaissance or even inspection by the other in order to stabilize the situation. Or, normal security precautions might need to be relaxed in order that the most deliberate and integrated staffing could be provided the President and the Presidential Group.

#### Survival of the President Versus the Presidency

One of the implications of the earlier discussion of controlled response is the premium it places upon presidential survival. Crisis management in the nuclear age is heavily dependent upon the President. Continuity of governmental control -- always desirable -- has become essential. If our national response to a hostile thrust is to be carefully calculated from our appraisal of enemy intent, our information and command channels and our command authority itself must be preserved. Under most circumstances this is no real problem, but it would be difficult to achieve in the face of a nuclear attack on Washington.

In considering presidential survival, it is necessary to distinguish between the incumbent and his office. To what extent does the national

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interest require that the President himself survive a nuclear attack? To what extent will a successor suffice in the event of the President's death? To what extent is the identity of the successor important? Admittedly such a discussion is conjectural, yet a conclusion in the premises must be reached if NMCS resources are to be allocated intelligently.

It seems difficult to over-estimate the importance of the incumbent President during an international crisis. Not only is he required to implement the controlled response policy, but his inspirational effect on the nation in his larger role as national leader is critical. Particularly if the nation absorbed a widespread nuclear attack, the President as a symbol of national determination to survive and as a rallying point around which Americans could regroup would be unique.

The question of presidential successors after a nuclear attack presents a dilemma: Those statutory successors who are intimately knowledgeable about the latest decisions and crisis moves would probably be killed with the President. Those who are remote from him are much less qualified to succeed because they are uninformed concerning the exact status of the crisis negotiations. It is not a promising prospect

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for any man, however able, to assume the office of President following a nuclear attack and without an intimate knowledge of the events and decisions immediately preceding. The fact is that during a crisis the President is the only person qualified to bear the burdens of his office. All others are poor second choices.

Yet, however indispensable the President may be, the fact remains that, despite elaborate protective measures, he could be lost during an attack. In such an event, the early succession of a qualified successor would be essential. Crisis management would not accommodate itself to an interregnum. Undesirable though such a succession might be, it is nonetheless preferable to chaos.

The unique value of the President requires that all possible measures be taken to secure his personal survival of an attack on the U. S. If these measures should fail, the provision for a surviving successor to the presidency is the irreducible minimum in protection for the office of the presidency. The specifics of these alternatives are addressed in Chapters V. and VI.

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CHAPTER II

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT

DoD Crisis Support Functions

The mechanism within the Department of Defense which provides crisis support for the President is the OSD/OJCS complex. This complex is the focal point of the DoD command structure. Looking downward along the chain of command, it acts to disseminate and translate into meaningful military orders the decisions of the President. Looking upward toward the White House, the OSD/OJCS gathers information and provides advice and recommendations with respect to decisions.

In Chapter I, the over-all presidential crisis support requirements were presented. From these it may be seen that the DoD responsibilities to provide support includes four principal functions: (1) warning and alert, (2) information, (3) analytic and interpretive support and attendant recommendations regarding military actions and civil defense, and (4) implementation.

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The last of these, implementation, involves the translation of decisions into military orders as well as the means of communicating with those who will execute them. It enables the President to exercise command of U. S. forces. Implementation is, by DoD Directive, a responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported by the Joint Staff and the NMCS. It will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. One point that should be noted in this context, however, is the presidential need to be able to compress the chain of command. This stems from the inevitable personal involvement of the President with those military operations during a crisis which are particularly sensitive because they involve risk of escalation. During crisis probing, the President may desire to have detailed data on a unit which is at a point of contact with a potential enemy and he may become intimately involved in the control of the unit. The mechanism through which the function of implementation is accomplished should accommodate this need.

The remainder of this Chapter will be devoted to the first three of the listed DoD crisis support functions: warning, information, and analytic and interpretive support.

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DoD - White House Interface

The upward flow of crisis decision support from OSD and OJCS may follow a variety of channels into the White House decision-making apparatus. Most obvious of these, from an organizational viewpoint, is the National Security Council, but of greater importance is the medium of direct personal contact between the President and his national security advisors. Other vital channels are DoD representation on White House crisis committees or task forces - usually sub-cabinet level - and interagency crisis management groups. Finally, there are interdepartmental liaison channels and direct queries to complete the picture. As discussed in Chapter I, the inter-face between the White House and DoD is almost entirely provided in the form of analysis and advice advanced by DoD representatives at the council table or by telephone.

It has been observed that the President's responsibility for close direction of potentially escalatroy situations, may require him to receive directly unprocessed information, but, from a quantitative standpoint, this is a small requirement. It certainly does not justify elaborate read-out equipment for information support in the White House. On balance, although the spectrum of DoD support

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for the President is almost infinite, the simpler the White House-DoD information link the better so long as it can accommodate the President's need to be able to focus on selected problems.

Information Support vs. Advisory Staff Support

In considering Defense Department support for Presidential decision-making, it is useful to categorize that support as either informational or advisory in character. As used here, the term information support means the provision of facts pertinent to the problem facing the decision-maker, while advisory staff support is interpretive or analytical. Information support may include the collection, collation and display of facts, current news, communications, etc. Advisory staff support involves an estimate of the situation, the development of alternative courses of action, anticipation of the consequences and recommendations. The two categories are complementary to one another. Advice depends on information and the decision depends on both.

The distinction is important to this discussion because each category lends itself to its own means of accomplishment and hence each imposes its own organizational requirement on the DoD. Information support, for instance, is difficult to improvise on short notice under the press of events. It requires an in-being

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highly developed organization, carefully trained operating personnel, and a relatively extensive physical installation. In contrast, whereas such regularization is feasible in arrangements for information support due to its predictability, it is much more difficult to achieve in advisory staff support. Each crisis seems to impose its own unique requirements for analysis and interpretation. The nature and extent of this support is difficult to anticipate, and is usually revealed only as a crisis actually unfolds.

#### Advisory Staff Support

Considering the nature of advisory staff support, it is not surprising to note that there has been no single integrated formal crisis analysis and advisory organization with DoD. The unpredictability of the demands which a crisis will make on the department, as well as the human tendency of leaders under pressure to look for help from people rather than organizations, makes departures from ordinary procedures understandable. The more unexpected or intense the crisis, the further removed from normal administrative policy channels it may be handled. Usually this means the formation of mission-oriented groups within OSD or OJCS which generate

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support for DoD representatives on national level groups who in turn directly support the President. They, in turn, may rely on normal staff organizations to develop the depth of information or analytical data needed to formulate advice or recommendations and to reach decisions.

To say that advisory staff support in crises is not readily susceptible to regularization or channelization is not to say that pre-planning is profitless. On the contrary, the thoughtful projection of today's realities into the various potential problems of tomorrow is the only adequate way to prepare for the future. Such activity should be emphasized and fostered in all its forms; contingency planning, war gaming, command and control system exercising, etc. The possibility of combining war games with exercises and deriving added benefits in terms of familiarization of decision-makers with plans and support facilities is discussed further in Chapter IV. The point to be made here is that advisory staff support is a creative function involving many unpredictable variables. Elaborate mechanisms for its production are not likely to be helpful and may in fact turn out to be restrictive to the flexibility which is needed. Also, it should be observed that the degree of flexibility required in

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developing advice depends upon the level within which the advisor is operating. Generally, the closer he is to the decision-maker, the greater his flexibility. The farther he is from the decision-maker the greater the degree of systemization his work will both need and tolerate.

One of the distinguishing features of a crisis is the increased pace of events. Decision points come at shorter intervals. Impending deadlines usually demand that a decision be made without the desired amount of deliberation since the utility of decision often declines rapidly as a function of time. Thus the decision-maker is faced with the dilemma that the very time he uses to prepare for a decision erodes its value. He must compromise between promptness and completeness of preparation. It is the function of those people and facilities in support of crisis decision-making to make this compromise as favorable as possible by making the basis for the decision as solid as possible within the available time.

It is important that evaluations and recommendations to the Presidential Group reflect all the factors, political, military, economic, etc., which bear on the problems considered. Decision support should be as broadly based as possible. There are a number of

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additional steps that could be taken to increase interdepartmental effectiveness in crisis anticipation and management. First, all levels of the Joint Staff could devote more attention to crisis anticipation, arrangements for crisis management, review and evaluation of contingency planning for the most likely crisis areas, and increasing discussion of these matters with counterparts in OSD, State and CIA. As an adjunct to this increased attention the Study recommends greater interagency discussion and review of both political and military contingency plans. Although the limitations of contingency planning must be clearly recognized, it would seem useful to have the State Department review some of the operational concepts and broad features contained in military plans; conversely, DoD should review political contingency plans and discuss with State the military possibilities and impossibilities, associated risks, timing factors, and effect on military preparedness for other situations. Contingency planning requires a continuous review that reflects political, diplomatic and military factors. Plans become out-of-date, and in extreme cases there is no plan for a likely contingency. Interagency review would also provide a useful vehicle for arranging for continuous scrutiny by the most senior officials of the most likely areas where

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crises may develop in the near future and of the political and military planning available for these areas.

Similarly, there should be increasing interagency participation in war gaming and exercising. The Study Group notes with interest that very senior officials from DoD, State, CIA and the White House have participated in various cold war games several times a year. It recommends that such gaming be conducted on an interagency basis for officials at a lower level. This gaming could provide a backdrop for the interagency review of contingency plans mentioned above. It might also prove valuable to have more interagency review of crisis conduct after a crisis has past. There seems to be a paucity of staff evaluations of crisis conduct after the fact.

Finally, the Joint Staff should consider expanding its diplomatic expertise in a manner analogous to the "little DoD" functions at the State Department. By strengthening these capabilities, the Joint Staff would be in a stronger position to interact positively and relevantly with ISA, the State Department and others.

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It should be noted before leaving this matter that the JCS in its Continuity of Operations Plan and in its Emergency Action Procedures has already provided streamlined procedures for its contribution to crisis management. However, since these procedures may not be put into operation until a general war commences or becomes imminent, they are not available for use during inter-agency contingency planning or even during the great majority of crises.

#### Information Support

Just as the advisory support machinery is informal and amorphous in character, so is the information support machinery necessarily formal and institutionalized. It is a highly developed and precise apparatus designed to receive, correlate, exchange, monitor and disseminate facts around the clock.

Conceptually the information support mechanism has three functions: first, it must contribute to the national capability to anticipate crises; second, it must serve as a marshalling and reference point for crisis support information; and, third, it should provide a quick reaction capability for emergency staff support during sudden crises.

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Nationally, responsibility for the anticipation of international crises is shared principally by the State and Defense Departments, by the Director of Central Intelligence, and by the White House. The function itself can range from the simple matter of reporting a de facto crisis resulting from a hostile act against the U. S. -- really no more than notification -- to a highly involved process of inductive analysis in which many seemingly unrelated facts and reports are integrated into timely warning of impending trouble. However, regardless of the complexity of the analytical process involved, the sine qua non of crisis anticipation is information. The continuous and systematic collection, collation, exchange and monitoring of this information are vital and therefore the information support machinery provides an ideal agency for its accomplishment. It is in continuous operation and has access to a wide variety of information sources, to sources of interpretive analysis, to other organizations involved in crisis anticipation, and to those persons who must act in a crisis situation.

It should be emphasized that many organizations bear responsibility for the anticipation of crises. Information machinery application in this field will be concentrated on the systematic

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aspects of the problem, on maintaining inter-organizational liaison, and on the notification function in small sudden crises.

The second major information support function is the provision of a marshalling point for the vast quantities of operational and intelligence information which is required for OSD/OJCS support of crisis decision-making. It is to be expected that the Joint Staff would be the main user of these information support capabilities, but there are other important users. The facility must accommodate the crisis support requirements of OSD as well as the Joint Staff. It should be a departmental facility operated by the JCS for the Secretary of Defense in support of the Department of Defense as a whole. Specifically, in addition to the Joint Staff, the facility should support and service any group or individual involved in providing advisory staff support for presidential decision-making so long as:

- a. The user has been specifically designated by the Secretary of Defense.
- b. The user has need for rapid access to the data that flows through the facility.

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The information support facility has yet another function to perform; that of quick reaction support of the decision-maker in sudden crises. This function embraces the whole scope of the decision support process -- from notification to recommendation. It falls into the information support facility simply because it is continuously alert. In the event that a sudden crisis occurs outside office hours when the usual decision support staff is unavailable, the facility watch personnel would be called upon to prepare such analysis and advice as time would permit. In a sense they would serve as a military staff in direct support of the decision-maker until relieved.

#### Relevance

It should be noted before leaving DoD decision support that the effectiveness of support effort at all levels is heavily dependent upon its relevance to the problems faced by the President and the Presidential Group. The study group has found several examples of past crises in which supporting elements were not sufficiently aware of the progress of the deliberations of high level advisory groups or committees. The importance of a "feedback loop" must be realized by those who receive support if that support is to be effective.

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CHAPTER III

NMCS RELATIONSHIPS WITH CINCS AND SERVICE HEADQUARTERS

The CINCs and the NMCS

The interrelationship between the Unified and Specified Commands and the next higher echelon of command, i. e., the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is generally exercised through the medium of the NMCS. Exceptions might be budget or personnel matters, etc., which, although important in themselves, usually do not require the rapid communications or quick reaction times particularly inherent in operational problems. The NMCS, while still in an early stage of its development, currently does provide, by means of the NMCC and the alternates, together with supporting communications, the apparatus by which command of the armed forces of the nation can be exercised. It should be noted that these supporting communications do not constitute a separate system but that they utilize Defense Communication System facilities which are designed to be responsive to the NMCS requirements.

This command operation has many facets. It not only comprises the dissemination of policy and orders to commanders in the field but also includes the equally important inflow of information

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from the commanders of the fighting forces to the policy and decision makers at the national level. This information not only relates to such things as force status and the progress of operations, but also encompasses advice and proposed courses of action that appear appropriate to the CINC. Almost as important as the capability for a vertical flow of information is the means for a lateral flow between the CINCs when required. It might be argued that, the existence of these lateral flow mechanisms is an anomaly for both non-nuclear warfare and for the direction of nuclear attacks. On the other hand, the interdependence of nuclear strike operations and the short time available for coordination make some type of direct CINC-to-CINC coordination desirable. The lateral flow of information between CINCs during a crisis situation, while normally not as critically time-dependent as in a nuclear exchange situation, can be vitally important. It is easy to visualize, in a case of CINCSTRIKE operations in Africa or the Middle East, the essentiality of information relative to CINCLANT or CINCEUR resources which CINCSTRIKE might require in support.

Related to this problem of lateral information flow is that of the volume of information required under the present system. During

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severe crises and exercises, communications channels almost invariably become saturated, and messages of the highest precedence suffer long delays. In the event of actual hostilities, this situation would inevitably be aggravated particularly if some of the communications channels were destroyed or otherwise unavailable. This being the case, two alternatives suggest themselves. Either more and faster communications channels are necessary or a comprehensive review and simplification of reporting systems should be undertaken. In actuality, both avenues have been pursued; but additional effort in the field of reports reduction not only appears more productive but is less expensive. Reporting by aggregate, while it may well have undesirable features offers promise. Examples of this approach are a system of reporting by exception, or a system of reporting by percentages of scheduled strikes in any given time frame, or a system of reporting when all strikes scheduled to be launched by a given command are under way.

Another aspect of the overall command problem is the need for a secure voice conferencing capability between the national leaders and all of the CINCs. Dissemination of policy and direction and exchange of information and opinion in a rapid and uniform

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manner may be of crucial importance in a rapidly escalating situation. In addition to the means for rapid communications between the military echelons of command, it has been demonstrated in past crisis situations that the President may desire to obtain "on the spot" information direct from a CINC or even a lower level of command. While this may be viewed with alarm by some as contravening the traditional military chain of command, it is nevertheless a fact of life, and provision must be made in the NMCS for this type of communications. Since communications of this type can often lead to confusion and inconsistent commitment, their use should be limited and carefully controlled at the national authority level.

In order for there to be rapid response to orders to CINCs from the National Authorities and effective coordination and mutual support between commanders in the field, there must be a medium for exercising overall supervision and direction over field operations by authorities at the national level. This is not to say that the responsibilities of the CINCs should be preempted at the Washington level. It is to say that the CINCs can best be assisted to carry out their assigned responsibilities if military command at the Washington

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level can be made cognizant of the current situation in any CINC's area and the resource status of other CINCs who might be in a position to assist. In addition the CINCs must be informed of the other relevant intelligence, political and diplomatic factors.

The NMCC is the central point at which the foregoing information, insofar as the Department of Defense is concerned, is collected and collated. In considering the level of detail of the information handled here, it should be borne in mind that the NMCC will be basically used in two different modes. First, the NMCC must support the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their "exercise of strategic direction of the armed forces." Second, the NMCC must be able to accommodate the President; or his advisors' "detailed monitoring and control of some actions at low echelons" when such detailed control is deemed necessary or desirable (Terms of Reference). Such "actions" will be selected instances in which a threatened or actual international confrontation contains the risk of escalation or will affect or reflect U. S. policy to a significant degree. A facility which is adequate for the first mode may be wholly inadequate for the second, while one satisfactory to meet the requirements of the second mode may be too detailed and

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cumbersome for exercise of overall strategic direction. In view of the fact that the NMCC must at all times have the ability to allow the Secretary and the JCS to exercise strategic direction worldwide while at the same time exercising detailed monitoring over a specific situation, the facility requirements should be basically determined to meet the strategic direction requirement. At the same time, the facility must be designed to provide the capability for detailed monitoring and direction.

In summary, the NMCC supports a Washington level command function that will often focus in detail on some military situations but that will primarily depend on the CINCs and their staffs for operational direction and coordination of military activities.

The Service Headquarters and the NMCS

The Services actively support the National Military Command System (NMCS) both administratively and operationally. Administratively, Service functions include participation in NMCS policy formulation, technical and funding support, and personnel and training support. Operationally, the Services command centers serve as information sources to the command system (i.e., the NMCS) through which the

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President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff apply the resources of U. S. military Forces.

The Unified and Specified commands utilize forces organized, trained and equipped by the Military Departments and receive overall strategic direction through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each of these functions -- strategic direction and resource management -- is furthered by an information support facility. In the case of strategic direction this facility is the NMCC. For resource management in a Military Department it is the Service Command Center. In order that the operational and resource aspects of our military effort may be properly balanced and coordinated, it is necessary that there be liberal exchanges of information between the NMCC and the Service Command Centers.

Each of the Service command centers, i.e., Army War Room, Navy Flag Plot, Air Force Command Post, Marine Corps Command Center, performs an essential task for its respective head of Service and associated staff by maintaining a readily available source of accurate and up-to-date information on the detailed status and location of all forces and resources of his Service. This includes information

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in considerable depth regarding logistic and base support status, present and projected combat readiness, and relevant personnel data. The Service command centers provide the focal point at which are assembled and collated the vast amount of information required by the heads of Services to discharge their assigned responsibilities.

The Service command centers support the NMCC and the alternates directly and continuously. This support, although it is a collateral function, is nevertheless essential. It generally consists of maintaining large and detailed data bases which may be tapped by the NMCC. The existence of the Service command centers obviates an NMCC of much larger size, of considerably greater complexity and expense, with storage for a vast amount of detailed information. Means for transmittal of data (both query and response) are currently manual in the main. It may be, at some future time, that it will prove desirable to institute the means for computer-to-computer exchange of data between the Service war rooms and the NMCC. This should be carefully evaluated, because the great bulk of the data is not overly time-sensitive. Further, to be adequately responsive to the needs of the Service chiefs, their command centers must be as close as practicable to their normal place of business.

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In summary, the Service Command Centers not only perform a vital role for the Service chiefs in the discharge of their responsibilities, but also furnish essential support to the NMCS.

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## CHAPTER IV

### THE NMCC

This chapter considers the current NMCC; its relationship to the Joint Staff, OSD users and other executive agencies; and alternative organizational and operational concepts for its further development.

#### Patterns in Crisis Management

It was shown in Chapters I and II that there is a tendency at the highest national level to use informal arrangements for crisis management. This is particularly true for the decision-making process which precedes the actual or potential use of combat forces. It is not so true for the process of implementing military decisions; implementation is and must be handled through established organizations. The method of operation for decision-making at national level is characterized by improvisation, people-to-people contacts, and extensive use of trusted advisors. It is the method used to focus effort on a particular crisis since formal arrangements for handling specific crises do not exist ahead of time (with a few exceptions, such as Cuba and Berlin that have a history of tension). In peacetime, most high level organizations are organized along functional lines rather than on a mission or task basis. When a

IV-1

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crisis occurs, there must be a means of concentrating and directing effort on the essential decisions that must be made. The informal process just referred to is the norm rather than the exception for doing this at the national level.

Within the military, there has been developed over a period of years a unique management arrangement for handling crises. The military makes extensive use of crisis "centers." While these "command posts," "operations centers," "flag plots," "war rooms," etc., come in various forms and sizes, they do have certain common attributes. They are tailored to fast response and provide much of the quick reaction support needed by the commander and his staff during fast-moving situations. They have extensive communications and other equipment for assembling and processing data. They are the means through which decision-makers give orders to subordinate units. They are the means through which commanders obtain much of the information needed for their own purposes and by higher echelons. These centers are continuously manned with highly trained professional staffs that can anticipate crises and alert decision-makers to serious events that take place. Prior to a crisis the centers assemble and evaluate information so that they can be prepared for a crisis when it unfolds. During the crisis, they provide an

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operations area for the augmented and changing staff that is tailored to the particular crisis.

In some ways, the current NMCC is such a crisis center, the one which operates at the highest level in the military hierarchy. Furthermore, the NMCC is uniquely different from the "operations center" prevalent in many other military organizations: In some ways its role and scope are broader; in other ways, narrower.

The role of the NMCC is broader in that it not only supports the Secretary of Defense and the JCS but also the President and his advisors. As a consequence, it must be responsive to all of the established institutions which are above it in the chain of command as well as to any improvised management structure that may be created during crises at the national or the Secretary of Defense level. As the highest level military "center" it performs its functions with respect to the resources of all of the Services and all of the Unified and Specified Commands. Because of the level at which it functions, it has a far greater need for reflecting world-wide political, economic and diplomatic factors that may be relevant to its properly supporting its many users.

The role of the NMCC is narrower than the normal "operations center" in that the NMCC is limited to: Alerting functions, information

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support to decision-makers and their advisory staffs, and support to decision authorities in implementing decisions. In supporting higher authorities preparatory to their making decisions, it is more like an information service than is true of typical operations centers. The NMCC provides information, routine evaluation of data, and warning; although it does not normally provide substantive analysis, evaluation and advice on broad issues, its emergency alerting function may include analysis and recommendation during a sudden unexpected situation. When the NMCC supports the implementation of decisions, the primary functions of the NMCC is to transmit and monitor JCS and SECDEF orders to the CINCs.

The substantive advisory staff support that is needed by the SECDEF and the JCS to analyze and develop alternative courses of action is not part of the NMCC itself but uses the NMCC as a primary source of such information as force status and CINC contingency plans. As pointed out in Chapter I, the particular nature of a crisis determines the size and composition of the staff support that analyzes the situation, develops alternative courses of action, and evaluates the possible consequences of each course. For the JCS, this advisory staff support is drawn from the Joint Staff, DIA and others; for the SECDEF, it is drawn from the Joint Staff, OSD and the Services; for the Presidential Group it is drawn from all executive agencies.

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Finally, the senior decision-makers served by the NMCC have used the Center as a conference room and display facility much less than the military commander uses the normal military operations center. The nature of the deliberative and command process at the Washington level differs from that in the field. The location and composition of conferences is more fluid; there is relatively less need for considering rapidly posted situation and status data. Accordingly, the NMCC has provided most of its information to remote users by report, telephone call, briefing and message; lack of space has inhibited, when appropriate, use of situation and small conference rooms, the need for which is discussed later.

#### Manning, Organization and Functions of the NMCC Today

In the past two years the NMCC has achieved a significant improvement in capability. As recently as the Cuba missile crisis in the fall of 1962, the NMCC (then called the Joint War Room) was very modest in numbers of people, in facilities and in reputation. The crisis centers of the three military departments had far greater capability than the NMCC. As a result, much of the command of operational military forces was handled through the military departments rather than the JCS. In effect, the growth and transition of responsibilities of crisis centers had not yet caught up with the laws and directives which established the

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Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands and placed their control in the hands of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS.

Since Cuba, there have been many improvements in the NMCC to the point where it is now clearly recognized as an effective center for alerting the National Decision Authorities to militarily significant information and for expeditious handling of directives to the operational commanders. The Army War Room, the Navy Flag Plot and the Air Force Command Post are now recognized as centers which deal principally in supporting functions such as logistics and readiness. On a day-to-day basis and during crises, they support the NMCC in operational matters.

#### Functions of the Current NMCC

The specific functions of the current NMCC are as follows:

1. Communicate. In order to conduct its business, the NMCC is a communication hub for many subscribers, including SECDEF and the JCS, the Unified and Specified Commands, the Services, and other Washington agencies. It communicates by voice and teletype, using secure and nonsecure facilities; it can establish conference networks with key leaders on short notice. In providing this communication

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network, the NMCC serves key decision-makers in their communications with operational military forces.

2. Acquire information. The NMCC requires information including routine reports on the status of U. S. and friendly forces, intelligence concerning forces of countries potentially hostile to the U. S., State Department information--in short, all information relevant to the potential use of U. S. forces in support of U. S. foreign policy. To illustrate, a Command/Area Desk officer examines messages and reports which deal with his particular area, where these reports include pertinent CIA and State Department traffic. He keeps in his files approved war plans, and a briefing kit on each one. He keeps tab on the location and activity of all forces in his area. He maintains a variety of check lists which describe actions to be taken during emergencies. He prepares maps, charts, and other displays on operational situations of particular interest. Intelligence information of all types received in the NMCC is routed to him whenever it concerns his area. Each Area Desk officer is, in effect, an area expert; his desk is the repository of a sizable body of ready reference information.

3. Consolidate and evaluate information. Putting together all information received and continuously monitoring, evaluating and

IV-7

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analyzing this information are the responsibilities of the entire Operations Team. This consolidation and evaluation process is getting larger and more complex every day. As the size of one information file increases, the evaluation of each new piece of information takes just that much more time and effort. Daily experience is teaching where the shortcuts lie, how to combine bits of information, how best to store and retrieve and analyze these information bits, and what other agencies to query in case the NMCC is depending on them as a primary source.

4. Disseminate information. A very great variety of persons must be informed about significant information and activities. A procedure used in connection with this requirement is to maintain a check list of individuals and agencies to be notified when various events occur. Other agencies such as the White House, the Secretary of Defense, the Services, the CINCs, and the State Department are also notified. Usually, in emergencies, two notifications are made to each agency--one to the duty officer, who notifies others within his department, and another to a high level official.

5. Display information. Effective and timely display of information greatly reduces the time required to bring personnel up

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to date on rapidly changing situations. With experience and coordination between the area desk and display personnel, much of the vital information can be pre-formatted and thus further reduce the time between receipt and use of information. Some displays are already automated and, as experience is gained, many more will be. These range from displays of sensor system inputs to immediate display of computer-analyzed data.

6. Alert. Certain situations such as DEFCON changes have prescribed procedures for alerting decision-makers and advisors. In other unpredicted situations, no procedures exist, and considerable judgment is required. An assessment must be made as to the severity of the situation and, accordingly, which decision-maker should be informed. This is particularly difficult during nonduty hours when key people are not at their offices. One of the procedures in the alerting process is the "emergency conference," which ties a number of key people together (either on a communications circuit or in a conference room) to brief them on the situation and to obtain their decisions. There are check lists of action items that the conferees should address. The procedure is for the general/flag officer on duty in the NMCC to manage the conference and present to the conferees those items that he believes are relevant to the emergency.

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7. Act. The NMCC has certain actions for which it temporarily assumes the responsibility in a crisis where decision authorities are not available. The level of urgency of a situation for which it will assume the responsibility can vary, depending upon whether the crisis occurs during the day or during the night, whether it is an anticipated event, or whether it is unexpected. In acting upon these responsibilities, the NMCC does "action planning": It alerts, issues orders to the operational forces, and keeps all people informed who are concerned with the crisis.

8. Maintain contingency plans. Contingency plans are prepared by the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands, together with the Joint Staff. The NMCC maintains files of the contingency plans and updates them when new information is obtained, so that it can assist decision-makers in deciding how applicable they are and where they need to be adapted for a particular crisis.

9. Monitor situations and anticipate crises. The NMCC maintains a continuous 24-hour watch, observing and assessing events as they transpire around the world. It initiates inquiries for additional information and focuses attention on problems that seem to be acute. It maintains a chronological log of events for reference and record

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purposes. It keeps the alternates informed of the events that take place so that they can handle situations if the occasion requires that this be done. There are a number of centers other than the NMCC which also perform a watch function, including those of the military Services, the Secretary of State, and the White House.

10. Transmit implementing directives and orders. For the most part, these are orders that have been given to the NMCC by higher level decision-makers. Nevertheless, there are lower tier messages that must be prepared by the NMCC itself and then dispatched to the military organizations concerned.

#### Emergency Functions of the NMCC

It was stated earlier that the NMCC was basically "more like an information service" and that its functions did not include command actions and advisory staff support for analyzing, developing and evaluating courses of action. An analysis of the above functions of the current NMCC indicates that this statement was somewhat of an oversimplification.

The fundamental responsibility of the NMCC is to perform a service function. Typical of the services performed are the 24-hour watch, the alerting of DoD officials during critical events, the maintaining and distribution of status information, etc. However, because the NMCC

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operates continuously, because it has a highly developed data base, and most important, because it has highly trained professional officers on continuous duty, the NMCC also has been assigned an "emergency" function. It is this emergency function that overlaps into advisory staff actions and command actions. The emergency function comes into play when the time available for decision-making is insufficient for referral to the normal decision group.

The emergency function is general in nature and can be used whenever the interests of the U. S. are jeopardized. It is called into play at the discretion of the NMCC Deputy Director of Operations (DDO). It is for this reason that the DDO must be a high ranking officer of great experience and mature judgment. He must determine, for example, when an event is important enough to call the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the JCS--or to judge when he should act himself.

It is significant that, whenever the emergency function is used, the NMCC is temporarily acting for someone else who has the inherent responsibility for that act. (There are some exceptions to this rule, as in those cases where the NMCC has been delegated certain specific responsibilities which are specified in the Emergency Action Procedures.) Accordingly, it is important that the NMCC return control of the action

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to the responsible office as soon as possible. In effect, the NMCC in its emergency function is an expediter. It exercises control by exception. It temporarily borrows the responsibility and authority of someone else because of certain unique conditions such as limited time.

In summary, the large majority of the work of the NMCC falls in the "service" category. The "emergency" functions, while important, are used far less frequently. An important corollary to this is that the service functions lend themselves to regularization and the use of pre-arranged procedures, specialized equipment, etc. --the staff and command functions far less so. This is the basic reason why the NMCC has become (and must be) a rather complex combination of people, equipment, and procedures.

Present Normal Manning of the NMCC

The NMCC is manned around the clock by one of five Operations Teams. Each of the five teams is organized with one of the Deputy Directors for Operations (NMCC) on duty representing the Director of the NMCS. The principal assistant for the general/flag duty officers in the NMCC is the Operations Team Chief, a colonel/captain who directly

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supervises the detailed activity of all elements of the Operations

Team. Each Operations Team consists of:

- a. A Situation Element of five Command Area Desks, each of which is responsible for a given geographic area of the world, and for the corresponding Unified or Specified Commands. When assistance is needed, it is provided from the appropriate division in the Operations Directorate (J-3) of the Joint Staff.
- b. A Reconnaissance Element with an officer and NCO on duty in the Joint Reconnaissance Center.
- c. A Moscow Communications Link Element which has an officer-translator and two teletype operators continuously manning the primary Washington terminal of the link.
- d. An Emergency Actions Element with two officers and two enlisted men trained to react to any type emergency and take all actions necessary to cause the whole command system to react and bring all the elements into play.

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- e. Other agencies of the government who furnish liaison officers to the NMCC. The intelligence community is represented around the clock by officers from DIA and CIA. The NSA provides liaison support during daytime hours. These officers have access to all operational and intelligence data on hand in the Command Center and expedite the exchange of information between the NMCC and the intelligence community. The Department of State furnishes an around-the-clock representative who serves as a link between the NMCC and the State Department Operations Center. The Defense Atomic Support Agency is represented by a watch team which operates in the Nuclear Warfare Status Center.

### Augmentation of the NMCC Staff

In a crisis, the NMCC staff may need to be considerably augmented with the size and composition depending upon the nature of the crisis. The majority of augmentation comes from Directorates of the Joint Staff. It is important to recognize that augmentation in a crisis is not for the purpose of assuming new duties in the NMCC. Rather it is

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for handling the added workload in assigned functions that comes about during tension and crisis.

In order that there not be any discontinuity or disruption of the normal procedures of conducting business when the world situation changes from one of the normal conditions to one of crisis, the Director of the NMCC and his staff control and supervise the activities of the NMCC in essentially the same way under all conditions. This rule would be followed if there were major augmentation of the NMCC staff during a crisis. It means that added personnel (except liaison categories) work for and are fully responsive to the operating head of the NMCC, irrespective of their normal assignments.

#### Relationship Between the Joint Staff and the NMCC

In this section, we consider the relationship between the Joint Staff and the NMCC during day-to-day operations and during crises. In both of these cases, the NMCC and the Joint Staff are mutually supporting organizations.

During day-to-day operations, the Joint Staff, in its role of supporting the JCS, prepares much of the information and many of the procedures that are reflected in the NMCC mission and data base during

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crises. For example, the J-5 and the J-3 play key roles in preparing guidance for the contingency plans of the Unified and Specified Commands and in reviewing these plans after they are prepared. After these plans are approved, they are added to the NMCC data base and procedures are developed by the NMCC whereby these plans can be quickly retrieved, displayed, analyzed for interactions, and evaluated for adequacy when a related contingency arises. This particular capability of the NMCC has only been under development for about a year. As it becomes more refined, it may prove very useful to the Joint Staff during the day-to-day review and preparation of contingency plans. Other examples of Joint Staff products that must be reflected in the NMCC are: Procedures for use of world-wide communication capabilities; plans for world-wide exercises; logistics resources and capabilities of the U. S. and allies; enemy and neutral order of battle; and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP).

The J-3 has a particularly significant role in supporting the NMCC. It is responsible for developing plans and procedures for supporting the SECDEF and the JCS during times of crisis. These include: Emergency actions procedures, procedures for convening and managing conferences, relocation plans, code-word lists,

IV-17

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operational reporting procedures for the CINCs and the Service Command Posts, and rules of engagement. All of the above activities are required to place the NMCC in a posture whereby it can play its day-to-day and crisis roles.

During a crisis, the NMCC becomes more of a focal point and information flows from it to the Joint Staff as the crisis develops, as forces are deployed or engaged, as intelligence and operational information flows into the Center, as the command authorities establish policy and select actions.

If the crisis moves very rapidly, then the advisory role of the Joint Staff may be relatively small and the command authorities receive most of their support from the NMCC and the CINCs. At most, only minor augmentation of the NMCC is required.

If the crisis were prolonged, if extensive military operations were contemplated or undertaken, if replanning and reinforcement of the CINCs were necessary, then the Joint Staff advisory role would become much larger and it would depend on the NMCC for large volumes of information on force status and plans. In order for the NMCC to perform its assigned role under these conditions of urgency and volume, the NMCC would require significant augmentation from the Joint Staff.

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Since the NMCC has been in existence, there has not been a prolonged crisis with military engagement and several phases of escalation. It is essential to keep in mind that the NMCC would be most vital and most taxed in such real situations; and that any planning in developing its role, organization and resources considers this contingency with as much weight as the day-to-day "garden variety" type of crisis that the NMCC has already faced many times.

#### Relationship Between Intelligence and the NMCC

The NMCS needs timely and effective intelligence initially to trigger necessary actions and subsequently to assist its functions in support of crisis management. The DIA is responsible for providing the intelligence required by the NMCC. To carry out this responsibility, DIA continuously surveys incoming intelligence from all sources and locations in order to have an up-to-the-minute picture of events and to be capable of discerning the events that are significant.

The intelligence surveillance of the world situation on a 24-hour basis in support of all DoD elements is performed in DIA's Intelligence Support and Indications Center (ISIC). This Center is under the Assistant Director for Processing, who also controls the DIA Production Center. The constant watch for subjects of interest to the NMCC is

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accomplished by a DIA representative in the NMCC, who provides a point of contact with all of DIA.

The specific intelligence functions in support of the NMCC include:

- a. Inform decision-makers, operators and planners of impending situations which might require important decisions.
- b. Provide follow-up reporting in detail on the potential crisis situation.
- c. Assemble and arrange for the ready presentation of background material pertinent to the crisis situation.
- d. Provide timely responses to queries.
- e. Supply information to the NMCC data base.

The broad intelligence base, from which much of the intelligence support for NMCC and the Joint Staff is derived, emanates from the DIA Production Center; from Scientific and Technical Intelligence; and from Mapping, Charting and Geodesy. This material may be

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distributed immediately in the form of intelligence studies, but usually it is stored, both as a backdrop for evaluating current intelligence inputs as they arrive, or as a means of fulfilling future requirements as they arise.

The ISIC provides the NMCC with current intelligence and with indications of the imminence of hostilities or potential crisis situations. As an integral part of the substantive intelligence-producing machinery of DIA, the ISIC analyzes and reports current development, assembles and stores background data produced by other elements of DIA, and provides the main interface between the NMCC and DIA. Although the NMCC and ISIC are separate centers under different management, their physical collocation and extensive interconnection should allow the development of continuously more responsive support of the NMCC by the DIA.

#### NMCC Support for OSD

The bulk of NMCC activities are related to support of the JCS. Nevertheless, since the NMCC is the command center of the Secretary of Defense, it follows that its frame of reference must be departmental in scope-broader than solely military. The Secretary of Defense has extensive responsibilities in the fields of resource management, civil defense, etc., which are not strictly military in character but which have

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definite application to DoD crisis management or to DoD support to the President during crises. The offices and agencies concerned with many of these functions have either a direct contribution to make to the NMCC during a crisis or they have a need for information from it in order to be able to provide timely support to the Secretary when called upon.

For example, the Civil Defense apparatus is both a user of the NMCC and a contributor to it. In the former capacity it depends on the NMCC for the DEFCON information which will put its machinery in motion. Once a severe crisis is underway, the Civil Defense organization supplies the NMCC with current information regarding the Civil Defense situations that are facing decision-makers and the actions that have been or will be implemented.

Similarly, in OSD several offices have important interests in the NMCC both as an information source and as one place where they can introduce their contributions to crisis management. These offices need to be made aware of the facts of a developing crisis. Whatever warning the NMCC can give concerning impending trouble permits OSD to be that much better prepared for emergency procurement, logistics support, legislation, etc. Within OSD, OASD/ISA probably has the most continuous need for close cooperation with the NMCC. In the future as it has in the past, ISA is certain to be deeply involved in the development of DoD support

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for presidential decision-making. Hence, during crises it has a minute-by-minute requirement for the latest facts and analysis which the NMCC can provide.

OASD/PA needs NMCC support concerning events for which a news release will be required. Alerted to the facts and given a short period to prepare a position, Public Affairs can prevent erroneous inferences from being drawn from events by the press media.

The general nature of the relationship of OSD to the NMCC is one of liaison rather than participation. In normal times there is not a requirement for continuous OSD presence in the NMCC. In a crisis certain offices such as PA and ISA will probably need such presence as will Civil Defense. However, if crisis support of DoD is to be effective, it is imperative that open channels of information be maintained through a series of designated NMCC contact points in OSD and free access for appropriate OSD personnel to the NMCC. These will promote mutual OSD-NMCC support and hence contribute to over-all DoD effectiveness.

Of corollary importance is the OSD responsibility for cooperation and support of the NMCC. OSD is a contributor to the NMCC as well as a user of its services. OSD must be ready to make that contribution whenever and within whatever time frame it is needed.

IV-23

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When a crisis promises to be severe, the President or the Secretary of Defense may assemble an ad hoc committee or task force to support him. Such an arrangement offers a decision-maker important attractions. First, it permits him to select as its chairman someone whose maturity, competence, and judgment he has confidence in. Second, it permits him to tailor the task force to fit the type of crisis he faces or expects. He can see that the group includes expertise in the problem areas which are at hand, and thus assemble a truly mission-oriented task force.

Such ad hoc groups have been used repeatedly in the management of recent crises, and there is little doubt that they will be employed in the future. Close cooperation with and support of such committees must be an important function of the NMCC. Not only must the NMCC provide the information support needed by such a group, but also it should be ready to furnish an appropriate situation room within its own facility for committee use.

It should be noted here that, in the past, the NMCC has often had to function without requisite knowledge concerning the stage of the deliberations of advisory groups or committees. Wherever possible such groups should endeavor to keep the NMCC informed as to what problems are being addressed. Without such a "feedback loop" the NMCC will not achieve its full support potential.

IV-24  
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The Relationship of the NMCC to Other Agencies

In the same way that the NMCC supports the SECDEF and the JCS, other command authorities have their own analogous centers including the White House Situation Room; the State Department Operations Center; the CIA Operations Center; the Service Headquarters Centers; and the CINC Operation Centers. Parallel to the organizational lines that relate these senior decision-makers, is the "communication and information network" that supports them. In general, each of the supporting centers exchange information with other centers that may be at the same echelon of command, or higher or lower. In some cases, liaison personnel have been exchanged to facilitate information exchange.

The preferred route when an official in one agency wishes to obtain information from another agency is to depend on the "communication and information network." For example, when the NMCC exchanges information with the Executive Office of the President, it normally uses its direct links with the White House Situation Room. Similarly if a subordinate official in the Department of State communicates with the NMCC, he normally makes a request known to the State Department Operations Center which in turn makes the inquiry to the NMCC. In this case, the State Department Center is responsible for insuring that the individual eventually receiving the information has the proper security clearances and "need to know."

IV-25

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While the procedures just described are the preferred routes (and the routes that most actions take), there are occasional informal actions that by-pass the "authority network". For example, the President or a member of his staff may contact the NMCC directly; or a member of the staff of the Secretary of Defense may contact the State Department Operations Center. In some such cases, it is important that procedures be established for insuring that essential information concerning the actions taken or decisions reached is appropriately available to all affected principals and all affected centers. The development of such procedures is the responsibility both of the authorities and their staffs and of the directors of the centers.

Similarly, there are many informal contacts between lower level officials in different organizations and information exchanged during these contacts would be of great value if more broadly disseminated. Here again, it is incumbent upon these people to make sure that the relevant information is introduced into the "communications and information network."

#### Operational Concepts for Future Development of the NMCC

The above discussion describes the operational concepts and organizational relationships that have guided the development and operation of the current NMCC. As pointed out earlier, the NMCC has been

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significantly strengthened since its establishment two years ago and it has been tested by many minor real crises and by one major simulated exercise. Unfortunately, for this exercise, it was necessary to simulate the play of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, other principal advisors, and, for the most part, the participation of staffs other than the Joint Staff. Accordingly, the exercise could only indirectly illuminate one of the most important functions of the NMCC: That of supporting the SECDEF and the JCS during an extended crisis involving major political decisions, military commitments, and rapid escalation.

This study considers that the current concepts and relationships as discussed above are appropriate. In succeeding sections, the Study recommends that additional emphasis be placed on certain concepts and capabilities related to improving the evolution of the NMCC.

Before discussing these, it is appropriate to make a brief reference to the organizational principles of the NMCC. During the course of the study, many opinions concerning possible changes in relationships were encountered. Any modification of current organization arrangements would require a detailed study by the JCS of possible relationships. If a modification is considered, the Study Group recommends that it reflect the following:

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- a. The organizational position and responsibilities of the NMCC should be precisely defined and widely promulgated in order to avoid confusion concerning what services the NMCC does and does not provide.
- b. Any contemplated change of the organizational position of the NMCC should recognize and guarantee the direct support provided by the NMCC to users other than the JCS and the Joint Staff. These other users include senior officials in DoD, staff members in OSD, and interagency groups that might be established in anticipation of or during a crisis.
- c. There is a need for a continuous and improved definition of working relationships between the NMCC and its various users. These working relationships should consider: The means and purposes of augmenting the NMCC during crises, the way in which users can obtain NMCC information support, the development of priority mechanisms when the NMCC threatens to be over subscribed, and means for insuring that all operational orders that originate in Washington to military forces in the field are known within the NMCC.

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Operational Implications for the Development of the NMCC

The concepts that have been advanced in this study could, if followed, have a significant effect on the future development of the NMCC. The case has been presented of an NMCC which is primarily a service organization that provides information and communications support. Other than routine analysis of data or exercising of its emergency prerogatives, the NMCC does not have the advisory staff functions of evaluating a situation and advising courses of action. It is not the seat where command is normally exercised. On occasion, decision authorities do convene in the NMCC for making decisions, but the more normal case is for information to be brought to the offices where these decision authorities regularly work.

The plans for the First Generation NMCC seem to be based on the assumption that the NMCC has a somewhat broader role (than is indicated in this study) and that it should provide not only information support, but advisory support as well. During crises, the First Generation NMCC was expected to be the hub for the national military decision-making process. Arrangements were planned to provide conferencing and office space for decision authorities, supporting staffs and liaison staffs, and they would conduct most of their crisis business in the center. In view of the more limited role that has been described

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in this study for the NMCC, it would seem appropriate to review the plans for the First Generation NMCC to see if the need for such extensive facilities is still valid.

Another factor that argues in favor of reappraising the need for a First Generation NMCC is that the single most important lesson learned in the past two years in developing aids for high level command has been the need to have these aids developed in an evolutionary manner. It just is not possible to plan for a major increase in capability for a time period several years off and have any assurance that the jobs will be the same and that the facility will be useful (let alone have an improved capability) in the later time period that the capabilities become operational. The predominant way in which high level command centers should grow is by continual introduction of small and medium-sized improvements that are suggested by the operators and users of the system, and by the evaluation of exercises and actual crisis performance. As new tools and techniques are brought into being through research and development, they can be installed for operational experimentation in the center. If they prove to be useful, they can be retained; if they are not useful, they can be discarded. The arguments of this and the preceding paragraph indicate the advisability of having the interim NMCC grow through this evolutionary process. This approach seems more desirable and would

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probably increase the capability of the center at a faster pace. At the same time, it would preclude the inevitable disruption to operations in the physical move from an old center to a new one.

### Physical Arrangements

Although it is desirable, on occasion, that decision-makers come and use the NMCC, means should be investigated whereby the capabilities of the NMCC can be brought to them. Better arrangements are needed to provide information and to answer queries on short notice under the following circumstances: When the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS are meeting with the NSC or national ad hoc groups; when these or other key officials are meeting with the President; when the JCS are in session in the Gold Room; and when the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, or others desire information in their offices. These objectives can be partially achieved by realization on the part of the NMCC staff that its value does not primarily depend upon the physical location within the NMCC of senior decision-makers. (For example, this realization would change the conduct of exercises and the emphasis placed on certain display techniques.) Beyond this, technical means of bringing information from the NMCC to the user (and from the user to the NMCC) should be further investigated; these could include closed circuit television, secure hot-lines between offices, query and input stations at remote locations

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(including the centers of other agencies). Also, organizational means should be investigated. The interchange with State, CIA, and NSA represents an invaluable step forward. It might be profitable to extend this type of arrangement and place NMCC representatives at the White House or on the staff of the Secretary of Defense. These individuals would be familiar with the capabilities of the NMCC and have rapid access to these capabilities. Finally, the NMCC should inform a broad audience on its capabilities and resources.

The simple matter of how office space is arranged--the number and size of conference rooms, the location of offices, and the functions that are performed in them--can have a profound effect on the usefulness of command centers in general and the NMCC in particular. Experience in past crises sheds some light on this subject and several guidelines can be stated: Key decisions tend to be made by small groups and not by large gatherings of people in a conference room. It is often profitable for a number of small discussions to be taking place at the same time, sometimes working on the same problem, and sometimes on different but related problems. In order to accommodate this type of operation, several changes might be desirable in the NMCC. First, when augmentation occurs during a crisis, it would probably be unwise to assemble many more people in the Current Actions Center (CAC) than is normal. Instead, it would be more

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desirable to establish small satellite groups that would then work as an entity and not as many different individuals in contacting the CAC. These groups should have available to them a number of conference rooms of varying sizes. Each should be well equipped to receive and display information from the CAC or the Emergency Actions Center (EAC). Another important point with respect to conference rooms concerns privacy and security. Top level decision-makers are hesitant to make decisions and form judgments in a room where they do not have privacy and where many officers and workers may be milling around doing a various assortment of jobs. There should be procedures which enable them to obtain privacy quickly and with the positive assurance that they do in fact have privacy. It would also be worthwhile to think in terms of an auditorium in which many people could be assembled at one time for briefing purposes.

#### Evaluation

On a routine basis and after crises, the NMCC should prepare and issue Operations Evaluation Reports which compare the actual performance to these measures and to the NMCC performance during exercises. It is essential that these reports be appropriately distributed to users, planners, and developers associated with the NMCC. These reports should not be confined to the many minor incidents and shortcomings

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that are inevitably discovered. Although such experiences and associated remedial measures are an essential part of the NMCC evolution, the reports must also consider gross performance capabilities so that senior decision-makers can better understand the role, the progress and the deficiencies that must be corrected.

After every incident, crisis, and major exercise, there should be a deliberate attempt to assess the activities that took place and prepare a list of "lessons learned." These lessons should be diligently recorded and periodically reviewed. In this way the NMCC will continue to grow in capability and overcome any tendency to make the same mistake several times because of personnel turnover.

The Study Group particularly stresses the important role of Summary Operation Evaluation Reports for senior officers and civilians concerned with planning, approving changes, and using the NMCC. Such reports would summarize the actual performance of the center during crises and exercises as compared with the gross performance measures discussed above. Study of these reports by senior individuals in DoD could uniquely contribute to their understanding the current performance and goals of the NMCC, and the remedial measures that are proposed. Since these reports would cover simulated severe crises, they would be

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equally relevant regarding situations the NMCC has never faced. As such, reading and discussing them could provide an indispensable foundation to better appreciation by senior individuals of more "static" system descriptions, functional requirements and proposed programs of improvements.

### Exercising

Although much can be learned from actual experiences in the NMCC, exercising of the system under simulated conditions and evaluation of these exercises is essential. The NMCC must grow and change and, therefore, its earlier experiences increasingly become less relevant. Also, there are many significant types of crises which the NMCC has never faced.

An exercise of a command center can be characterized by many variables:

- a. Type of crisis -- Does the exercise focus on a minor crisis, a severe crisis, on SIOP exchanges, on reconstitution, or on all phases?
- b. Timing -- Does the exercise proceed with realistic timing or is "exercise" time faster or slower than "real" time?

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- c. Functions exercised -- Does the exercise focus on particular functions such as logistics or intelligence, or on particular capabilities such as communications or data processing?
- d. Decision-maker's role -- Who plays the role of the actual decision-makers: The decision-makers themselves, senior members of their staffs, senior individuals of the center being exercised, or exercise control?
- e. Freedom of play -- Do decisions early in the exercise have a significant effect on later play such as terminating the exercise early (in this case, opponents must be played); or is the progress of the exercise "forced" by a scenario?
- f. Subordinate command participation -- How far down in the command echelon do other headquarters participate? For example, all subordinate levels can be simulated.

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- g. Cooperation by coordinate agencies -- What participation is there from OEP, State, CIA and White House staffs and centers?
- h. Realism -- Are certain capabilities such as communications or survivability treated unrealistically in order to achieve the purposes of the exercise?
- i. Frequency -- How often must a particular type of exercise be conducted in order to be useful?
- j. Purpose -- Is the exercise intended for training, operational evaluation, testing of procedures, exploration, informing, or commander feedback?

In designing any exercise and in evaluating its results, each of these characteristics must be considered. There are difficult and inter-related choices involving many tradeoffs. For example, consider the relationship between war gaming and world-wide exercises. In contrast with a real crisis, a war game is a multi-sided exercise directed by smaller groups than would normally be involved, played at a much faster tempo, and with the decision groups supported by smaller staffs and

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confronted with much less data on the developing situation. On the other hand, world-wide exercises of the NMCS are in some ways much more realistic than war games: Their slower tempo, their larger staff support (including participation by the CINCs), their higher communications traffic, and the standard procedures utilized conform much more closely with the case of real crises. The shortcomings of these world-wide exercises stem from their ambitious scope:

- a. They cannot be conducted frequently and so they cannot be used to test different procedures in the face of many different types of situations;
- b. In order to achieve proper training value from the few exercises that are conducted, some artificialities must be introduced, such as increasing the number of participants and not degrading communications realistically;
- c. It is virtually impossible to secure extended (and therefore realistic) participation from principals within DoD and from principals and their staffs in other agencies;

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- d. It is difficult to introduce sudden developments or free play during the exercise that would result from interactions among several nations.

Over the past two years, exercise capabilities of the NMCC (and the NMCS) have grown continuously. In addition to the world-wide exercises conducted once or twice a year, dozens of exercises have been developed for training and operational evaluation. In order that the NMCC may continue to evolve and be evaluated, the Study Group recommends that the exercising function must be assigned more personnel, space, data processing support and, most important, emphasis. At least three goals should be followed in expanding the exercise function:

- a. More extensive and frequent participation by top-level decision-makers;
- b. More extensive participation by using staffs (that is, separate from participation of decision-makers and in addition to participation by the NMCC operating staff); and
- c. Closer integration of NMCC exercising with the war games conducted by the Joint War Games Agency.

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In order to achieve the first two goals, a family of exercises will be needed that can not have the scope of participation of world-wide exercises, that focus on particular functions and capabilities, and that are run faster than real time.

In order to get participation by top level leaders, exercises must be realistic and interesting. High level officials are not going to participate frequently if the exercises just check facilities and not the performance of people and the total system. Furthermore, the exercises should be designed in a manner which considers the motivations and concerns of high level people. For example, a high level official might not want to become involved in an exercise in which he is performing before many people when he is not completely familiar with the environment or what his role is. He might not want to seem unprepared or feel committed as a result of impromptu action and, therefore, might refuse to participate. One solution that has been suggested is to use stand-ins for these key leaders and let the key leaders watch and observe how these stand-ins behave. Then later, when the principals become more familiar with the actions that take place, they may want to assume their own roles.

Finally, the Study Group has been impressed with the extent to which the Joint War Games Agency has managed to attract the participation

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of many highly placed individuals both within and outside the Department of Defense. Many of these individuals should be cognizant of the capabilities of the NMCC. Conversely, the needs and concerns of these individuals during war games can shed some light on the types of NMCC capabilities that would be necessary during crises similar to those being gamed. Accordingly, consideration should be given to a much closer integration of the staffs and facilities supporting war gaming and supporting the NMCC. Considerable duplication in scenario generation, information support and know-how could probably be eliminated and yet both functions could be enhanced.

IV-41

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CHAPTER V

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CHAPTER V

PRESIDENTIAL NEEDS DURING INTENSE CRISES AND GENERAL WAR

One of the most important responsibilities of the President or his successor concerns his basic and unique authority to release the use of nuclear weapons. A second important responsibility, if the strategy of selective commitment and controlled response during a general war is to be realized, concerns Presidential selection of an initial strategic option, the conduct of negotiations with enemies and allies, additional commitment of U. S. strategic forces if the negotiations fail or are impossible, the establishment of terms for cessation of hostilities if negotiations prove fruitful, and judgement as to whether these terms are being observed.

Without question, there are some conceivable situations where the President cannot be protected. The most obvious is a Soviet strike against the President's location where the absence of warning or the problem of accessibility has prevented relocation to a survivable location. Another case is a successful Soviet attack on the President located in a protected alternate.

If the President is lost, there are two basic approaches to

V-1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

insuring continuity of command. The first is to provide procedures and protection for a duly designated successor to the President either in his broad role as President or in his narrower role as Commander-in-Chief. If this avenue fails, then there could be a final resort to doctrinal or predelegated response by the senior surviving military commanders of the nuclear strike forces.

This study has only considered protection and support of the President and his successors. It has not considered the possibility or form of doctrinal arrangements. One reason for this limitation has been assumption F. 2 in the Terms of Reference: "For the foreseeable future the President will not predelegate authority. . . ." The main objective of the study has been to delimit and define the command and control support to be provided by the Department of Defense to the President. As such, the goal for this support should be to provide the fullest reasonable protection for the President himself under various conditions of tension and conflict; and, if this protection fails, to provide protection and support for the legally designated presidential successors, or for successors designated by the President to assume his role of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

Survival of the President himself has the very highest priority.

V-2

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Survival of a successor is a poor second choice but important. There is no useful cost-effectiveness trade-off that indicates how much less protection should be provided the President if it is cheaper to protect a successor. Even more, whether or not doctrinal arrangements have been established, their possibility should in no way detract from the efforts to protect duly constituted national command.

The need for the President as an individual or an office has already been stated in Chapter I so the discussion will be limited to problems relating to his survivability and his support. If the President (or his successor) is to exercise control of the national military and diplomatic effort, he must have immediately available the best information and advice possible and he must have the communications necessary to insure implementation of his decisions. When considering the environment of widespread nuclear exchanges, this becomes a difficult achievement.

Presidential survival arrangements must be designed to withstand an attack and to provide continuous command and control of all military forces and civil government of the nation during and after such a violent upheaval. Provisions must also be made to provide for

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

the survivability of the political and military advisors that the President will require for advice and recommendations concerning the courses of action we should pursue to attain national objectives. There is also an important requirement for survivable staff support and communications: (a) to alert responsible officials to the situation, (b) to assess the attack for the President to permit him to select appropriate responses, (c) to implement the commands of the President including the direction of military forces, and (d) to provide for communications with heads-of-state -- allied, enemy and possibly neutrals.

The Need for Protection Short of General War

Experience has shown that the President is reluctant to leave the Washington area. This is understandable when it is considered that Washington provides the machinery for government, the maximum advice and assistance from agencies and government leaders, and the hub of an intricate and efficient world-wide communications network. In addition, there is a possibility that presidential relocation during an emergency would precipitate panic among the people and uncertainty in the minds of our allies and adversaries as to our intent. On the other hand, our nation has never faced a situation where the use of strategic strikes by one or both sides had become a plausible step in

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

the escalation of a crisis. There is also the possibility the Presidential relocation to a survivable alternate would signal the severity of the crisis and would cause our enemies to reconsider their proposed actions, but would neither panic the people nor disrupt alliances.

The requirement that alternate command centers be equipped and manned to provide staff and communications support for Presidential management of a severe crisis stems from a lack of any degree of assurance that the President could rapidly reach a survivable facility when a situation escalated from the crisis phase to general war. There are two basic reasons why presidential survival should not depend on presidential movement after the onset of general war. First, the Soviets could easily deny tactical warning that Washington was to be struck. Second, even if tactical warning of an attack on the U. S. was received, it is not clear that the President would immediately choose to seek shelter, particularly if available survivable centers were not accessible in a matter of minutes. Both of these factors are discussed below.

First, tactical warning of an attack on Washington could probably be easily denied the U. S. by the Soviets (or, less likely, by some other

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

nuclear capable power). If the Soviets wanted to disorganize a U. S. retaliatory decision at the expense of precluding subsequent negotiation and termination, then they could launch a small but reliable precursor strike that would destroy soft U. S. national centers but that would not be detected by U. S. warning systems designed to detect large salvos. In such a first strike, they would strive to synchronize three events: destruction of the U. S. national command centers, initial detection by the U. S. of the much larger missile attack, and detection by the U. S. of other attacking delivery vehicles such as aircraft and submarine launched missiles. This tactic could be most easily used by the Soviets in escalating a severe international crisis when both U. S. and Soviet forces and command were highly alerted and strategic warning was difficult to achieve. Or it could be used during a period of seeming international relaxation, particularly, if the Soviets launched from their day-to-day posture. The availability of this Soviet tactic means that any serious attempt to protect a national command function against a deliberate Soviet attack should not depend on the availability of warning that the Soviets are attacking that function. For example, a mobile center in port or on strip alert provides only marginal protection of a national function.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

The second reason for not counting on presidential relocation after the onset of a general war is that the President might choose not to relocate immediately on the receipt of tactical warning. The actions of the President in this case could be highly dependent on the state of alert of national command at the time the tactical warning was received.

If there had been earlier indications of hostile Soviet activity, for example, if there had been a preliminary crisis, then considerable planning and preparation should have taken place prior to the tactical warning. Alternate decision groups might have been relocated to alternate centers and these centers might have been deployed in order to make them more survivable but less accessible to the President. Some of the mobile centers might have been deployed closer to Washington in order to reduce the time for presidential relocation. Provisions might have been made for the rapid relocation of a senior decision group (such as one including the Vice-President or the President himself). Threats or statements of intent might have been exchanged by the opposing heads of state where these diplomatic communications might add credence to the warning, or suggest the nature of the attack, or reveal the dissimulation of the exchanges. The President might

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

have developed recently refined understandings with his senior military commanders regarding predelegated authority.

Similarly, a variety of situations can be conceived for those cases where there had not been earlier strategic warning when the tactical warning was received. These stem from such questions as: Where are the President and his principal advisors? What is the situation at the CINCs and what communications are available? What is the nature of the warning? How well informed are the principals on the meaning of information they are given, on the decisions that face them, on the procedures that have been developed, and on the facilities that are available?

Although there are many possible situations depending on the amount of earlier strategic warning, two facts will loom large on the receipt of tactical warning. First, there will be no positive indication as to whether Washington is a sanctuary or a target. And, if it is a target, whether it will be struck momentarily, in minutes, or in hours. The time available for relocation, negotiation and retaliation decisions will be unknown. (Considering the nature of the presidential process and the novelty of the situations being discussed, it would be

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

optimistic to assume that any presidential decision whose need had been triggered by the warning would be forthcoming in a matter of minutes.)

Accordingly, it is not at all clear that the President's immediate response on the receipt of tactical warning would be to relocate. Considering the ambiguities regarding Washington's safety and the time available for decision, and considering the immediate and extreme pressures for presidential consideration of the situation, the President might choose to stay in Washington, to address decisions such as the initial U. S. response, and to arrange for the immediate relocation of an Alternate Decision Group.

As indicated above, there are a great many conceivable situations that could be present on the receipt of tactical warning. Regarding the decision whether or not to relocate, some important factors in considering relocation would relate to the nature of the alternates available:

- How long would it take for the President to reach an alternate?
- How long would it take for his principal advisors to

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

assemble there (compared with their assembling at his current location either by being physically present or by being connected by phone)?

- Would adequate supporting staff be available at the alternate?
- During the transition phase of relocation, how well could the President keep abreast of the situation? Specifically, what communications and what advisory staff support would be available?

One of the key factors bearing on the relocation decision would be the time required to reach an alternate. Realistic estimates of these times for each of the present alternates under the most favorable conditions are:

	<u>Presidential Group</u>	<u>Advisory Staff Support</u>
NEACP	15 minutes	45 minutes
ANMCC	1 hour	2 hours
NECPA	2 hours	6 hours

These time factors indicate that, if relocation is not accomplished during the escalation of a crisis, it may be unwise or impossible to

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

do so under limited warning conditions.

In summary, if the President and the Presidential group had not relocated during an intense crisis that might escalate into a general nuclear war, and if they were not managing that intense crisis from the protected alternate with the goal of averting the escalation to general war, then, if the escalation occurs it is questionable whether it would be wise for the President to relocate and it is certain that protection of the President himself had become marginal.

#### The Use of Alternate Decision Groups During Crises

If it is postulated that the President might not leave Washington during periods of mounting tension then it would appear vital that legal successors be prelocated away from the Washington area. However, when closely scrutinized, prelocation of successors does not appear as desirable or as feasible as might appear on the surface. Current succession legislation were not written with the primary intent to provide immediate succession of the Commander-in Chief's authority, but rather to provide for an orderly but less rapid assumption of presidential authority.

Many of those in the line of succession are the very ones that

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

the President will most need to assist him in coping with the confrontation. These are the men on whom the President must primarily rely; they are the ones in whose ability he has the most confidence. Others of the successors are inexperienced, for the most part, in the complexities of command and the armed forces and of conduct of diplomacy during the nuclear war that would be of primary concern if the reason for their relocation became a reality. In short, there is a dilemma. Those of the legal successors most suited to assume the presidential role of Commander-in-Chief are the very men the President will most want with him if he does not relocate. And those of the legal successors most available for relocation are the men who would be least qualified to face the immediate responsibilities to which they succeeded.

Nonetheless, it would seem essential and prudent to provide the capability for relocation to the NMCS alternates of alternate decision groups headed by presidentially designated successors who might or might not be in the legal chain-of-succession. This relocation might take place during a crisis or upon the receipt of tactical warning.

The Terms of Reference for this study single out as one

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

objective: "The scheme for establishing alternate decision-making groups composed of the President or his successors; principal civilian statutory advisors or their representatives; principal military advisors; and immediate staff support, and proposed methods of dispersing these groups."

Development of the NMCS alternates must recognize that the major decisions relating to utilization of an Alternate Decision Group that does not include the President will be made by the President at the time of crisis. The decisions will name the leader of the group, determine its composition, and select a time or condition for relocation. These are problems that are particularly sensitive to the desires of a particular President, to the relationships he has established with his Cabinet and with other personal advisors, and to the estimate of the situation he develops at the time the group might be employed.

The technical and operational problems of supporting an Alternate Decision Group seem much smaller than those of selecting and instructing it. The Group will only assume command after a crisis has escalated to strikes against the U. S. and after the President has been destroyed either in Washington or in another alternate.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Since the group will not manage intense crises short of general war, the group can be smaller than the Presidential Group which the President would require at his location. In particular, the number of non-military advisors should be significantly smaller and the composition of the Advisory Group should change much more slowly, if at all. The Group will require less space at an alternate, smaller transportation capabilities between Washington and the alternate, and less staff and communications support at the Alternate.

The primary role of an Alternate Decision Group is to insure a coordinated, rapid, politically authorized retaliation in the event of Soviet escalation (probably unrestrained) to a general war that includes an attack on Washington (and possibly the Presidency). Their more unlikely role would be to manage a controlled general war with the attendant problems of pause, negotiation, restrike or termination. Where priority is assigned to the primary role, this argues for the adequacy of an even smaller Alternate Decision Group and staff support, and for a shorter post-strike endurance of the alternate center utilized. In particular, support to the Alternate Decision Group should stress:

- a. Modest communications capabilities with the

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Presidentially occupied center so that the Alternate Group can follow the broad outlines of a developing crisis;

- b. Sensory, communication and procedural capabilities to determine that the President is lost, that no other senior successor is readily available, and that the subsequent accession of authority at the alternate is deliberate and promulgated;
- c. Attack assessment capabilities that will confirm that an unrestrained attack is taking place (i.e. that the attack is not confined to a bizarre loss of Washington such as discussed below on pages 22 to 23);
- d. Highly survivable, low-capacity communications capabilities with the nuclear capable CINCs and their alternates.

These represent minimal yet significant capabilities. They indicate that certain alternates that would be inadequate for the President might be adequate for supporting an Alternate Decision Group.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

In particular, such austere facilities might consist of a single, KC-135B NEACP; or a very rudimentary National Mobile Land Command Post; or a small DUCC (50-man or so). An Alternate Decision Group could relocate to such an austere alternate during crises or after tactical warning.

Of the four capabilities indicated above, the most difficult to achieve is the ability to detect the loss of the President and to assume authority rapidly. In the face of a widespread nuclear attack, there may be monstrous uncertainties as to what was destroyed; as to the location and survivability of other more senior, presidential successors; as to available communications and subordinate command facilities; as to who is talking to whom and what authority each possesses; as to which procedures and plans are applicable. There might be considerable reticence on the part of surviving civilian authority to assume a successor role without first receiving considerable evidence regarding these questions. If a capability for answering these questions is not developed and if an Alternate Decision Group is used, then its value may be considerable degraded if its assumption of authority is delayed. Development of this capability requires: (a) clear procedural plans before the fact (primarily on the part of the President and of

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

the CINCs); (b) sensors capable of discriminating the damage situation in Washington and to the Presidential locations; (c) particularly survivable communications between these sensors and the alternates; and (d) a presidential successor locator system which at least works with high effectiveness when an Alternate Decision Group is relocated.

A consideration of the above problem leads to three important conclusions:

- a. A significant reason for placing high priority on the survival of the President himself is to avoid the manifest problems that might arise in determining rapidly and reliably the Presidential successor. As discussed below, this might be one of the more important factors that favors a DUCC.
- b. Of all the Presidential successors, the Vice-President plays a unique role. He is next in line to the President and would seem to be the individual most ready to assume presidential authority should the President be lost or inaccessible during a general war.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

He is the only individual who is commonly accepted as a Presidential successor by the American people, and by allied and enemy Heads of State. He can have access to developing administrative policy before the crisis, to the moves made by each side during an escalating crisis, to the most sensitive military and intelligence information, and to plans for general war. Using the Vice-President as the head of the successor group would go far in eliminating the quandary as to who is in command. The Study Group considers the Vice-President to be the most suitable individual to head the primary Alternate Decision Group, while fully accepting the possibility that his value to the President as a close advisor may render him unavailable.

- c. Finally, the effectiveness of an Alternate Decision Group, particularly in the absence of the Vice-President, may depend on an understanding before the Group is relocated between the President and the head of the Group. Parts of this understanding must be

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

promulgated to the CINCs and their alternate command centers.

The above analysis and other discussions throughout the Executive Department indicate to the Study Group that it is highly unlikely that several Alternate Decision Groups would be constituted during a period of intense crisis. The number of individuals available for such groups is quite limited. From the civilian side they include the Vice-President, and a few senior individuals in the Department of Defense, State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. There will be strong arguments for retaining these individuals with the President whether he stays in Washington or relocates. Accordingly, we would consider it likely that the President would establish one group at most during an intense crisis. If this assumption is correct, it has some bearing on the number of alternates in the NMCS.

Situations That May be Faced at the Alternates

There are many different situations that may confront a President who has relocated to an alternate. These range from a non-nuclear intense crisis to an unrestrained Soviet attack on U. S. command, communications, forces and cities. There are four general cases that the Study has considered with respect to the support needed

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

at the alternate or available from other national centers:

- a. An intense crisis short of general war;
- b. A general war where restraint is shown by the Soviets in that they withhold a significant portion of their ready strategic forces and avoid attacks on National Command Centers and on the communications supporting these Centers;
- c. A general war where the Soviets display no restraint and are not concerned with negotiations or termination;
- d. A general war where Washington is destroyed but where there is still an advantage to the U. S. to withhold, coerce and negotiate in order to limit damage and obtain a more favorable settlement.

Clearly there is some overlap between these cases and an infinite variety within each one. Also, one case might follow another. Finally, whereas support to the President must be provided at an alternate for all four cases, only the last two would face an Alternate Decision Group whose head succeeded as Commander-in-Chief.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

As argued above, the President should relocate to an alternate during an intense crisis in order to achieve the only guarantee of protection available in light of the many ways a crisis might escalate to general war. For management of the intense crisis, the President would require the immediate presence of his senior diplomatic, intelligence, military, political, domestic and civil defense advisors. But this group would depend on their own unprotected Washington centers and soft communications for information, broader staff support, and the execution of their separate decisions.

If the crisis escalated to a general war where both parties displayed restraint, then probably Washington would not be destroyed. For this situation, the President would need the broadest immediate staff support and information relating to the developing situation. Although the alternates should be designed so that they can operate when Washington is lost (the last two cases above), they should also be capable of taking advantage of the communications and staff resources that would be available in Washington if it were not destroyed. In the unpredictable world of controlled general war, where both sides pause and negotiate, some of the information and analyses available only through Washington might prove vital to an improved outcome.

**TOP SECRET**

## TOP SECRET

The fourth case above where Washington is destroyed but where it would be in the U. S. interest to withhold and negotiate seems remote indeed but it might result from one of the following somewhat bizarre situations:

- Inadvertent destruction of Washington by misdirected Soviet strikes.
- Destruction of Washington by a third party during a U. S. - Soviet crisis.
- Attack of Washington by a major dissident element in the Soviet military where an avoidance option had been selected by the Soviet national leaders and was being followed by some Soviet forces.
- A Soviet attack whose objective was all-out but which developed much below Soviet expectations through failures in command and control, defection of subordinate military groups, poor weapons performance, or sudden Soviet indecision after U. S. threats promoted by strategic warning of the Soviet attack.
- Finally, a Soviet attack which took out Washington in

**TOP SECRET**

fulfillment of a negotiatory threat that was made with the understanding that the President and the Presidential Group had relocated, were not in Washington, and would be able to negotiate after the loss of Washington.

The possibility of cases such as these argue for the protection of the President himself. If the dividing line between a controlled and an uncontrolled general war were clear -- if in the controlled war there was complete assurance that National Centers and their communications would not be attacked -- then there would be significantly less reason for the President himself to relocate. A small Alternate Decision Group located in an austere alternate could determine that the war had passed the controlled phase and this Group could release a swift all-out retaliatory strike.

The Study Group concludes that it is useful to distinguish between two phases of general war:

- a. The strategic weapons exchange phase begins with the commitment by one or more parties of extensive strategic nuclear strikes. The phase ends when the

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

participants agree on conditions of termination; or it ends when they completely expend their readily deliverable strategic weapons and the unterminated war enters a "broken back" phase. The strategic exchange phase could be quite short -- a matter of days. Or, it could conceivably last for months if all parties displayed restraint, escalated slowly, and participated in lengthy negotiations. As pointed out above, it is improbable but possible that this phase might continue for some time after the destruction of Washington.

- b. The follow-on phase begins after the strategic exchange phase. If the conflict had been terminated, then national leaders would be concerned with reconstitution of government, maintenance of peace terms, regrouping of the armed forces, and recovery of the economy. If the war were still on, then the nation's leaders would be concerned with reconstitution of the government, mobilization of armed force, regrouping of residual military capabilities,

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

reinforcement overseas, recovery and mobilization of the economy, protection of the U. S. homeland, prosecution of the war, and, exploring means for terminating the conflict. The state of the nation's resources during the follow-on phase could vary widely. The situation would be critically dependent on factors that are almost impossible to predict: the conduct of the war, the success or failure of strategic weapons systems that have never been used under war time conditions, and the effects of extensive destruction on societies and people.

With regard to these phases, the Study Group concludes: First, the predominant concerns of the President and the Presidential Group during the strategic exchange phase will hinge on military commitments and military restraints demonstrated by all parties. During this phase, it may be vital to negotiate with the enemy, coordinate and consult with allies, and inform and lead the public. But the essential substance of these activities will relate to military confrontations: to developments in the intense crisis that led to strategic exchanges, to the progress and nature of the exchanges themselves, and to local conflicts that might be

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

started during this phase (such as a Chinese move into Southeast Asia or a Soviet move into the Middle East). Accordingly, the advisory staff support to the Presidential Group during the strategic exchange phase must have a strong military element so that the Presidential Group and the smaller non-military supporting staff can be informed on military developments and possibilities.

Second, during the strategic exchange phase, the President can delegate many of his domestic responsibilities so that he is free to concentrate on military events and their diplomatic concomitants. These domestic responsibilities relate to such matters as civil defense, economic mobilization, resource allocation, and maintenance of local law and order. Extensive delegation of these functions should take place so that the President and the Presidential Group can concentrate on matters where Presidential decisions can have the greatest effect on national survival. If this principle is accepted, it could significantly affect the constitution of the Presidential Group and their information needs during this phase.

Third, the Study concludes that both the intense crisis and the strategic exchange phase comprise a "protective phase"; that is, a period during which the highest protection must be provided to the

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

President. This protective phase might be as short as several days or it might last weeks or months. However, the possibility that it might last months does not mean that a protected Presidential Center must be capable of independent operation for several months. If enemy attacks have been sufficiently effective that a Presidential Center has been denied external logistic support, it would seem extremely likely that remaining ready strategic weapons on both sides will be soon committed and that the follow-on phase will follow. For example, if a DUCC is undertaken, a capability for 30-day "buttoned-up" operation seems more than adequate. This would <sup>NOT</sup> preclude the use of the DUCC for many months during an intense crisis and a general war. It merely admits that it isn't worth much to provide endurance in a DUCC sufficient to conduct strategic exchanges for more than thirty days after Washington is destroyed.

Fourth, the study concludes that survivability and continuity of national capabilities for conducting the strategic exchange phase should be an order-of-magnitude more reliable than survivability and continuity of national capabilities for managing the follow-on phase. For those resources needed during the follow-on phase, it must be expected that there will be, in worst cases, considerable delay and

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

confusion in regrouping and recovering, in reestablishing organizations and chains-of-command, in locating and assigning staff resources, in providing communications with state and local agencies. Protecting and maintaining national governmental capabilities, both military and non-military, for the follow-on phase, cannot and need not strive for the degree of protection and continuity of command that is needed for conduct of the strategic exchange phase. Loss of command for a month by a Service Headquarter or by some other Executive Department would be damaging, but to a significantly lesser degree than the loss, for a few hours, of Presidential command of strategic exchanges. It is in this light that the discussion below does not support the ANMCC as a presidential relocation center for the strategic exchange phase but does consider it a valuable resource for the follow-on phase.

Finally, the Study Group questions whether the objective of controlled response has been adequately supported by a declaratory policy that stresses the need for both sides to avoid attacks on high level command centers and their supporting communications during the strategic exchange phase. Up to now, both official and unofficial statements by the U. S. have stressed the avoidance of urban and industrial targets, the reduction of collateral damage, and the use of

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

force against force. It would seem they should stress as equally important that any degree of control during strategic nuclear exchanges will be heavily dependent on the preservation of national controls, of some sensory capabilities, of some major subordinate command capabilities that control and assess, and of the communications that tie these together. Also, if one side endows its high level command and control with a centralized capability for significantly increasing its force effectiveness (rather than the deliberateness of its force application), these high level operations centers become valuable targets in a damage-limiting attack by the other side. Any declaratory policy should also reflect this danger (as should the design of the NMCS).

Centers for Protecting the President

At present, there are many centers where the President or an Alternate Decision Group may find protection during intense crises or during the initial phases of a general war. These include: the White House underground, Highpoint, Camp David, the Presidential aircraft, the ANMCC, the NEACP aircraft and the NECPA ships. All of these except the White House underground, which provides inadequate protection, require relocation. A deep underground center in the Washington area (the DUCC) is being considered. For each of these

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

plans and procedures explicitly include the possibility of Presidential presence and command of a general war. In addition, there are many locations currently available, being developed, or under consideration that could serve the President during a general war. These include: Alternate Service Headquarters, the primary or alternate Centers of the Unified and Specified Commands (both within the CONUS and overseas), and the protected relocation sites of certain Executive Departments and Agencies. These latter sites, for which Presidential presence has not been explicitly planned, could be made as effective as some of the explicitly designated locations with minor modifications in communications, facility, staffing, prepositioned data, and transportation plans. (As discussed below, this level of effectiveness is not very high).

The Study Group supports two principles that should guide the designation and development of centers that might be used by the President or an Alternate Decision Group for the conduct of intense crises or general war:

First, the concept of maintaining a multiplicity of centers is very sound and should be continued. This concept ensures Presidential flexibility. It conveys to a potential aggressor a serious concern for

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

presidential survivability. (He cannot distinguish with certainty facade from substance). It complicates the targeting problem of the enemy who wants to attack national controls. It provides adaptability to unforeseen developments regarding enemy capability, knowledge or intentions. The concept has significant implications on the desirability of the DUCC. If the DUCC is developed (as this study recommends), it should not appear to the enemy to be, nor become in fact, the only facility that provides the President comparable protection and staff support. If the DUCC developed into a completely unique capability, for example, if comparable relocation centers were discontinued after a DUCC, then an enemy might detect a "Maginot Line" strategy of protecting the Presidency and his problems of developing counter-measures would be considerably simplified.

As a second principle, the Study concludes that there would be significant advantages, for conducting the strategic exchange phase of a general war, in collocating the President with national level military staff and communications that tie the President to strategic forces. One can separate the problem of protecting the Presidency and the problem of providing surviving military staff and communications support. In practice, separation would present significant problems and dangers. Collocation would minimize echelons of

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

reporting and communication, would enhance survivability of both decision makers and decision support, would place the President or his successor in more direct contact with his commanders in the field, and would provide the adaptability in estimating and planning that can best be achieved by the direct interaction of the decision group with its staff support. In advocating the desirability of collocation, the Study is not suggesting that national decisions during the initial phases of a general war would be purely military. Diplomatic, intelligence and domestic factors may be equally critical. On the other hand, as argued earlier, the substance of diplomacy and domestic affairs will be dominated by the commitment or withholding of strategic strikes, by the effects of delivered weapons on all sides, by the prospects of continuing or pausing, and by the progress of the earlier military confrontation that led to escalation to general war. The disadvantages of dispersed decision groups and staffs during minor or severe crises have been well recognized. If collocation is not achieved prior to the physical disruption, tension and confusion of a general war, the disadvantages will be that much larger.

The above two principles of multiplicity and collocation are

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

competitive. It is difficult and expensive to develop centers where the President could be adequately protected and collocated with staff and communications support. The limiting factors are not only technical and financial; it is equally difficult to provide experienced and exercised manpower and procedures. Accordingly, the Study recommends that capabilities for presidential conduct of intense crises and general war be classified as follows:

- a. Class I facilities provide the capability for collocation of the President and the Presidential Group with supporting staff and communications to conduct both an intense crisis and the initial phases of a general war. Such facilities would provide high protection. For general war, staff support and communications would not depend, in a worst case, on other national centers. As discussed below, the DUCC, the NECPA ships and a National Mobile Land Command Post (NMLCP) are the only centers that meet these criterion. The Class I facilities that are developed would receive the highest priority for resources, improvement, full-time experienced

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**TOP SECRET**

staff, facilities, exercising (including participation by senior members of the White House staff and other executive agencies), and relocation planning and transportation.

- b. Class II facilities provide the capability for the minimal needs of an Alternate Decision Group during a general war. Any of the above Class I facilities would be more than adequate. In addition, as discussed below, the NEACP aircraft seem ideally suited for this role. The Study Group also considered providing such a minimal capability at Cheyenne Mountain or at the SAC underground at Offutt. However, if one of these locations survived the first exchanges of a general war, it would still seem better to depend on mobility for protection of the Alternate Group rather than to place them in a location that might be targeted for follow on attacks. The Class II facilities would also, like the Class I, receive a high priority for resources, exercising, etc.
- c. Class III facilities would be those readily accessible

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

to the President at all times when he is away from the White House. These capabilities would be used to alert the President, to tie him into the NCS and senior advisors, and to receive early decisions regarding commitment of forces and plans for further presidential relocation. Such facilities consist of communications, a few trained personnel, and procedures. They should be available in Presidential aircraft, motorcades, hotels, his personnel residences, etc. Development of these capabilities is well along.

- d. Finally, Class IV facilities would be centers to which the President and the Presidential Group might relocate after the onset of a general war either on the receipt of tactical warning or after. Such facilities are primarily provided for presidential flexibility and to complicate an enemy attack on the Presidency. At present, the ANMCC, Camp David and High Point are examples. Each of these facilities should be justifiable on the basis of providing capabilities other than presidential protection.

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

For example, as discussed below, the primary capabilities that justify the ANMCC are its extensive communications facilities and its potential availability as a reconstitution site after the initial stages of a general war. The Class IV facilities should receive a significantly lower priority for resources and exercising than that attached to the other facilities discussed above.

#### The No-Warning Situation

The above discussion of alternate decision groups has been in the context of situations where a U. S. - Soviet crisis precedes the escalation to general war. The case where there is no such warning, where the Soviets strike during a time of international calm, is much harder to cope with if the initial Soviet strikes attempt to destroy U. S. national command. (Clearly, if the Soviets should unexpectedly and fully alert their strategic forces and if this is detected by our intelligence system, this situation does not represent "international" calm).

Fortunately, the prospects of the Soviets attempting a strike "out of the blue" seem reduced as a result of U. S. protected missiles

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

and an alert bomber force that can be launched on receipt of 15 minutes warning. On the other hand, if the Soviets should attempt such a strike, only very limited measures are available to insure deliberate, enduring, national-level command. These include:

- a. Attempts can be made to keep, as often as possible, a few of the individuals on the presidential succession list dispersed and out of Washington. All of these individuals frequently travel and schedules might be adjusted with this goal in mind.
- b. The system for locating successors can be improved. This measure and the preceding one must cope with the political reality that it might prove exceedingly difficult for senior government officials to reconcile their daily responsibilities with the requirements of a constant readiness posture for a "remotely possible" Soviet initiative strike.
- c. Capabilities can be strengthened for providing tactical warning of an attack on Washington (as distinguished from an attack on the U. S.). Such improved tactical

V-37

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

warning enhances two somewhat conflicting opportunities: first, a command conference could be convened earlier than otherwise with the knowledge that Washington may well be under attack; second, the President could decide to relocate immediately, or if a DUCC were available, to seek shelter there.

- d. Transportation arrangements for Presidential relocation can be improved. This together with (c) above might marginally enhance the viability of the relocation option, and might be appropriate if a DUCC were not available.
- e. Attempts can be made to improve the local defense capability at Washington. Such measures might include anti-ballistic missile installations.

**TOP SECRET**

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CHAPTER VI

Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400040003-3

**TOP SECRET**

CHAPTER VI

THE ROLE OF THE NMCS ALTERNATES

Alternates, unlike the NMCC, have a national role because in them the Presidential Group or an Alternate Decision Group, during intense crises and general war, must be able to direct and control the combined efforts of the U. S. Government. Integrated diplomatic, military, and civil decisions will be made here in directing the crisis and war effort. Based upon the attack assessment, appropriate retaliatory responses will be determined. Allocation of reserve forces and nuclear weapons and those actions required to terminate hostilities may be taken. The alternates must be capable of assisting the President in directing civil defense efforts and in maintaining law and order. The personnel in the alternates could also provide the nucleus for reconstitution of the national government in another location.

Although the alternates are primarily designed to provide for the survival of the Presidential Group and for the control of general war, there is no reason they cannot be effectively used

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

for managing crises less than general war. Augmentation of staffs, timely relocation of the Presidential Group, and non-survivable, high-capacity communication links between the alternate and other participating government agency situation rooms will provide all of the coordination and information required to manage the crisis right up to the time Washington is destroyed.

In order to analyze the effectiveness of the NMCS alternates, it is necessary to determine the functions that they should perform in relative order of priority. Operational criteria required to perform these functions must then be established which can be applied against each alternate, presently existing or proposed, to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of each alternate and the effectiveness of the system as a whole.

#### Functional Roles of the Alternates

Protecting and supporting the Presidential Group in an intense crisis short of general war and in the conduct of general war are the most important functions of the alternate command centers. Key individuals must be constantly available during periods of increased tension to render immediate and substantive advice to assist

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

in the decision making process. Information from world-wide intelligence, diplomatic, domestic, and military sources must be provided for accurate and timely decision making. Communications are required for reliable transmission of these decisions with a minimum of delay under all conditions of crisis and war. During crises, the majority of decisions will initially pertain to foreign affairs; but as situations become more critical, military and civil defense requirements may assume a dominant role. It is not necessary that all assistance be located in any one facility but that it be immediately available on call from the principal supporting agencies who have specific responsibilities during the various stages of escalation of a crisis.

The next priority function is protection of an Alternate Decision Group and supporting this group in conducting general war in the event the President is disabled. The use of successors is a poor second choice to insuring that the elected President survives; but if it is postulated that he might not leave Washington during periods of increasing tension and escalation or crisis, or that he might be lost in another alternate, then the minimum requirement

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

would be to relocate a Presidential successor and an advisory group to assume national leadership in the event the President is lost.

A third priority concerns the functions of the alternates in the event the President or Presidential successor is not immediately available or is located elsewhere. There must be a capability to locate the President or successor, to brief him on the situation and to implement his decisions. If the Presidential Group is located at an alternate or at another center such as High Point, the remaining alternates must provide staff and communication backup support relating to military operations and intelligence.

In the event Washington is destroyed and the President or successors are not available, a fourth priority function is that the alternates must keep each other and the CINCs informed of the current situation and assist them in the interchange of information between the Unified and Specified Commands.

The fifth priority function concerns the requirement to provide survivable locations for senior advisory personnel who may be needed after the initial phase of a general war. Relocation of selected personnel from Government agencies to alternates could

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

be initiated during the escalation of a crisis and would provide the President with the nucleus of a staff for use in national government post-war functions.

Operational Criteria for Alternates

Any facility must possess certain capabilities to provide a positive contribution to the system. It is not essential that each alternate meet all of the criteria. However, their effectiveness can best be measured by the number of criteria that they meet and the degree to which they meet them. Listed here are the most important capabilities and characteristics which alternates should possess to some degree to be of value. Briefly they are: survivability, accessibility, endurance, staff support, communications support, flexibility and low-cost.

Survivability is considered one of the most important of all the criteria. It can be achieved with alternate command centers combining mobility, hardness, multiplicity, and defense. Alternates do not provide invulnerability; but the cost to the enemy of destroying them can be made very high, enemy confidence in his ability for

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

timely interruption of command can be seriously diminished, and the command structure can be made an unattractive target system in terms of potential results versus weapons expended. Mobile alternates enhance survivability by providing an enemy target planner with the problem of committing a large number of weapons to achieve a high confidence of destroying all national command posts. If one portion of the command system is designed to have high confidence of survival, it tends to provide additional protection to other parts of the system by making them relatively less attractive targets.

A second equally important criterion is the accessibility of an alternate to the President, the Presidential Group, successors, advisory groups, and augmentation personnel. Accessibility must be considered in relation to the various levels of tension during a crisis and the amount of warning received of an impending attack. To be truly accessible, a facility must be immediately available so that the President will feel free to use it during periods of mounting tension and would become accustomed to doing so. As a bonus, such a facility would be easily reached in a matter of minutes so that the President could enter it on the receipt of tactical warning

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

if he were not already located within it. If the President will work in it during crisis periods, he may survive a no warning attack on Washington. Accessibility by the Presidential Group and their immediate staff to the Center during intense crisis is almost as important as ready accessibility by the President. It is important to recognize that, as the crisis intensifies and spreads, the individuals required for immediate staff support to the President and the Presidential Group will change and possibly grow in number. Continuous and ready accessibility of these individuals to the President and the principals will be essential. If this capability is not provided by an alternate and by the transportation means between it and Washington, then the alternate center will not be used by the President during the mounting crisis.

A third criterion, endurance, concerns the ability of an alternate to maintain an operational capability under different levels of crisis or general war with the minimum disruption in capability during the time required to complete its mission. During intense crises, any alternate facility utilized by the President must be capable of prolonged operations over days and weeks, and it must be able to survive the transition to general war. During general war

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

there are several distinct phases. The minimum endurance required covers the initial deployment and engagement of forces including the commitment of initial SIOP strikes and related CINC plans. This first phase, if in retaliation to a Soviet initiative strike, would require from several minutes to several hours. The upper limit allows for some crude attack assessment and for timely commitment of SAC forces under positive control. Under very ambiguous conditions, this phase could require up to twenty-four hours.

A second phase, requiring from 24-72 hours after E-hour, includes reconnaissance reporting time of results of the initial SIOP strikes, consideration of the residual enemy threat, and assessment of residual U. S. capabilities. In the event of major strikes by both sides, the second phase would be required to obtain the first factual indications on how well U. S. forces were performing and how well planned objectives were being met; to determine what forces the Soviets possessed and what their capabilities were; and to discover the Soviet attitudes and objectives with respect to targeting, avoidance, withholding, and alliances.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

The inherent timing of the first and second phases is primarily determined by military considerations -- by the rate at which forces can move, penetrate and strike; by the times required for collection, communication, collation and presentation of data. Any communications or negotiations between heads of state during these phases must recognize the speed with which forces can be committed and the delays that are inherent in determining what has happened.

A definition of subsequent phases and their probable durations is much more conjectural. It is based on the commitments and successes for each side during the earlier phases, on the degree to which both sides exercise restraint, on the readiness of both sides to pause and handle the crisis diplomatically, and, if there is a pause, on the ability of both to guarantee the truce through reconnaissance and other forms of inspection.

A fourth criterion relates to the capability of providing adequate staff support for the Presidential Group both for intense crisis and general war operations. Operations during crises will require small numbers of personnel at the alternate to provide a link with staffs

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

and communications in Washington. The size of the general war support staff needed will depend on many factors. The essential general war operations consist largely of pre-planned actions and do not require a large group for staff support. This criterion is of sufficient importance in determining the size and capabilities of an alternate that it is discussed at greater length in the next section.

Communication requirements, a fifth criterion, vary considerably between intense crisis and general war. During crises short of general war, extensive communications are needed with many government departments, with unified and specified commands, and with Soviet leaders and Allied nations. After general war begins, command will primarily be concerned with the control of the military forces involved, with those agencies concerned with civil defense matters, and with intelligence gathering systems. Whereas nonsurvivable links are adequate for the pre-general war communications, much more highly survivable communications are required with those agencies and military commands directly involved in the conduct of general war. Finally,

**TOP SECRET**

## TOP SECRET

a virtually invulnerable communication capability should exist for committing of retaliatory strikes. This capability can have very low capacity.

Flexibility, a sixth criterion, is important to permit evolutionary growth and improvement of the system. As the needs for national command become better defined and understood and as the state-of-the-art in communications and information handling equipment advances, changes and additions must be made to the present systems to improve the relevancy and efficiency of operations and procedures. For example, the problems inherent in pursuing the policy of controlled response demands considerable improvement and elaboration of existing sensors, communications and procedures. These must be applied to the NMCS system before this policy is fully credible.

Finally, cost of a facility must be considered in relation to the operational capability it will buy. While cost must not be the sole overriding factor, all possible solutions to a problem must be investigated to determine the least expensive way of fulfilling a requirement.

## TOP SECRET

### Personnel Capacity at an Alternate

Determination of the numbers of personnel required at an alternate to support the President and the other groups that might occupy the Center presents an extremely complex question. As a start, it is useful to consider the following categories of people occupying a center:

- a. The President or the Presidential Successor plus his immediate advisory staff. In the case of the President and the Presidential Group relocating to an alternate during a time of intense crisis, this group would consist of the President, his principal advisors such as heads of some Executive Departments and their key deputies, and a small number of personal advisors and assistants to these principals. The size of this group will depend on the desires of the particular President, on the number that can be accommodated in an alternate, and on the accessibility of some of the less important members if they are not always



## TOP SECRET

collocated with the principals. This accessibility can be achieved either by communications or transportation. To the extent that these means of accessibility prove less desirable, it will be necessary to provide additional permanent space in the alternate. We estimate that the number of Category I personnel will range from 20 - 40 primarily as a function of accessibility of the less important individuals.

The numerical size of an Alternate Decision Group headed by a Presidential Successor could be considerably smaller since it would function only after the crisis has culminated in general war when it would face a less complex decision-making situation (albeit a calamitous one). We would estimate this number to be somewhere between 10 - 15.

- b. Communication and Staff Support to the Presidential Group for Intense Crises. This group will keep the President and the Presidential Group in contact with the less senior advisors, with the soft command and

## TOP SECRET

information centers of the various executive departments, with the CINCs, and with all the other individuals and agencies that can be contacted through the National Communications System. Accordingly, its primary responsibility will be to provide access to many high capacity, soft communications systems. In addition, it will perform other routine clerical support needed by the principals. The size of this group will depend on capabilities outside the alternate, on the extent to which accessibility to the alternate permits rotation of these personnel in and out of the alternate, and on the degree of automation of this function that can be achieved with an overall saving in spaces. The proportion of these personnel required in an alternate is highest for the NECPA since its communications capacity with fixed centers is relatively low and since its personnel cannot be conveniently rotated. The number would be smallest in a DUCC both because of necessity and since this

**TOP SECRET**

fixed facility can be inexpensively supported by above ground, closely located, unhardened communications centers. In addition, most members of this group could be rotated on a daily basis in and out of a DUCC.

c. Direct Staff Support to the Presidential Group or an Alternate Successor Group for General War.

This group provides the staff support relating to the conduct of the initial phases of a general war. With reference to the phases defined above, it includes the staff support required for Phases I and II but not that support which would be required for a general mobilization associated with a prolonged war, for a detailed assessment of residual capabilities, for development of a centralized plan to apply these to a prolonged war, or for reconstitution of military and civil government after the war. The size of this support is most variable. Some of the factors in its determination are indicated below. (Pages 16 - 29)

**TOP SECRET**

## TOP SECRET

d. Personnel for Operation of the Alternate.

This group includes the personnel required to operate the alternate, to maintain equipment, to feed the occupants, etc. Its size and composition is determined by the operating characteristics of the alternate. Of all the groups, the size of this one is most easily calculated with confidence. In the current alternates, the size ranges from a seven-man crew for a NEACP aircraft to a 1200-man crew on a NECPA.

- e. Personnel for Reconstitution, Mobilization and Direction of an Extended War. This group includes the military, diplomatic, intelligence and civil defense staff support that would be needed by the national authorities for conduct of an extended war and for immediately after the war. As indicated above, this group should have the lowest priority for assignment to an alternate, particularly if their relocation would disrupt or threaten the operational capabilities of the alternate during the initial phases

**TOP SECRET**

of nuclear exchange. There remain many crucial questions outside the purview of this study relating to the size and composition of this group, including such questions as the relationship between the DoD support and High Point and OEP; the desirability of providing alternate capital cities where governmental functions could be more rapidly constituted; and, if alternate capitals are desirable, the best means of protecting the personnel resources that would be needed after, but not during, the initial phases of a general war.

In light of this categorization, the highest priority for manning of the NMCS alternates should be placed on the first four categories. The size and composition of three of these four is relatively straightforward, the three being the Presidential Group, the staff support for intense crisis management, and the personnel needed to maintain and operate the alternate.

The most complex problem is analyzing the size and roles of the staff support to the Presidential Group for the conduct of general

**TOP SECRET**

## TOP SECRET

war (c. above). Analysis of this problem is important if the limited facilities of the current alternates are to be wisely used, or if the design of new facilities (such as a DUCC or a Mobile Land Command Post) is to be soundly conceived.

The size of the staff support needed at an alternate for initial general war operations depends on many factors:

a. What functions will be attempted at an alternate?

As a minimum, an alternate should be able to determine that a heavy attack is underway and that other national centers have been destroyed. On the basis of this assessment, the senior authority at the alternate, if so empowered, can issue early and coordinated retaliatory strike orders to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands. To this minimal capability one can add a host of additional functions such as: more refined estimates of enemy attack patterns; monitoring the status and success of U. S. and Allied strikes; estimating damage to the civil and military resources of the U. S. Allies, enemies and neutrals; evaluating the success of enemy strikes; projecting alternative

**TOP SECRET**

courses of action available to all participants;  
and establishing acceptable terms for cessation of  
hostilities. All of these functions and many others  
must be performed to some degree if U. S. actions  
are to be appropriately controlled during the initial  
phases of exchange and if favorable negotiations  
are to be undertaken.

- b. To what extent is non-military advisory staff support  
needed at an alternate? By non-military, we are  
referring to foreign and domestic affairs. At one  
extreme, the non-military staff resources could  
be limited to the individuals in the Presidential  
Group, with the Presidential Group depending on  
support from staff headquarters in Washington. This  
is the method of staff support proposed by the Study  
for the conduct of intense crises. On the other hand,  
for the initial phases of certain forms of general  
war, it would be desirable to have a sizeable staff  
of diplomatic, intelligence and domestic advisors  
collocated in an alternate with the Presidential Group.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

- c. At what rate will the war develop? If the war develops very rapidly with virtually no pauses and a need for rapid decision, the amount of staff analysis that can be effectively provided will be, perforce, small. In a short time, a large staff cannot scan and cull relevant data, compare and analyze, collate different factors, develop summary presentations, and present them to decision-makers. In this case, a small staff that processes less data in a more aggregated manner may be more responsive. On the other hand, if there are extended pauses, the advantages of more thorough staff action are both possible and valuable.
- d. What data will be available? A broad spectrum of damage might be suffered by sensors, communications paths, communications centers, subordinate command posts, and intelligence gathering facilities. The possibilities are infinite and difficult to predict. On the one hand, damage to this portion of U. S. resources might be quite light so that an alternate receives a high volume of data providing comprehensive coverage on what is happening (if the data is properly

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

analyzed). On the other hand, the complex data collection system might be severed at vital points by relatively few strikes so that few reports are received and these are spotty and inconsistent.

e. To what extent will operations be centralized?

The Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands are developing increasingly survivable command capabilities and extensive staff capabilities. Their senior commanders will need to address many of the same questions that concern national command. To the extent that the national alternates can depend on these capabilities, the supporting staff in the NMCS alternates can be reduced. On the other hand, if centralized replanning and coordinated direction of the CINCs is desired, then a much larger support staff will be required at the national level.

f. How much will one NMCS alternate depend on or utilize the staff support available at another?

The operational concept for utilization of the present

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

alternates has stressed self-sufficiency of each alternate during general war; this concept has recognized that post-attack dependence by one center on the capabilities of another center could decrease the survivability of the NMCS and would complicate the development of operational capability in the alternates. Under the current concept, alternates are updated pre-strike by the NMCC and the ANMCC; and for post-strike situations an alternate not in command monitors the activities of the primary center in command. However, the staff support at each alternate is primarily directed to support the Command Authorities without depending on staff activities at other alternates. There has been some discussion of modifying this concept in the case of a DUCC so that a smaller DUCC staff would be supported in the post-strike phase by the ANMCC or the NECPA.

- g. How experienced is the staff at the alternate? A small, well-exercised staff whose sole responsibility

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

has been preparing for general war support will obviously be better prepared to support the national authorities compared with a considerably larger staff that has hastily relocated and that consists largely of individuals whose duties before relocation were quite different from their general war assignments.

- h. To what extent can some staff functions be aided with automation? At present, there is considerable effort within the NMCS and elsewhere attempting to provide automated assistance to staff functions. This assistance is aimed at the functions of message handling, intercenter communications, data analysis and retrieval, and display. These efforts are still very much experimental in that there is not yet any conclusive evidence that automation can provide overall savings in space at an alternate or provide significantly more effective staff support to commanders. Without a doubt, the equipment available for automated assistance can be dramatically decreased in size and cost and increased in

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

capability during the next few years. However, there is considerable doubt whether the application of these devices promises, in fact, that a smaller alternate in the future will match the capabilities of a larger alternate today.

The size of the maximum general war support staff at the current alternates covers a broad spectrum: tens of people on the NEACP, several hundred on the NECPA, several thousand at the ANMCC. In some measure, these numbers were determined by the capacity of the particular alternate, and functional objectives for each alternate have been set accordingly. If a new alternate such as a DUCC or a Mobile Land Command Post is considered where the size of this alternate is an open issue, then detailed analyses that include the above questions will be necessary.

The Study Group recommends that such analyses be guided by the following principles:

- a. The highest priority general war functions for a DUCC or an NMLCP would be those supporting Presidential decisions during early phases of strategic exchange that might be accompanied by

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

negotiations. These functions include appraisal of the enemy attack and his remaining resources, commitment of U. S. strategic forces, strategic direction of theatre conflicts, and establishment of enforceable and inspectable terms for cessation. Functions that should be given much lower priority are mobilization, reconstitution and planning for a prolonged struggle.

- b. High priority should be given to providing adequate staff support for general war situations where damage to sensors and communications is reasonably light and where the pace of the war includes pauses and negotiations. These conditions that favor damage limitation and negotiated termination require greater staff support than situations requiring rapid all-out response. An inadequate staff could prevent capitalizing on the opportunity for controlled response.
- c. The advisory staff support should include non-military representation, particularly from State and CIA (in addition to the individuals from these agencies that are members of the Presidential Group). The

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

military representation on the supporting staff will be larger than the non-military expertise since, in the initial phases of a general war, the most important "counters" for coercion and negotiation will be: damage inflicted or avoided, success or failure of strategic weapons, the size of remaining centrally-controlled strategic reserves, and, possibly, the status of the earlier military confrontations that led to the general war. On the other hand, the employment of these "counters" for negotiation and the establishing of the conditions of termination may entail many non-military considerations. The arguments for collocating the Presidential Group with their supporting staff apply equally to essential military and non-military functions.

- d. For the conduct of intense crises, the supporting staff at an alternate for information and facility maintenance should be provided on a three-shift per day basis. However, for general war, the supporting staff (including advisory, information and maintenance) can be much more austerly provided.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

A complement allowing two-shifts per day would be adequate for information and maintenance needs. And, considering that there will be essentially "one-shift" of the Presidential Group, the higher levels of the Advisory Staff can be provided on almost as austere basis, i.e., one-shift.

- e. The command and control capabilities of the CINCs should be depended on for detailed control of forces including detailed force monitoring, damage assessment, reconnaissance, intelligence, retargeting, and coordination with other CINCs. Detailed data should be processed by national alternates only if this is the most reliable and effective way of supporting major national decisions. Increased emphasis should be placed on aggregated reporting by the CINCs and on the direct participation by the CINC himself or his successor in guiding national decisions.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

- f. Principle e. should lead to greater emphasis on a highly professional, well trained and exercised staff at an alternate and less emphasis on the use of automated aids to process volumes of detailed data. In particular, the general war military supporting staff for an alternate should be predominantly provided by permanently assigned personnel. The alternate would be manned on a continuing basis by a fraction of this staff and, during crises, full augmentation would be provided by the staff. Similarly, the individuals who may constitute the non-military staff support must be thoroughly familiar with and exercised in the conduct of general war operations. It is recognized that this group cannot be provided by permanently assigned personnel.
- g. In its primary mode of operation during general war, an alternate should be capable of supporting the Decision Authorities without depending on staff or communications support from other NMCS alternates.

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

There should be some capability for utilizing the capabilities of other NMCS alternates if time allows, if they survive, and if communications are available.

- h. Realistic exercising is by far the most valuable tool in determining the proper staff support at an alternate. Exercising will disclose numbers required, organizational relationships, functional priorities, and procedures needed. There is no substitute. Exercises should be designed to test the above principles. Their conduct, evaluation and results should concern all agencies that are responsible for planning, developing, reviewing or using an alternate.

#### Evaluation of Individual Alternates

We now apply the seven criteria discussed above -- survivability, accessibility, endurance, staff support, communications support, flexibility and cost -- to the current alternates of the NMCS, to the current alternates operating under somewhat modified operational concepts, and to a DUCC and a National Mobile Land Command Post.

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**TOP SECRET**

The Fort Ritchie Complex and the ANMCC

The ANMCC is an alternate that is part of a much larger complex that also includes the AJCC, Fort Ritchie, and numerous communications subsystems. This complex currently performs many functions, including:

- a. It houses the ANMCC including prelocated operations teams; communications consoles; control of the primary alerting system for transmitting emergency messages; automatic data processing support; and space for the President, the Presidential Group and an augmented staff from DoD and other Executive Departments. Less than a quarter of the 3000-man capacity is needed for its effective operation during the initial phases of a general war.
- b. It contains communications resources of the Defense Communications System including a variety of land-line and radio terminals that tie it to the CINCs and service facilities, the NMCC, and the mobile NMCS alternates. These communications resources

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

are used for both crises short of general war and during a general war.

- c. It provides support to the NMCS as a whole in such prestrike general war functions as maintaining SIOP data bases, exercising emergency procedures, and developing computer programs.
- d. Its computing equipment provides a rapid operational backup to the compatible non-duplexed NMCC equipment in case the latter should fail.
- e. It contains message distribution capabilities that support the NMCC and the alternates.
- f. The AJCC also interfaces with the Inter-Agency communication system that serves other government agencies in their various relocation sites.
- g. It provides a relocation site for large numbers of personnel from the Services and other agencies.

VI-31

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Because of its size (which has recently been increased by over sixty percent), the underground center is highly conducive to growth and evolutionary change. Accordingly, there are proposals for adding to the above functions:

- a. It is planned that the AJCC will provide alternate facilities for the DIA and for the DCA Operations Center.
- b. If experiments with automatic message switching prove successful, a significantly expanded message distribution center supporting the entire NMCS is proposed.
- c. It has been proposed that the ANMCC provide direct personnel and data-processing support to the NMCC both in the conduct of operations and in the development and evaluation of improved techniques for processing, communications and display. In this role, the ANMCC would be a satellite of the NMCC, not merely a back-up in case the NMCC equipment failed.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

There is a broad variation in the degree to which each of the above functions supports the ANMCC and the other NMCS alternates.

As an alternate of the NMCS, the ANMCC provides the largest center, has the most growth capability, is supported by the most extensive contiguous communications capability, can operate under buttoned-up conditions for thirty days, and can operate indefinitely during intense crisis before a general war. It would also be the most readily accessible center if there were a sudden mass relocation of staffs from Washington.

On the other hand, the low degree of hardening makes it improbable that the ANMCC will survive if targeted. This makes it approximately as survivable as Washington and the NMCC. In addition, the ANMCC cannot be considered readily accessible to the Presidential Group under limited warning conditions. For these reasons, the Study considers it highly unlikely that the President or an Alternate Decision Group would relocate to this facility during an intense crisis or immediately after the onset of general war (particularly since comparable support and much greater protection could be provided at the NECPA or at an NMLCP for the initial phase of a general war).

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Although the AJCC is not currently suitable for its originally intended function -- i.e., acting as an alternate seat of government in the early phases of a general war -- the center has been completed, it provides some protection, and it would not be a bonus target in an attack on Washington. Accordingly, it can provide a number of valuable functions:

- a. It can provide marginal protection to large numbers of personnel (both military and non-military) and serve as one potential reconstitution site of government or of the Department of Defense during the follow-on phase (see page V-24 ). In this role a portion of the AJCC could serve as a part of the OEP "protective arc" complex.
- b. The extensive communications capabilities in the AJCC provide a dispersed back-up to the Washington-centered communications complex. These also would not be bonus targets and, if they survive, they could be valuable during and throughout a general war.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

- c. Possibly, the staff and communications capabilities at the AJCC can provide an extension of the capabilities of the NMCC during day-to-day operations and crises. This role is considered partially operational at this time. However, the use of remote support to the NMCC presents many technical, developmental and operational complexities. Before this role of the AJCC is expanded, the Study recommends a thorough analysis and evaluation of these problems and a comparison of this approach with other more direct means of strengthening the NMCC.
- d. The AJCC could provide back-up support to the other alternates of the NMCS during the strategic weapons exchange phase (see page V-23). If this role is overly emphasized and recognized by an enemy, then his motivation to attack the AJCC is higher (if he wants to attack national controls) and loss of the center obviates its value in performing the first

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

two functions above. Accordingly, the Study suggests that this role be given a low priority.

- e. Finally, the AJCC can be considered one of the Class IV centers for Presidential relocation.  
(see Page V-35 ).

Considering these various roles, the Study recommends that the AJCC be continued, not as a primary alternate for use by the President or an Alternate Decision Group during the strategic exchange phase, but as an NMCS supporting center during crises and as a potential reconstitution site during the follow-on phase.

The currently projected annual operating and investment costs of the AJCC are on the order of \$20 million per year. The Study recommends a detailed functional and technical analysis of the AJCC so that each of the capabilities and costs can be related to the above five functions. Such an analysis will provide a sounder understanding of the costs of NMCS-wide functions and may indicate savings that would not reduce the operational effectiveness of the NMCS.

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

National Emergency Command Post Afloat (NECPA)

The NECPA is an emergency command post afloat which provides survivability through mobility while at sea and which requires two ships to insure that one is at sea and fully operational at all times. The use of two ships adds most to the survivability of the entire NMCS. If only one ship were available in the NMCS, it would not be available during its dockside maintenance periods. Also, the need to keep one ship in a high state of readiness or near readiness would preclude the extensive exercising and operational experimentation necessary for evolution of operational capabilities. It would also inhibit the introduction of the many minor improvements in equipment and facilities that temporarily disrupt operational capability but that are necessary for long term improvement.

The NECPA is capable of accommodating a Presidential Group and approximately 300 supporting staff members. It is capable of independent operations in a general war environment for a period of at least two weeks without external logistical support.

VI-37

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Under current concepts of operation the NECPA is not readily accessible to the Presidential Group. In addition a major weakness may be its vulnerability to submarine or air attack. These problems could be considerably reduced by providing adequate fleet protection when appropriate. By operating in protected waters such as the Chesapeake Bay, it would be not only much more accessible and relatively safe from submarines but would still have to be targeted with many weapons to insure destruction. Another problem is the difficulty of transporting large groups of personnel to the ship; this situation could be alleviated by having adequate numbers of standby helicopters immediately available for this purpose. Operating the NECPA nearer to the Washington area would also ease this problem.

Staff and communications support for intense crisis situations and for general war is adequate. The ship is large enough to accommodate a data base of the size and scope to provide the essential information required. Greater capability could be attained, however, with the addition of improved communications and technical staff support. Finally, space available on one of the NECPAs is adequate to provide the flexibility required for future growth and modification of the system.

VI-38

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

At the present time, the two NECPA ships authorized are the USS NORTHAMPTON and the USS WRIGHT. The NORTHAMPTON was placed in operation as an interim measure pending conversion of the WRIGHT and the SAIPAN. Due to the interim nature of her planned service and inherent limitations in her design, the NORTHAMPTON was not outfitted with optimum facilities, and, through operational experience to date, she is known to have many deficiencies. For example (1) there is extremely limited contiguous deck space, (2) there is limited space for operating helicopters, (3) there is an undesirable placement of communications equipment, (4) unsuitable antenna system configuration causes mutual circuit interference particularly on voice channels, (5) there are no VLF communications, (6) there is no automatic data processing capability, no manual display, or voice conferencing capability, and (7) available space is not adequate for growth.

On the other hand, the SAIPAN, which was eliminated from the NMCS program, contains 12,000 square feet of contiguous command post deck space (as opposed to only 2,400 square feet on the NORTHAMPTON), improved design and installation of communications

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

and antenna systems including space for digital data systems and VLF, and space for simultaneous operation of two helicopters.

These deficiencies in the NORTHAMPTON and the dissimilarity in configuration with the WRIGHT place serious operational limitations on the ability of this NECPA to perform its assigned mission. Without costly modifications, there is little or no space to permit a growth potential in the NORTHAMPTON. Separate Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP) and different operating instructions are required for each NECPA because of the different accommodations and facilities.

National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP)

The NEACP provides for (1) a ground alert facility for use by the President or an Alternate Decision Group; (2) the ability to transport or accompany designated authorities on trips outside the Washington area while acting as an operational facility; and (3) an airborne communications relay facility as required. The present program consists of three aircraft.

The NEACP, once airborne, is the most survivable of all the alternates because of its high degree of mobility. Due to its

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

location, it is the most accessible existing alternate in a short time; however, unless relocation of the President or successor is resorted to prior to tactical warning, it cannot be considered as being survivable. Under no warning or tactical warning attack conditions, it could be a bonus target if Washington were destroyed. Considering the fact that under these conditions the NEACP would not be accessible in time for the Presidential Group to occupy it, there may be merit in considering dispersal of the aircraft to bases outside of the Washington area (e. g., Patuxent River Naval Air Station). This would greatly increase their survivability and the survivability of the NMCS system as a whole. Such dispersal would make them at least as accessible as the NECPA is at present.

Providing faster means of transportation to remove the Presidential Group from the White House would improve the use of the NEACP in those crises where relocation appears to be a feasible action. High speed helicopters located at the White House on a permanent basis or jet aircraft based at National Airport may be reasonable approaches to the problem. Another possibility would be to keep a NEACP at a location closer to the White House such as basing one at Washington National Airport during times of tension.

VI-41

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

The endurance in flight of the NEACP is limited. Bases away from the Washington area are required from which to operate during prolonged periods of world tension. Air bases require preplanned logistical and ground communication terminal support if the endurance of the NEACP is not to be seriously questioned. Transportable ground communication terminals must be provided for rapid deployment to areas not adequately covered in the fixed ground environment. An inflight refueling capability would markedly increase the endurance of the aircraft.

The space available in the aircraft restricts the size of the Decision Group, supporting staff, communications support and data base that can be used. Working space is available for 33 personnel, consisting of 17 operating personnel and 16 additional persons. Six additional people can be accommodated if necessary. The NEACP is specifically intended for general war operations only; if the President and the Presidential Group relocated during an intense crisis, they would not select the NEACP because of these limitations. The President might, however, position an Alternate Decision Group on board one or more of the aircraft and have these planes dispersed outside of the Washington area. Also, if an intense crisis escalated

VI-42

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

into general war, the President might choose to use the NEACP immediately on the receipt of warning or, if Washington was not attacked, after he had reviewed the immediate situation and issued the initial retaliatory orders. In any event the NEACP should accompany the President whenever he leaves the Washington area.

Space also restricts the flexibility of the NEACP to permit growth and evolutionary change; however, it may be feasible to improve both the flexibility and independent operating capability of the aircraft by internetting several aircraft in flight and so providing additional staff support, equipment and communications.

#### Proposed NMCS Facilities

When it is considered that: (1) the President is the only one who can legally authorize the use of nuclear weapons; (2) dependence on predelegation of this authority is not desirable; (3) the President may not leave the Washington area during an intense crisis prior to general war; (4) relocation of successor groups provides a capability definitely inferior to protecting the President; (5) many unforeseen events may develop during nuclear exchanges; (6) and it is national policy to pursue a strategy of controlled response, then

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

it becomes clear that the NMCS as presently configured could be further improved to enhance the protection and accessibility required for the President and his immediate advisors.

The Study considered a number of additional types of alternates that might be added to or substituted for the current alternates. Some of these were rejected; two seem to offer considerable promise; a DUCC and a National Mobile Land Command Post (NMLCP). These are now considered.

Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC)

At this time the development of a DUCC in the immediate Washington area appears to be a means for providing a survivable facility that would be readily accessible to the Presidential Group and could be used as the White House control center during any stage of crisis. In addition, a DUCC would provide for inconspicuous relocation of the President and his advisors and would permit the Presidential Group to remain together for continuity of operations. It would add to the survivability of the NMCS by providing additional redundancy and different form of protection. A DUCC could be hardened to provide considerable assurance that it would survive

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

several direct hits of multimegaton weapons. Its capability for at least 30 days of buttoned-up operation would provide adequate endurance. The survivability of the DUCC would be enhanced by the installation of an ABM defense in the Washington area when it becomes available. Such a defense could be made particularly effective against the high-yield weapons that would need to be penetrating or surface burst if the capsule itself were to be attacked. This defense could be deployed even if it were decided not to deploy ABM installations nationwide.

Although there are significant advantages to a DUCC, three significant disadvantages should be recognized:

- a. It is important to note that no experimental weapons effect data has been obtained close to the scale of the physical phenomena that would be encountered. Extrapolations involved in the design might be very much in error so that a DUCC, if attacked, might easily survive; or, it might be destroyed by a much smaller attack than the one for which it was designed. Actual data cannot be

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

obtained by the U. S. or the Soviets under the current nuclear test ban treaty. If this treaty is revoked, subsequent testing might resolve these questions after a DUCC was under construction or completed. However, it is possible that the factors that inhibited the U. S. and the USSR from conducting such effects tests before the treaty would still obtain if the treaty were revoked. There is a general consensus among technical experts that a DUCC has been conservatively designed in light of the defined attack.

- b. A DUCC will entail substantial cost--probably on the order of half of the NMCS funds during the next five years. However, the price of the DUCC can also be compared with elements of the strategic forces: it will cost about as much as one squadron of Minutemen, or one conventionally powered Forrestal-class attack carrier, or two Polaris submarines.

VI-46

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

- c. A heavy attack on Washington might not destroy the President but might deny his subsequent escape. If this were the case, a DUCC would have preserved the President during crisis and nuclear exchange but would have lost him for the aftermath. Mobile alternates are not as vulnerable in this regard.

Nonetheless, this Study feels that the advantages of protection and accessibility outweigh the disadvantages of uncertainty, cost, and, possibly, escape.

As indicated in earlier sections of this Chapter, there seems to be little point in constructing a DUCC which would only be used after a crisis had escalated to general war. Presidential access to such a facility could probably be denied by the Soviets (or a third party) without providing tactical warning and at a cost much lower than the lowest cost estimate for a small DUCC. The importance of short access time to the DUCC is not predicated on the use of tactical warning but rather on (1) making it accessible to the President so that he feels free to come and go during conditions short

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

of general war, (2) making it accessible to the changing Presidential Group and their immediate advisors during times of crisis so that face-to-face conferences can be readily held as the nature of the crisis expands.

Accordingly, if a DUCC program is approved, the minimum DUCC considered should provide capabilities for management of intense crises as well as for conduct of general war. The lowest possible access times should be provided for the President and a few principal advisors. Somewhat longer access times could be used for the higher volume transportation of other staff advisors and of day-to-day operations and maintenance personnel.

The size of a DUCC could vary extensively as a function of its assigned missions and operational concept. The degree of centralization of control envisaged in its use is an important variable. As centralization of decision and staff support increases from requirements to authorize the execution of plans to the capability to select and modify plans, to the capability for flexible

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

and detailed control of all national power, then the manning requirements escalate rapidly. With staff support and information provided from other facilities, a DUCC could be smaller.

The general war mission would require a minimum of 25 supporting staff personnel within the DUCC. Adding to this approximately 20 for the Presidential Group and ten for support of intense crises would more than fill up a 50-man facility. To this number must be added the maintenance personnel required for the communications, data processing equipment, generators, air conditioning, and utilities, medical and food service technicians; and hard-rock miners to repair or reopen communication and escape tunnels. Cross training of personnel would keep the numbers down, but the highly technical nature of much of the equipment coupled with a DUCC's possible complete isolation limits the extent to which this can be done. Finally, if the principles stated above (pages 24-29 ) are adopted, the 25 personnel indicated above for general war support would be completely inadequate.

For a small, 50-man DUCC, its general war capabilities would approximate the operational capabilities of a NEACP; for a

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

300-man facility, they would be somewhat less than the capabilities of a NECPA. These estimates assume a self-sufficient DUCC that does not depend on other NMCS alternates for post-strike staff support. If other alternates were continued after a DUCC became operational, then it would be possible for a DUCC to operate in several modes depending on the post-strike availability of the other alternates and their communications with a DUCC. In its most austere mode, a DUCC would deal directly with the surviving centers of the Unified and Specified Commands. If the NECPA were available, a DUCC would depend on it for more extensive staff support. In this way, a smaller DUCC could be built with the attendant risk of somewhat less overall system survivability and the operational and technical difficulties of coupling two remote staffs.

The flexibility of a DUCC for change and growth is critically dependent upon the number, size, and configuration of the underground capsules constructed. Because of this, considerable care should be taken to determine the mission, functions to be performed and who will use this facility prior to finalizing development and construction plans in order to minimize the cost and maximize the

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

utility of a DUCC. Even so, irreducible uncertainties in planning and the confining nature of the underground facility make it one of the least flexible alternates.

National Mobile Land Command Post

Consideration should be given to adding a National Mobile Land Command Post (NMLCP) to the NMCS. Other than the NECPA, this is the only facility that could provide the staff supporting communications and protection that might be needed by the President and the Presidential Group in the six or more years before a DUCC could be operational.

The operational and technical feasibility of an NMLCP have been studied. These studies indicate that communications equipment and operational facilities permanently installed on a train, or installed in special purpose motor vehicles using a piggy-back concept of rail transportation combined with an off-train capability, would provide survivability through mobility and additional redundancy to the NMCS as a whole. An NMLCP kept on the move and configured to look like any other train would be extremely hard to target and

VI-51

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

difficult to sabotage; there are thousands of miles of single track rail and tens of thousands of miles of road within several hundred miles of the Washington area.

The train could be made at least as accessible as any of the other alternates or could be located in any area of the nation where fallout and blast damage would be least likely to occur. It could provide transportation for the President on trips, for relocation of successors, and could be used as a ground mobile system to tie in with the NEACP at whatever air base it used when outside the ground communication system.

A moderate size NMLCP could provide a capability comparable to the NECPA. It could provide any size staff required by merely adding cars or an additional section of train. There would be adequate space for communication and data processing equipment needed to function during both crises and general war (assuming, of course, dependence on soft centers for crises less than general war).

An NMLCP could be tied into fixed communication facilities within the U. S. while on the move; however, for adequate long range communications in certain modes it might have to stop. It

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

might also have difficulty communicating while travelling through tunnels and over heavily girdered bridges but the magnitude of these limitations couldn't be precisely determined until operational experience was gained. In any case, survivability does not require that an NMLCP be continually on the move; only that movements be frequently made in an irregular manner. It could be protected from fallout and even blast damage by operating in tunnels. It has the capability of providing additional communication relay facilities for any element of the NMCS.

A train is easy to maintain, has a long life, and its endurance is only limited by normal logistical support required for any facility. It possesses considerable flexibility for growth, expansion and change. It is probably the cheapest way to provide a capable mobile alternate. If it is decided to add an NMLCP to the NMCS, it could become operational within eighteen months.

#### Evaluation of Best Combination of Alternates

Finally, for the time period 1965 - 1970, this section analyzes various combinations of alternates ranging from most austere to most capable. Configurations of alternates for a later time period that

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

could include a DUCC have been excluded for several reasons:

First, if a DUCC is approved, decisions on future alternates will depend on its detailed functional design and on the degree of its operational dependence on the other NMCS alternates. Second, these decisions will depend on further experience gained with the current alternates. They have been operational for about three years. Three times this much experience will have been gained by the time a DUCC could be operational.

This section only considers configurations of alternates that are primarily intended to support the President or an Alternate Decision Group during the strategic weapons exchange phase defined on page V-23 . (These are the Class I and II facilities discussed on pages V-33 - 34.)

The design of the current system of NMCS alternates is based on several principles:

- a. Survivability is best achieved through a multiplicity of alternates that have different types of vulnerability so that the enemy must pursue different tactics and timing in attacking each one.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Multiplicity greatly increases the cost of a successful attack against all the alternates and promises, even if an attack is eventually successful, to force the enemy to show his hand by presenting problems of timing the attack. This concept argues that a system of one ship at sea and one plane airborne is more survivable than a system of two ships at sea.

- b. Because of the different sizes of the various alternates, the system provides for many different levels of staff and communication support ranging from the very austere capabilities of the NEACP to the three-thousand-man capacity of Site R.
- c. Except for small prelocated operations teams at each of the alternates, the main staff support for the NECPA and the ANMCC will be derived during periods of crisis through augmentation by hundreds of personnel from the Joint Staff, OSD, the Defense Agencies, the Services, and other Executive Departments.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

- d. To the extent that warning permits, the President and presidential successors will relocate to different alternates so that one surviving alternate will carry duly constituted authority on board.

Although there is considerable merit to each of the above principles, each one can also present problems and disadvantages. Multiplicity in types of alternates, in size of staff, and in roles assigned can only be capitalized on if there is multiplicity and specialization in development of operational procedures, in providing for relocation and accessibility, in organizing and assigning qualified manpower, in specialized exercising and evaluation, in communications internetting, and in research and development support. There is a danger that too much multiplicity supported by too little authority, staff, and resources can lead to a multiplicity of second-class facilities.

Recent discussions of the NMCS budget lend credence to this danger. If resources are limited, there is a tendency to remove one ship from the NECPA, to delay the procurement of significantly improved aircraft for the NEACP, to reduce personnel, development and procurement for each alternate.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

If only a very austere system of alternates could be provided, then a two-ship NECPA program would appear to be the most desirable. Such a system would have the following important capabilities:

- a. One ship could be maintained on station at all times to receive the President or an Alternate Decision Group should strategic or tactical warning be received; or should the President decide to relocate during intense crises.
- b. Even if the ship continuously-on-station was not used by the President or an Alternate Decision Group, its high survivability would do most to insure availability of at least one NMCS command center after loss of the President and Washington. This situation might arise after a Soviet initiative strike "out of the blue", that is a strike not preceded by a crisis. Or, it might arise during an intense crisis if the President did not choose to relocate himself or an Alternate Decision Group. In either case, the ship's capability to inform the CINCs,

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

to assist in information interchange between them, and to seek out a Presidential successor would be essential.

- c. The second ship could be occasionally withdrawn from operational readiness for a period of days or weeks in order to be maintained, modified or exercised at sea.
- d. In the event that a severe crisis developed, both ships could often be made available so that the President and an Alternate Decision Group could be relocated, and so that the enemy would be faced with the problem of simultaneously attacking two mobile alternates. Possibly this is not as difficult a task as attacking a ship and a plane but it is considerably more difficult than attacking only one ship.
- e. Staff support of at least three hundred personnel in each ship could be provided the National Decision

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Groups. In addition, there is expansion capability for increased use of automated equipment and expanded communications as new techniques are developed and proven.

- f. If the authority and resources available to develop improved operational capability in the NMCS alternates is limited, then these resources could be focused in a concerted fashion on these two alternates.
- g. When the President travelled for an extended period to a location far from Washington, one of the ships could often be prepositioned for readier access when he arrived at his destination.

The Study considered a second austere configuration consisting of one ship and three NEACP aircraft. Compared with the two-ship only alternative, this configuration would have the following advantages:

- a. It would be more survivable in that the enemy would be forced to target both a ship and a plane

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

moving randomly (assuming that both were mobile at the time of the enemy attack).

- b. It would cost somewhat less over a 5-year period than the 2-ship configuration.
- c. It would provide an airborne communication relay.
- d. The aircraft could be made somewhat more accessible than the ship for rapid relocation of the President or an Alternate Decision Group on receipt of tactical warning.
- e. The aircraft could accompany the President on trips outside the Washington area.

However, a three aircraft - one ship configuration would have the disadvantage that there would be numerous intermittent periods when a ship would not be available on short notice. If the single NECPA ship were to be modified and exercised as necessary, then we would estimate only 80 percent availability of

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

the ship on a 24-hour or less notice,\* and only 90 percent availability on 1-week notice. At times when the ship was unavailable, the President would be unable to relocate to an alternate during intense crises since the NEACP does not possess the capability of supporting him for prolonged periods in situations short of general war.

Also, it is difficult to assess the significance of any added survivability of a plane and ship configuration over that of a 2-ship configuration. The primary role of the NMCS in providing presidential protection is to insure that a National Decision Group will not be destroyed by an attack on Washington and that a very concerted attack would be required to destroy their center. In this sense, there seems to be much less value in raising the price of attack from 25 to 50 weapons compared with insuring that the price is at least 25 weapons.

Finally, the lower endurance after the onset of general war of the aircraft element compared with the NECPA element is significant.

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\*This relatively high availability figure assumes two full crews for the single NECPA ship similar to the Blue and Gold crews used for Polaris submarines.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Accordingly, this Study concludes that the 2-ship configuration would be the preferred austere system if priority is assigned to providing a capability for presidential relocation during an intense crisis. On the other hand, if it were considered highly unlikely that the President would relocate under these conditions, that he would utilize an Alternate Decision Group instead, and that he planned to relocate himself after the onset of a general war, then the 1-ship - 3-aircraft option seems preferable.

The second increment in improving this austere NMCS system would depend on the priority attached to the following different objectives:

- a. Provide a multiplicity of centers to which the President could relocate during an intense crisis;
- b. Provide a multiplicity of centers to which the President or an Alternate Decision Group could relocate after strategic or tactical warning;
- c. Provide a very large, flexible center that would not be a bonus target for an attack on Washington.

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The first need implies: (1) a larger staff than can be provided by the NEACP, (2) endurance and nondisrupted operational capability during the crisis, and (3) extensive communication support with soft national centers supporting the Presidential Group. The most promising means of satisfying this need (in the period before a DUCC could be built) would be the NMLCP. If proper priority were given, such a capability could be developed in less than eighteen months.

If priority were given to the second need, the austere two-ship system should be enhanced by a NEACP system consisting of three modern aircraft. This expanded alternative would also have the advantage that a NEACP aircraft could readily follow the President on his travels. It would also be capable of a limited, continuous airborne alert during intense crises.

If priority were given to the third need above, the ANMCC would be added. However, this study questions the wisdom of this priority considering the extreme unlikelihood that the President or a presidential successor would relocate to the ANMCC. However, the study does recommend continuation of the AJCC with the mission discussed on pages VI-34 - 36.

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If it is desirable to strengthen the NMCS even more, then the third level of improvement would consist of one of the following, depending on the priorities that had been stressed above:

- a. A two-ship NECPA, a three aircraft NEACP, a NMLCP.
- b. A two-ship NECPA, a NMLCP, an ANMCC.
- c. A two-ship NECPA, a three aircraft NEACP, an ANMCC.

Alternative a. stresses survivability; Alternative b. stresses relocation of the President during crises and flexibility of support; Alternative c. (the current system) stresses flexibility, the use of an Alternate Decision Group, and the relocation of the President after tactical warning.

Finally, one could include all of the present and proposed facilities discussed above.

The Study Group recommends, for the time period before a DUCC could be operational, that a two-ship NECPA element and a three-aircraft NEACP element be continued and improved for use during the strategic weapons exchange phase of a general war; that the

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NECPA ships be developed so that they are useable by the President and the Presidential Group during intense crises short of general war; and that the role of the AJCC stress its use in phases before and after the strategic weapons exchange phase. Although a National Mobile Land Command Post promises a capability comparable with that of the NECPA ships at probably less cost, the Study Group does not recommend that an NMLCP be developed at this time. Essentially this is a comparative judgment. The NMLCP represents an additional facility in support of the relocation option of the President in severe or intense crises, short of general war. The White House and other Executive Agencies have expressed relatively little interest in this option. Capability to support it can be explored and developed by expanding the role of the already available NECPA ships. On the other hand, the DUCC offers a degree of accessibility and communications support not duplicated in other facilities and particularly well matched to the President's crisis management needs. However, an NMLCP should be seriously considered if the DUCC is not approved or if greater interest develops in additional highly protected relocation sites during the time period before a DUCC could become operational.

VI-65

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As pointed out in the discussion of the current NECPA ships (pages VI-37 - 40), the USS NORTHAMPTON has certain deficiencies with regard to communications, helicopter operating space, data processing and display, and growth capability. In addition, differences in configuration between the NORTHAMPTON and the WRIGHT hamper operational effectiveness of the two NECPAs and increase the cost of improvement.

The operational deficiencies of the current NECPA, indicated above, can be reduced. There are many possibilities including:

- a. Significantly improve the NORTHAMPTON.
- b. Convert a hull comparable to the USS WRIGHT in physical and operational characteristics as a replacement for the NORTHAMPTON.
- c. Man the WRIGHT with two complete crews (the Polaris Blue and Gold crew concept); keep her on station to the maximum extent compatible with effective operations, exercising, maintenance and development; and place the NORTHAMPTON on station only when the WRIGHT must be in port or participating in exercises.

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- d. Keep a somewhat improved NORTHAMPTON at sea as much as feasible with one crew and two primary missions: (1) provide for the no-warning situation where Washington and the President are destroyed, (2) support a Presidential Decision Group. Keep the WRIGHT available, exercised and up-to-date for Presidential relocation during an intense crisis. This alternative is probably the least expensive but it is significantly less desirable than the first three considered above.

A detailed study would probably suggest that a combination of these possibilities is indicated. For example, the extent of delay in replacing the NORTHAMPTON would affect both the size of a reasonable investment for improving the interim NORTHAMPTON and the interim operational concepts. Accordingly, the Study Group recommends that the JCS assisted by DCA and the Navy conduct a study that develops plans for remedying the operational defects of the current two-ship NECFA element. This study should: (1) detail functional needs and criteria for supporting the Presidential Group

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during intense crises and during the strategic exchange phase;  
(2) compare the costs and schedules of significantly improving  
the NORTHAMPTON or obtaining a replacement hull; and, (3)  
consider operating concepts with the current or new ships.

Summary Conclusions

The following is a summary of the conclusions of the Study  
Group regarding the alternates of the NMCS:

1. The alternates, unlike the NMCC, are national  
centers in that they must provide support to a decision-making group  
concerned with more than Department of Defense resources and  
with more than military considerations.

2. The most important functions of an alternate are to  
protect and support the President and the Presidential Group during  
both intense crises and general war. If the President and the  
Presidential Group do not relocate during an intense crisis, then  
their protection is marginal at the onset of general war. For  
management of intense crises short of general war, the Presidential  
alternate would primarily depend on staff and communications support

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from the various soft-centers in Washington; the alternate would be connected to these centers with high capacity communications that are not necessarily protected. For management of general war, the basic mode of operation would not depend on survival of Washington or of other NMCS alternates. For this mode, highly survivable, lower capacity communications are required between the alternate and the CINC Headquarters, the CINC alternates and other subordinate centers.

3. Only the NECPA, an NMLCP and a DUCC could satisfy the requirements of protection, endurance, staff support and communications capability needed for both intense crises and general war. The advantages of the DUCC with respect to accessibility and communications support during intense crises outweigh the disadvantages of cost, unknown weapons effects, and uncertainty of escape. If a DUCC is undertaken, its precise size should be determined by considering the factors indicated above (see pages VI-18-29).

4. Provision should also be made for supporting an Alternate Decision Group headed by a Presidential successor that would relocate during intense crisis or after receipt of tactical warning.

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Since this group would require less communications and staff support than the Presidential Group, all of the alternates listed above plus the NEACP would be adequate. The Vice-President seems uniquely suited to head an Alternate Decision Group. In any case, the Study considers it unlikely that more than one Alternate Decision Group would be constituted during crises or general war.

5. For the time period before a DUCC could be developed, the Study has considered the following three different configurations of alternates ranging from the most austere to the most adequate:

- a. Two functionally similar NECPA ships
- b. Three NEACP aircraft plus a. above
- c. An NMLCP with a staff capacity somewhat less than a NECPA plus b. above.

A selection of one of these alternatives depends on many factors: available funds, available personnel for prelocation and round-the-clock operation, augmentation plans, priority assigned to Presidential relocation during intense crises, and degree of dependence on relocation Alternate Decision Groups. The Study recommends Alternative b. -- Two NECPA ships and three NEACP aircraft.

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6. If a DUCC is approved, mobile alternates will still be needed after a DUCC is operational to provide flexibility and to enhance the survivability of the entire NMCS. Selection of a precise configuration of alternates for this time period should await detailed functional design of a DUCC and further experience with the current NMCS alternates.

7. The JCS assisted by DCA and the Navy should conduct a study that develops plans for remedying the operational defects of the current two-ship NECPA element. This study should: (1) detail the functional needs and criteria for support of the Presidential Group during intense crises and during the strategic exchange phase; (2) compare the costs and schedules of significantly improving the NORTHAMPTON or obtaining a replacement hull; and, (3) consider operating concepts with the current or new ships.

8. The operational concept and support plans of the NECPA and the NEACP should be revised to provide for greater endurance, survivability and accessibility. For the NECPA, this planning should include increased protection from various forms of attack, larger and faster transportation capability between Washington

VI-71

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**TOP SECRET**

and the ships, and operations closer to the Washington area during crises. For the NEACP, the planning should include use of aerial refueling, permanent dispersal of the aircraft, capability for post-strike use of several bases that have prelocated logistics and communications support, and plans for locating an aircraft closer to Washington during severe crises.

9. Because of its relatively low survivability, the ANMCC is not suited to use by the President or an Alternate Decision Group during an intense crisis or the initial stages of a general war. The facility, however, should be continued as an AJCC with primarily the following functions: act as a potential reconstitution site in the follow-on phases of a general war; provide a dispersed back-up to Washington communications; and support other NMCS centers for day-to-day operations and crises. A detailed functional and technical analysis of the current and planned AJCC should be conducted in order to develop a better understanding of how particular capabilities and costs contribute to each of these functions. The study should indicate potential savings.

VI-72

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SUMMARY  
CHAPTER VII

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## CHAPTER VII

### SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The President increasingly becomes the focal point of crisis management as a crisis intensifies. He devotes more time to the crisis and considers selected operations in greater detail. The President needs and operates with extreme flexibility -- flexibility in constituting his immediate decision group; in defining alternate courses of action that must be considered; in determining, to the extent feasible, the timing of the U. S. responses and therefore the time allowable for staff inputs; flexibility in seeking detailed information on selected military operations; in establishing and employing the organization and operational command chain including reducing the number of echelons of command; flexibility in determining the sensitivity of selected information relating to the crisis; in communicating with allied, neutral and enemy heads of state; and in establishing constraints or accepting risks in conducting the crisis.

The President will select the Presidential Group that will assist him in directing a given crisis. This has invariably been true in the past and it is reasonable to assume that it will continue to be so in the future. Since the Presidential Group will include personal advisors,

VII-I

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and statutory advisors and their subordinates, it will reflect military, political, diplomatic, intelligence and other such interests that might be relevant to the crisis. As a crisis develops, the composition of the Presidential Group will normally grow and alter.

So far the U. S. has experienced only a very few of the infinite number of crisis situations with which command and control support arrangements must be prepared to cope. Crisis situations, far more intense than any yet experienced, but nevertheless short of a large scale intercontinental nuclear exchange, are possible. These should be given more consideration in the development of U. S. command and control arrangements. For example, as indicated below, consideration of intense crises can have a significant impact on plans for presidential **protection**.

During a crisis the President and the Presidential Group will probably use mission-oriented interagency groups to assist them in estimating the present situation, and in developing and evaluating alternate courses of action. These groups may be asked to consider broad or narrow aspects of the crisis. The President

VII-2

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and the Presidential Group expect that such support has melded military, political, domestic and diplomatic factors. Accordingly, the constitution of the Presidential Group and their need for staff support implies the need for interagency staffing before estimates and advice are advanced to the Presidential Group.

For severe crises, the composition and extent of the advisory staff support to the President will be uniquely determined at the time of the crisis by the nature of the crisis including such factors as timing, areas and participants, scope of conflict, the opportunity and the need for secrecy, escalatory potential, and diplomatic constraints. On the other hand, the routine information support capabilities needed to support these individuals are much more predictable. These capabilities include communications and message distribution, provision of factual data on force status and plans, routine staff support in implementing and promulgating decisions, conferencing and display facilities, and the staff which operates and provides these capabilities. Accordingly, it is desirable and feasible to separate conceptually and organizationally the problem of providing the advisory staff support from that of providing the routine information support. It is difficult to improvise information support during a crisis and it is possible to anticipate the requirements

VII-3

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for this support before the crisis. The reverse is true for staff advisory support.

Presidential councils are informal and consultative in nature. The President receives his information support through his advisors and, accordingly, crisis management would not be enhanced by establishment at the national level of an elaborate "National Command Center" manned by a large, permanent interagency staff.

Many avenues are available that would improve interagency effectiveness in crisis anticipation and management. The following are recommended: increased attention at all levels of the Joint Staff with crisis management, freer interaction at all levels between members of the Joint Staff and their counterparts in other agencies, greater interagency review of military and political contingency plans, increased interagency participation in war gaming and exercising, and increased attention within the Joint Staff on non-military factors affecting crisis anticipation and management.

Within the military establishment the concept of handling crises within command posts or operations centers is well established. The NMCC is similar to, but both narrower and

VII-4

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broader in its scope than the conventional operations center. It is narrower in that its support to decision makers is rendered through the medium of their staff advisors, and ordinarily it does not itself provide advisory staff support except when an emergency does not permit referral to such advisors. It is broader in that the principal users of NMCC information support are not only the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, but also various elements of OSD and authorized persons in the White House, State Department and CIA.

The NMCC performs the functions of (1) warning and alert, (2) information support, and (3) implementation. Its principal suppliers of information to the NMCC are the operating forces, the service operations centers, and the DIA through the Intelligence Support and Indications Center.

The fundamental character of the NMCC is that of a DoD information support facility operated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the DoD as a whole. In the performance of its functions the NMCC should exchange information freely with analogous information centers elsewhere within the Government.

VII-5

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The management arrangements under which the NMCC operates should preserve its close working relationship with the Directorate for Operations in the Joint Staff and also should reflect its essentially informational character and DoD-wide scope.

Future development of the NMCC should emphasize evolutionary improvement as opposed to sweeping change. Such evolution will be helped by increased efforts to evaluate NMCC performances both in actual crises and in exercises. The establishment of suitable performance standards for the NMCC will also be helpful in its development.

Exercises of a variety of types and scope are necessary not only for the improvement of the NMCC but also to familiarize participating decision makers with its facilities and with command problems. For some of these exercises, senior members from all affected agencies and their staffs should participate.

At any stage of crisis or general nuclear war, enemy options range from a deliberate heavy attack against national command centers to strenuously avoiding these targets. In addition, there are a host of foreseeable and unforeseeable events that could lead to nuclear strikes on Washington or to Washington remaining completely undamaged. In providing for command and control

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support to the President, all of these contingencies must be considered. In providing survivability for the President, the worst cases must be planned for.

There are many factors militating against presidential relocation during crises short of general war. However, if the enemy decides to escalate a crisis to general war, he can easily destroy unprotected national centers without the President's receiving tactical warning. If tactical warning of an attack is received, it is not clear that the President's wisest course would be to seek immediate protection. Accordingly, capabilities should be provided for presidential protection in a highly survivable command center during any phase of crisis. This Center must allow the President and the Presidential Group to manage intense crises short of general nuclear war as well as these can be managed from the White House.

The unique value of the President required that all possible measures be taken to insure his personal survival of an attack on the U. S. However, provision for a successor is also necessary. Accordingly, capabilities should allow relocation to a highly survivable center of an alternate Presidential Group headed by a presidentially designated alternate Commander-in-Chief. The

VII-7

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command and control support for this alternate group could be much more austere than those for a relocated President.

It is important to recognize the national-level character of those alternates that might be used by the President or an Alternate Decision Group as contrasted with the DOD-level role of the NMCC.

*Deep underground facility*  
A DUCC in Washington would be the only facility that could adequately satisfy the presidential needs for accessibility combined with survivability and adequate staff support. However, since a DUCC cannot be operational for at least five years, in the interim only the NECPA ship and a National Mobile Land Command Post (NMLCP) come close to approximating the requirements of: adequate staff support; high volume (not necessarily survivable) communications between the alternate and soft Washington centers; continuous operation for a period of days or weeks; and high survivability of the alternate itself. The NEACP falls short of meeting the first three criteria: the ANMCC fails on the last.

For the time period before a DUCC could be operational, the study developed the following three different configurations of alternates ranging from most austere to the most adequate:

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(1) Nat'l Emrg.

(2) Nat'l. Emrg.

Airborne Command Post

(3) Nat'l Emrg.

Land Command Post

- (1)
  - a. Two functionally similar NECPA ships
- (2)
  - b. Three NEACP aircraft, plus (a) above
- (3)
  - c. An NMLCP with a staff capacity somewhat less than a NECPA, plus (b) above.

The Study recommends alternative (b) above. An NMLCP is not recommended unless greater emphasis is placed on providing flexible capabilities for presidential relocation during intense crises short of general war.

The JCS assisted by DCA and the Navy should conduct a study that develops plans for remedying the operational defects of the current two-ship NECPA element. This study should: i) detail the functional needs and criteria for support of the Presidential Group during intense crises and during the strategic exchange phase; ii) compare the costs and schedules of significantly improving the NORTHHAMPTON or obtaining a replacement hull; and, iii) consider operating concepts with the current or new ships.

The operational concept and support plans of the NECPA and the NEACP should be revised to provide for greater endurance, survivability and accessibility. For the NECPA, this planning should include increased protection from various forms of attack,

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larger and faster transportation capability between Washington and the ships, and operations closer to the Washington area during crises. For the NEACP, the planning should include use of aerial refueling, permanent dispersal of the aircraft, capability for post-strike use of several bases that have prelocated logistics and communications support, and plans for locating the aircraft closer to Washington during severe crises.

Because of its relatively low survivability, the ANMCC is not suited to use by the President or an Alternate Decision Group during an intense crisis or the initial stages of a general war. The AJCC should be continued with primarily the following functions: act as a potential reconstitution site in the follow-on phases of a general war; provide a dispersed back-up to Washington communications; and support other NMCS centers for day-to-day operations and crises. A detailed functional and technical analysis of the current and planned AJCC should be conducted in order to develop a better understanding of how particular capabilities and costs contribute to each of these functions. The study should indicate potential savings.

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ANNEX A

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**THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON**

27 FEB 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR** The Secretaries of the Military Departments  
The Director of Defense Research & Engineering  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense  
The General Counsel  
The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense  
The Assistants to the Secretary of Defense  
The Director, Defense Atomic Support Agency  
The Director, Defense Communications Agency  
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
The Director, Defense Supply Agency  
The Director, National Security Agency

**SUBJECT:** Conceptual Approach to the NMCS

**References:** (a) CM-1151-64, "Review of NMCS Planning,"  
dated 27 January 1964  
(b) Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum,  
"Command, Control and Communications,"  
dated 10 February 1964

As an initial step in re-evaluating Department of Defense command and control activities, as proposed in reference (a), I desire that an appraisal be undertaken of the requirements for command and control support to the President during crisis situations. This appraisal will furnish the standard against which Department of Defense capabilities and plans, particularly for the National Military Command System (NMCS), can be compared to insure that our conceptual approach to command and control is valid, effective, and understandable. Terms of Reference for the appraisal are attached.

The Director of Organizational and Management Planning as my representative, and Lieutenant General David A. Burchinal, designated to represent the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will provide policy guidance for the study effort. In addition, the Director of Organizational

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
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and Management Planning will arrange for participation in the Study Group by appropriate elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, has designated Rear Admiral Paul P. Blackburn, Jr., Chief, Command and Control Requirements Group, to chair the Study Group and to arrange for Joint Staff support, as required.

Following submission of the Study Group report, I will request comments on the result prior to arranging for the subsequent steps in clarifying our conceptual approach to command and control.

Actions designed to pursue the re-evaluation of other portions of the over-all command and control problem, indicated in reference (b), will be announced later.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Cyrus Vance". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the main text block.

Attachment

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ANNEX B

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### COMMAND AND CONTROL SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL DECISION AUTHORITIES

#### TERMS OF REFERENCE

##### A. INTRODUCTION

1. There is a need for a re-evaluation of the purposes of; conceptual approach to; detailed planning, designing and engineering support efforts for; assignments of functional responsibility for; and organizational arrangements for command and control systems within the Department of Defense.
2. The over-all re-evaluation will be divided into various problem areas and separate efforts initiated to seek solutions in each of these areas.
3. A problem with long range implications is the need to establish a clearly defined conceptual approach to command and control at the national level. The study effort outlined in these Terms of Reference is designed to provide a basis for developing a valid, universally understood conceptual approach for Department of Defense command and control support to the President. \*

\*As used here the term "support to the President" is visualized to include support to the President, to his personal and statutory advisors, to the successors, and to existing organizational entities or organizational entities which the President may establish which have as their purpose providing assistance to the President in the management of crisis situations.

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### B. OBJECTIVE SOUGHT

The specific objective sought in this study effort is the identification and cataloging of the command and control support needs of the President during crisis and conflict situations and the delimiting of those needs for which the Department of Defense is, or should be, responsible. The types of activities and resultant categories of support to be investigated are as follows:

1. The information which the President will require in order to reach decisions during crisis situations. With respect to this informational need, it will be necessary to determine the type (status of friendly forces, intelligence, political, domestic, etc.); the nature (scope and degree of refinement); the form (method of presentation which will be most useful); the time factors involved; and the source (who provides it and through what channels).
2. The statutory advisors or others with whom the President may wish to confer directly during the decision-making process and whether these individuals should be co-located with the President.
3. The scheme for establishing alternate decision-making groups composed of the President or his successors; principal civilian statutory advisors or their representatives; principal military advisors; and immediate staff support, and proposed methods of dispersing these groups.
4. The types of decisions that will be made, the individuals or activities who will require notification of such decisions, and the form and method of such notification.
5. Staff required to support the principal statutory advisors both:
  - a. At the President's location providing immediate support to the advisors;

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- b. At locations where the alternate decision-making groups may be located; and
- c. At locations where the more detailed activities associated with the responsibilities of the advisors are being performed and from which back-up support can be provided.

### C. RESULT DESIRED

- 1. A report to the Deputy Secretary of Defense having a target date of 1 May 1964 which will:
  - a. Set forth the information requested in a manner permitting subsequent evaluation as to whether or not the present Department of Defense command and control apparatus, particularly the NMCS, is capable of reasonably meeting the requirements of the National Decision Authorities; and
  - b. Identify any need to alter the conceptual approach within the Department of Defense to command and control.

### D. METHOD

- 1. The Study Group will develop the requirements for information, decisions, instructions, and requisite staff support, by investigating a range of crisis and conflict situations (either hypothetical or historical) covering a spectrum of intensity.
- 2. Particular emphasis should be placed on those periods immediately preceding or following basic decisions, identifying where possible the more critical needs of the President and his personal and statutory advisors as opposed to those needs which permit a useful, but not vital, degree of refinement.
- 3. The study should include consideration, under strategic warning conditions, of a minor crisis, an intermediate

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crisis, and a major crisis where both sides are on the brink of exchanging strategic weapons. The major crisis situation should be escalated to include consideration of support needs during a general war. In addition, the major crisis should be varied to include consideration of a situation in which Soviet strategic nuclear weapons are launched against the U. S. without (or with only minimum) strategic warning, posing the need to obtain information, reach decisions and take appropriate action under these conditions. The study should also consider the needs of the President and his principal advisors with respect to temporarily stabilized conflict situations arising out of crises (for example, the Congo and Korea) that may lead to new crises and any unusual needs which may result from multiple crises situations.

4. In conducting the review, analytic techniques employed should include the following:
  - a. The analysis should be made in terms of the principal types of political and military incidents, activities, and problems that occur during crises and conflicts; the relationship of these to the assessment and decision roles of the President; and the resulting implications for command and control support to the President;
  - b. The development of scenarios for different types of crises. To the extent feasible, it would be desirable to employ scenarios that have already been developed for other purposes; and
  - c. The testing of analytic conclusions against historical situations.

### E. LIMITS FOR THE INVESTIGATION

1. The study effort will be conducted within the confines of current national policy and strategy as enunciated by the President and other principal administration officials.

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2. Time frame to be considered will be 1965 through 1969.
3. The effort will be directed toward identifying requirements for the information and necessary staff support essential to decision-making and the issuance of instructions rather than toward means for satisfying these requirements.
4. The principal concern should be the immediate support to be provided to the President at the Washington level and the Department of Defense back-up required to insure that this support is available.
5. The study effort will be conducted on a strictly in-house basis until such time as clearance is obtained from the Secretary of Defense to contact outside agencies. Therefore, projections of support provided by outside agencies will be based on information currently available within the Department of Defense, will be stated in general terms, and will consider particularly that support which interacts with support provided by the Department of Defense.

### F. ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions will be used by the Study Group. No other assumptions will be used without prior approval from the Deputy Secretary of Defense or his designee:

1. Because of political factors, it is extremely unlikely that the President would leave the Washington area during a crisis situation which could result in a nuclear exchange. However, if located outside of the Washington area at the initiation of a rapidly developing situation, the President may not return to the Washington area.
2. For the foreseeable future, the President will not pre-delegate authority for the initial expenditure of nuclear weapons, except possibly for air or missile defense of CONUS.



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3. The direct access between other Presidential advisors, such as the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence, and certain of their subordinate advisors and staff support mechanisms will be maintained as long as these survive.
4. For most levels of conflict and to the extent possible, the President and his principal advisors will exercise detailed monitoring and control of some actions at low echelons whenever these actions appear to have inherent national significance.

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ANNEX C

SCENARIOS, WAR GAMES, EXERCISES AND HISTORICAL INCIDENTS

PART I

INTRODUCTION

This annex indicates some of the scenarios, war games, exercises, and actual crisis situations that were utilized during the course of the Study. In studying these actual or hypothetical situations, the goal was to determine the lessons applying to command, control and communication support of the President. The technique used was to consider the world situation at a point in crisis, to identify associated decisions that faced the President and the Presidential Group; to develop the information needs of the President and his advisory staff support including the volume, detail and timing of this information; and, finally, to derive the impact of these needs on concepts and operation of command and control support. The goal was not to evaluate the quality of crisis management in actual situations (e. g. could better decisions have been made), nor to suggest principles of crisis management or strategic policy for the future. In this regard, one conclusion of the Study Group is that national level command and control support to the President is more heavily influenced by the operating needs of the Presidency rather than by the particular force postures and national strategies of parties to the conflict. (Of course, this phenomenon become less and less

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true as one considers command and control capabilities at successively lower echelons.)

The study of conflicts short of general war was particularly assisted by an analysis of six war games conducted by the Joint War Games Agency. Each of these games involved the threat or use of extensive military action. In general, the game players on both sides were senior policy-level officials within DOD and at State, CIA and the White House. As such, this participation highlighted the concerns of senior officials and demonstrated ways in which military and non-military factors must be integrated in crisis management. The six games dealt with:

1. South Vietnam in 1964, where little escalation took place.
2. A large conflict in South East Asia in 1965
3. An Eastern German revolt in 1964
4. A Berlin confrontation in 1963
5. A battle for Laos and South Vietnam in 1962
6. Escalation in Iran in 1962.

For each of these games, succeeding sections discuss the game focus, chronology and issues involved.

Although these games are invaluable in identifying the timing and nature of key Presidential decisions during crises and the many

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

interrelated factors that must be considered, they contain virtually no data on the actual problems of coupling information support at the national level with the advisory staffs supporting the President and his key advisors. The study of command and control support during actual crises is an invaluable, albeit restricted, tool in this regard. It is restricted, as pointed out in a section below identifying the particular historical crises that was considered, because even the severest crisis in the past decade -- the Cuban Missile Crisis -- involved no battle, no commitment of major forces in crisis management and many stages of escalation short of general war remained available to both parties to the conflict. This observation coupled with the possibility that general war will become in the future a less viable option for both sides leads to the discussion and recommendation in the body of the report that greater attention must be devoted to the study of managing intense crises and to the command and control implications.

The Joint Staff conducted Exercise Key Chain in October 1963 as a world-wide exercise of crisis and limited war in recognition that at least simulated testing of the world-wide command and control system was needed for a crisis such as would have occurred had the Cuban missile crisis escalated several stages. As discussed below, this Exercise was precluded from achieving its full goals

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

but study of the conduct was nonetheless most revealing.

One of the key problems affecting command and control needs is the situation in Central Europe and the many possible developments in NATO strategy and forces. The scenarios developed in the Tac Nuc 65 Study by the Chairman's Special Studies Group were among those utilized for this purpose. The political and diplomatic questions that would be present during such scenarios were not as fully developed as the military factors. Nonetheless, these scenarios provide valuable insights into questions of available options, timing, level of conflict, and attack assessment needs even recognizing that political and command and control restraints may preclude the development of as rich a range of options as was presented in this study.

Regarding general war, the HIGH HEELS II exercise conducted by the JCS in October 1963 and the HIGH HEELS III exercise planned for September 1964 (but cancelled as a result of the Gulf of Tonkin) were studied. The HIGH HEELS exercises are very useful in studying national level command and control support mechanisms to the President. They reveal problems and needs related to vulnerability, emergency procedures, augmentation, possible roles of the alternates, alerting of forces and detection of major Soviet attacks. Since the exercises are necessarily forced to widespread strategic exchanges

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

(for exercise purposes) they do not shed light on war avoidance measures that might be considered by the President at the time of intense crisis. They also have not considered possibilities of intra-war deterrence and war termination.

As an aid in illuminating some of the more complex politico-military problems that might face the President during intense crisis and the strategic exchange phase of a general war, the Study Group used three scenarios developed in the NESC study on the Management and Termination of Thermonuclear War with the Soviet Union (TS). Several excursions of these scenarios involving strategy changes and technological uncertainties are discussed briefly in the last section of this annex.

**TOP SECRET**

## TOP SECRET

### PART II

#### SIX WAR GAMES

This section considers six war games developed by the Joint War Games Agency of the JCS.

1. South Vietnam -- 1964

- a. Game Focus -- SIGMA I-64 is a military political game centered on the escalation of the war in South Vietnam and its extension by the United States to North Vietnam by attacking limited objectives.

The major U. S. objective is to compel reduction of North Vietnamese intervention in South Vietnam through military action against North Vietnam. Escalation is carried out in two steps: (1) Republic of Vietnam (RVN) ground and air action on a "tit-for-tat" basis, and (2) strokes by U. S. aircraft against selected North Vietnam (DRV) targets.

b. Chronology

(1) Pregame Events

Mar-June	Increased Viet Cong action supported by North Vietnam.
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Decision by U. S. to create climate  
of opinion favorable to escalation.

(2) Game Events

Jun 15-25      The U. S. and RVN decide to carry out  
tit-for-tat raids against North Vietnam  
with RVN ground and air forces. Action  
to begin June 25 and to continue until  
"indications" reveal a substantial  
reduction of DRV support of Viet Cong  
action.

DRV, Viet Cong and Pathet Laos rely on  
parrying the U. S. offensive through  
diplomatic and psychological pressure  
depicting the U. S. as aggressor.

Communist China declares support for  
DRV and furnishes air defense fighters  
and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).  
It refuses to supply tactical aircraft.

Jun 15 -      U. S. intervenes and bombs DRV military  
Jul 21      targets. Communist leaders turn world  
opinion against U. S. As a result,

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

American domestic opinion is sharply split. UN Security Council action against U. S. is staved off only through U. S. veto. Soviet Union supplies MIG 17s and SAMs to DRV.

Jul 22

President asks for Joint Congressional Resolution noting DRV aggression against RVN, warning other Communist powers against intervention, and authorizing President to use U. S. forces to repel aggression in SE Asia.

Jul 22

U. S. bombs DRV targets. Communist China recommends and prepares for support of DRV offensive operations against Thailand and Northern Burma. The game ends with the U. S. and Communist China on a direct collision course in SE Asia. The U. S. is attacking military and economic targets in North Vietnam and conducting air reconnaissance over China, while China is preparing for a ground invasion of Southeast Asia.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

c. Principal Issues for Presidential Decision

- (1) Whether and when U. S. should switch from support of counterinsurgency operations within South Vietnam to indirect and direct support of military action against North Vietnam?
- (2) Which actions are best calculated to compel reduction of North Vietnamese intervention in South Vietnam without bringing about war with Communist China?
- (3) What can be done to prepare domestic and world opinion for direct U. S. intervention and to minimize expected adverse reaction?

2. Large Conflict in Southeast Asia -- 1965

- a. Game Focus -- SIGMA II-64 considers U. S. military strategy to be followed in SE Asia in 1965, assuming a belligerent Red China and large-scale U. S. intervention. The U. S. objective is to stop broad Red Chinese incursions into SE Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Burma) through decisive military action backed by appropriate political cover moves. Large U. S. ground, sea and air forces are deployed and spread out over South Vietnam, Thailand and Laos.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

b. Chronology

(1) Pregame Events

1964 Fall	War in S. Vietnam goes badly for U. S. and the Khanh regime. Limited U. S. naval air strikes against N. Vietnamese bases do not produce desired effect. Red China deploys MIG's to North Vietnamese airfields. In December, <del>North</del> <sup>South</sup> Vietnamese ground forces supported by U. S. air suffer a serious defeat near Saigon.
1965 Feb 26	U. S. President announces to Congress: - debarkation of U. S. Marine force in S. Vietnam; - planned airlift of one U. S. Army brigade to Thailand; - policy of retaliatory air strikes against selected North Vietnamese targets; - intelligence indications of the presence of a ChiCom division in Laos.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Mar U. S. builds up logistics in SE Asia.  
Incidents occur at Berlin.

(2) Game Events

April 1 President declares national emergency.  
Three U. S. Army divisions, one Marine  
division and supporting air units are  
deployed to Thailand. An additional  
Attack Carrier Group and one ASW  
Carrier Group go to Western Pacific.

April 1 Red Chinese objective is to eliminate U. S.  
from SE Asia while avoiding direct  
collision with U. S. forces.  
The supporting Red strategy calls for four  
Chinese Communist divisions to move  
surreptitiously into Laos and for one  
additional North Vietnamese division  
to infiltrate into South Vietnam.

April 1-15 U. S. air offensive against North  
Vietnam destroys all military and  
industrial targets of consequence.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Apr 2            President refuses to delegate to  
CINCPAC authority to use tactical  
nuclear weapons against Chinese  
Communist ground forces as needed.  
SEATO powers do not actively support  
U. S. offensive militarily or politically.  
Chiang Kai-shek offers ground forces  
for employment in S. Vietnam or against  
the Chinese mainland.

Apr 15           Red Chinese infiltrate another N. Vietnamese  
division into S. Vietnam.

Apr 21           Fighters bearing N. Vietnamese markings  
engage U. S. aircraft over N. Vietnam.  
U. S. and Thailand agree on joint operations  
East of Mekong for May.

May 1-25        U. S. air offensive against N. Vietnam  
continues. Joint U. S. / Thai operations  
in Laos.  
Two Chinese Communist divisions advance  
through Laos to the Vietnamese and Burmese  
borders.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

May 25

French Government calls for international conference of the Geneva powers and the U. S. to arrange cease fire. Premier Khanh considers situation hopeless and wants to resign. Ambassador Taylor talks him out of it. Game ends with Blue considering three courses of action (without coming to a conclusion):

- (a) Negotiation;
- (b) Take over of military command in S. Vietnam, engagement of Chinese Communists in Thailand and Burma, and bombing of Chinese mainland military and industrial targets;
- (c) Execution of general war plans against Red China, with conventional or nuclear weapons.

The Chinese Communists decide to continue their slow advance in Laos and to move two divisions to Northern Burma.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

c. Principal Issues for Presidential Decision

- (1) What kind of provocative N. Vietnamese or Red Chinese act should trigger a large scale deployment of U. S. forces?
- (2) What actions would constitute an appropriate tit-for-tat response to Red provocation?
- (3) If large forces are deployed to SE Asia, and if the Red Chinese and N. Vietnamese then back down, what should the U. S. do with these forces? Should they be returned? Can they defend in place against a "nibbling" Communist strategy? Should they take the offensive in the absence of provocation?
- (4) When would it be appropriate for U. S. to take over command from S. Vietnamese? Should a SEATO supreme command be formed?

3. Revolt in East Germany -- 1964

- a. Game Focus -- Epsilon I-64 is a military-political game which focuses on the exploration of U. S. alternatives in the event of an East German uprising, brought on by a conflict between two Communist factions. The scenario

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

calls attention to the similarity of U. S. and Soviet interests and highlights the problem of tacit and open cooperation between the U. S. and the Soviet Union in such an event.

b. Chronology

(1) Pregame Events

1964	Relaxation of East-West tension.
Summer	
Fall	Disastrously bad harvest in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) leads to production shortages, longer working hours, and reinstitution of oppressive political controls. General Stoph succeeds Grotewohl as GDR Premier.
	The Federal German Republic (FGR) and the U. S. offer economic aid. GDR leaders quarrel over whether to accept aid from the FGR only or the U. S. as well. The Stoph faction is willing to accept aid from both. The opposing Stalinist faction in the GDR compels a

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

rupture of contacts and trade with the West. It forms a plot to arrest Stoph. The attempt to seize Stoph fails. Security guards are killed in the attempt.

Some GDR Army units and party formations declare for Stoph, others support the Stalinist faction. Civil war results.

(2) Game Events

Oct 1 Soviet forces in Germany go on alert. U. S. wishes to limit risk of general war, especially through miscalculation, while expressing sympathy for GDR liberal uprising. There is no eagerness to render direct assistance to either side. U. S. covertly offers asylum to Stoph. U. S. decides not to move American or NATO forces into the GDR. Soviet objective is: first, to end revolt in East Germany; second, to restore a

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

GDR regime responsive to Moscow;  
and, third, to avoid direct confrontation  
with U. S. Soviet Union decides to  
support Stoph for the moment and to  
move reinforcements to the GDR from  
Western Russia.

FGR military units move to zonal border  
to assist refugees. Minor armed clashes  
with GDR and Soviet border guards and  
military forces result.

Chancellor Erhardt proposes 50-year  
non-aggression pact to Soviet Union in  
return for agreement to work out phased  
program for German reunification.

Oct 2

Increasing civil war in the GDR.

U. S. opts for restoration of order in  
the GDR, support of the "liberal" Stoph  
regime, and prevention of FGR intervention.

Two STRICOM divisions are alerted for  
move to Europe. France and Britain oppose  
risking war to assist East Germans.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Neutralist East German labor leader  
proclaims independent provisional  
government in Halle. Several East  
German generals declare support of  
this revolutionary regime.

Mikoyan and Suslov arrive in Berlin to  
take control of East German regime.

Soviet Union moves to stamp out uprising;  
is prepared to teach militant FGR a  
lesson (threat of conventional bombing);  
and remains determined to conciliate U. S.

The game ends.

c. Principal Issues for Presidential Decision

- (1) Whether interests of the United States and the Soviet  
Union are sufficiently alike in the event of an East  
German uprising to permit localization of conflict  
through Soviet-American cooperation.
- (2) Should U. S. support move of FGR forces into GDR?
- (3) How shall U. S. react to Soviet moves to stamp out  
East German revolt? What can U. S. do to moderate

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Communist counter-measures?

- (4) What should U. S. do in face of massive border crossings by refugees?
- (5) Shall U. S. acquiesce in the temporary closing of access routes to West Berlin in the event of an East German revolt?
- (6) Can U. S. use East German revolt to bring about change in status quo in Central Europe? Force moves toward German reunification? Get FGR to accept the permanence of Germany's division?

4. Battle For Laos and South Vietnam

- a. Game Focus -- SIGMA I-62 centers on the military-political problem for the U. S. of preventing the complete Communist take-over of Laos and the subversion of South Vietnam in the face of stepped up North Vietnamese and Red Chinese intervention. The solution attempted is a moderately large direct intervention with U. S. ground and air forces in Laos from bases in Thailand and South Vietnam.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Chronology

(1) Pregame Events

1962	Red Chinese do not comply with agreement
Spring	to withdraw all foreign personnel from Laos by June 16.  U. S. protests to International Control Commission to no avail.  U. S. operation BEEF-UP in South Vietnam (RVN) results in improved performance of RVN forces.
Jun 28	President Diem of RVN states that Communists have taken over Laos and that his own country was now threatened due to massive VC infiltration from the North. In case SEATO continues to refuse to act promptly, Diem expects to ask for Thai and Chinese Nationalist aid.
June	Thailand calls for urgent SEATO meeting. USSR asks UN to stop SEATO action. Promises massive economic aid to Laos.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

(2) Game Events

Jul 1-31      Red (Chinese Communists and North Vietnamese) shift from warfare in Laos to concentration on transit of guerrillas through Laos into RVN. They accuse U. S. of imperialist intervention in RVN, piracy on the high seas, and germ warfare in Laos.

U. S. steps up aid to Thais and South Vietnamese. Guides RVN propaganda and supports RVN covert operations in North Vietnam (DRV). Appeals to ICC to clear Laotian corridor.

Aug 1-31      Reds pass 1500 guerrillas per month through Laotian corridor and land additional ones in South Vietnam from junks. Supplies are air-dropped to VietCong in aircraft supplied by USSR.

U. S. succeeds in establishing SEATO military command (minus U. K. and France) in Thailand.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

U. S. deploys advance elements of a Marine division and Air Wing to RVN and sends air defense units to Thailand. Joint Blue (U. S. and RVN) covert operations are undertaken to sever Laos corridor and to mine DRV harbors. U. S. steps up support of CHINAT irregulars in South China.

Sep 1-15

Stepped up warfare in Laotian corridor. ChiComs move two divisions to Yunnan border and publicly alert others. VietCong sabotage destroys much POL in RVN. Laotian neutralist government falls, creating new crisis.

Sep 5

U. S. President announces that he has ordered airlift of reinforcements to SE Asia and the immediate move of U. S. units in Thailand and South Vietnam to Laos. Equivalent of two U. S. divisions and air support are involved in latter move.

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

Sep 15-30 Red moves two ChiCom and two DRV divisions into Laos.

U. S. forces in South Vietnam and Laos replace loyal RVN and Laotian forces in fixed positions, releasing the latter for offensive action. U. S. air provides close support.

Laotian corridor becomes major battle area.

c. Principal Issues for Presidential Decision

- (1) How to skirt a SEATO veto prohibiting bold action in Laos and South Vietnam.
- (2) How to avoid "domino" effect expected as a result of possible loss of Laos or coup against President Diem.
- (3) How to make U. S. intentions clear and actions credible to Communist regimes.
- (4) Whether it would be militarily and politically sound to risk turning the Laotian corridor into a battlefield.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

(5) Trade off between overt and covert (unconventional warfare) action for U. S. Trade off between direct U. S. intervention and greater support for Laotian and South Vietnamese forces.

(6) Whether South Vietnam would really be more defensible than Laos.

5. Escalation in Iran -- 1962

a. Game Focus -- MU I-62 focuses on a political crisis in Iran which escalates suddenly and unexpectedly into a large, local conventional war which draws in Turkey, the United States and the Soviet Union. Several major U. S. and Soviet moves result from misunderstanding. Other actions are forced upon them unwittingly by the Iranian factions which they support.

b. Chronology

(1) Pregame Events

1962	Police brutality against rioters in Teheran
Oct 1-18	triggers revolution. Shah forced to flee to Turkey. Riahi assumes presidency of Iran.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Riahi asks U. S. to recognize Iranian neutrality. Warns that otherwise Iran would be swept into Communist orbit. Riahi controls most of country but not the Tabriz area.

Shah calls on U. S. to honor treaty obligations. He would then go to Tabriz and lead loyal forces to victory.

U. K. wants to support Shah. Nehru and Nasser recognize the new provisional government of Iran.

Nasser also hints that he would close Suez Canal to any belligerents.

(2) Game Events

Oct 19	Shah flies to Tabriz. Several squadrons of Iranian F-86's fly to Tabriz area. Other military units declare for Shah. U. S. half-heartedly supports Shah.
Oct 20	Riahi rejects U. S. explanation of its position. U. S. agent reports indicate

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

public opinion at Teheran overwhelmingly  
against Shah.

USSR warns U. S. against intervention.

Oct 22-24 Turkish forces cross into Iran and reach  
Tabriz on the 24th. Turkey calls CENTO  
Council meeting. U. S. tries for compromise  
between Riahi and Shah and attempts to slow  
Turkish intervention. No success.

Oct 26 Riahi asks for the aid of all government  
recognizing his regime in repelling in-  
vaders. Denounces U. S. and Britain.  
Covertly asks for Soviet intervention: air  
strikes against Tabriz targets and Turkish  
troop concentrations.

Oct 27-28 Soviet tactical aircraft strike targets not  
only in Tabriz area but attack all air force  
bases in Iran loyal to Shah. This includes  
Abadan, Shiraz and Hamadan fields. These  
attacks compel U. S. to modify its plans  
for deploying CASF and airborne troops.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Elements of the U. S. 82nd AB Division  
land instead at Adana, Turkey.

Turkey wants quick token U. S. inter-  
vention in Iran to discourage Soviet  
ground invasion.

U. S. tries to assemble an air strike  
capability in the Middle East but NATO  
allies and CINCEUR counsel against  
withdrawal of air strength from Europe  
at this tense moment.

Britain urges caution with firmness.

Large numbers of Soviet technicians and  
advisors attach themselves to the Riahi  
forces.

c. Principal Issues for Presidential Decision

- (1) Whether to support Shah outright from the moment  
of his ouster.
- (2) How to intervene militarily in Iran with major U. S.  
forces without provoking large conflict with USSR.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

- (3) How to screen U. S. military moves so as to mislead USSR into believing that U. S. would not intervene.
- (4) How to reconcile the Shah's and the Riahi factions in time to keep the Soviets out.
- (5) Once engaged with Soviet forces in Iran, how to avoid escalation and find acceptable negotiable positions.

6. Confrontation Over Berlin -- 1963

- a. Game Focus -- EPSILON I-62 centers on a confrontation over Berlin which occurs between East and West following an announcement by the Soviets of their intent to withdraw from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and an announcement by the GDR that all transportation routes to Berlin will be closed to civilian traffic.

Major U. S. objectives are to maintain free access to Berlin, to maintain Allied presence in Berlin, to assure freedom of West Berlin, to avoid recognition of GDR, and (eventually) to effect unification of Germany. Major Soviet objectives are to break up the NATO shield, effect the withdrawal of

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

U. S. forces to North America, and to split the common market, incorporating as much of it as possible in the Soviet economic system.

Determined to avoid general war, both sides react to crisis conservatively, although there are numerous opportunities for major gain to either side. Emphasis, therefore, is on political rather than military considerations.

b. Chronology

(1) Pregame Events

12 Sep 62	Warsaw Pact nations, less Albania, sign treaty to become effective in March 1963. Treaty denounced by West, with U. S. calling on FRG to reaffirm its ties to NATO.
12-17 May 63	USSR and GDR notify UN that treaty is in effect. Under Article #5, East Germany withdraws from the Pact, being protected from attack by Warsaw Pact Protocol. Khrushchev calls for withdrawal of FRG from NATO to form a "peaceful German federation."

**TOP SECRET**

## TOP SECRET

24-25  
Mar

Soviets announce withdrawal of forces from GDR starting 31 March. No troops to remain west of ROSTOCK-BERLIN-LEIPZIG - PLAUEN line. Soviets ask UN to move Headquarters to Berlin.

1 Apr

GDR Foreign Minister announces 4-6 day suspension of traffic, effective 9 April, on all transportation routes to Berlin from West Germany on the grounds that the move is essential to the Russian withdrawal to the East and the relocation of NVA, SAP and Frontier Police.

### (2) Game Events

3-9  
April

Soviets border guards replaced by East Germans. Soviet units reported prepared to move. Air France civilian aircraft collides with military aircraft, British Viscount forced down after straying out of corridor on 9 April. By 0500, 9 April, all civilian traffic is stopped.

TOP SECRET



**TOP SECRET**

11-12  
April

While practicing Berlin troop deployments, one small Allied probe unit breaks out, but becomes trapped in heavy Soviet GDR military traffic.

Despite pleas of Mayor Brandt, West Berliners begin rioting the evening of 11 April, storming the Soviet War Memorial and stoning GDR guards. Several rioters are wounded accidentally by burp-guns.

13-14  
April

Increased communist military activities in the Far East, India and Latin America. East Germany urges U Thant to fly to West Berlin to review the critical situation. On 13 April, France and U. K. lead a hard line NATO policy vote declaring a NATO Reinforced Alert, authorizing full implementation of TREADMILL plans. NAC authorizes a blockade of the Communist Bloc if Berlin blockage continues past 1200, 17 April.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

USSR cables Tripartite Powers stating penetration of GDR by FRG troops moving into W. Berlin would be considered an act of aggression.

On 14 April, West Berlin mobs become increasingly vocal and impossible to control. Finally an incident causes an enraged mob of 50,000 to charge the Wall. By 2130 East German troops supported by tanks attack the mob driving it back into Berlin, killing and wounding hundreds.

15-18  
April

Within Berlin violence and rioting continues with military forces on both sides anxious to avoid a shooting war. In the U. S., the President declares a national emergency, effective 15 April, and U. S. forces go on DEFCON II.

U Thant, in response to a vote in the General Assembly, makes on the spot

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

investigation and urgently requests  
a UN Peacekeeping Force (UNPKF)  
be sent to Berlin. On 17 April DeGaulle  
warns Kennedy that the presence of a  
UNPKF in Berlin foretells the end of  
NATO. DeGaulle and Adenauer come  
out for an iron fisted policy, urging  
dispersal of forces, evacuation of major  
cities, and preparations for launching a  
nuclear demonstration, or multi-megaton  
attack, if necessary, but state that the  
decision must be made before the UN takes  
over Berlin.

The game ends as UNPKF approach  
Tempelhof, Shoenfeld and Tegel airfields.

c. Principal Issues for Presidential Decision

- (1) What statements should be made concerning Soviet  
responsibility for maintaining free access to Berlin?  
Should the West offer to assist the Soviet evacuation in  
return for their help in maintaining free access to Berlin?

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

- (2) What actions are required relative to the NATO alliance? Should a NATO embargo be imposed?
- (3) What actions should be taken in Berlin itself? What contingency plans are feasible for implementation? How can Allied forces be maintained in Berlin without becoming involved in a shooting war in the face of West German rioting?
- (4) What course of action should be taken to inhibit the possibility that Warsaw Pact nations come to the aid of the GDR?
- (5) How should Allied forces in Europe be reinforced and made ready, yet restrained? What orders must be given to USCINCEUR - SACEUR? What is the U. S. position regarding the use of U. S. forces and weapons assigned to EUCOM, particularly nuclear delivery systems and weapons?
- (6) How should the situation be interpreted in terms of threat to the U. S. continent? What DEFCON and

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

mobilization status is required, and when?

- (7) Should actions be considered to inhibit the possibility of a "go-it-alone" course of action by the French and FRG?
- (8) What position should the U. S. take with regard to neutralist sponsored UN intervention in Berlin, particularly considering the possible effect of this move on the NATO alliance?
- (9) How can the USIA assist in the Berlin crises? How should the situation be explained to U. S. and Allied publics? What actions should be taken by CIA forces?
- (10) What actions should be taken in response to stepped up communist activities in the Far East, India and Latin America?

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

PART III

HISTORICAL CRISES

The Working Group used recent historical incidents as subjects for analysis in those levels of crisis which have been experienced. To the extent that it was available, information on Korea, Hungary - Suez, Taiwan, Berlin 61, Lebanon, Cuba 62, Panama 64, Brazil, RB 66 64, and Tonkin Gulf was examined. Source material included JCS chronologies; crisis studies by DOD, State, CIA and contractor groups; and interviews with participants and observers.

The Cuba crisis of 1962 is easily the best documented major crisis in recent experience. For this reason and because it is the severest crisis available for scrutiny, the Study Group concentrated on it.

It was concluded from this crisis study that there are two principal variables which must be considered in determining the intensity of a crisis. The first is the degree of escalatory potential in the crisis situation. The second is the extent of the actual combat operations directly employed as counters in the

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

management of the crisis. Cuba and Berlin, for examples, were high in escalatory potential, but involved negligible combat operations. Korea and Vietnam on the other hand included extensive combat operations, but had far less escalatory potential. It is significant that our command and control apparatus and ~~our~~<sup>our</sup> decision-makers have not yet been tested in an actual crisis which was both highly escalatory and which involved extensive employment of combat operations as a feature of its management.

**TOP SECRET**

## TOP SECRET

### PART IV

#### EXERCISE KEY CHAIN

Exercise KEY CHAIN (October 1963) was designed and conducted as a world-wide command post exercise. Its objective was to exercise limited war contingency plans in such a way that the National Command Authorities might have an opportunity to observe and participate in the strategic direction of the Unified and Specified Commands under realistic exercise conditions as well as to provide subordinate commanders and their staffs with a similar opportunity to exercise at their limited war emergency duties. A further objective was to exercise command, control and communications facilities and procedures as well as emergency plans and procedures at all participating levels of command.

KEY CHAIN did not include escalation into a general war situation, but it did provide a measure of "brink" operations in that SIOP forces participated and responded in terms of readiness to exercise requirements. In keeping with the limited war theme, hot spots were developed in peripheral contact areas (Korea, Middle East, etc.) as opposed to direct confrontations with the Soviets. An actual crisis in Berlin caused premature termination

TOP SECRET



**TOP SECRET**

of the exercise, but the most disappointing feature thereof was the lack of participation by top level authorities. The exercise was conducted by staff-level personnel. All background data for the exercise (intelligence, political, operations, etc.) was predetermined. Movement of forces was simulated.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

PART V

CONVENTIONAL AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARFARE  
IN CENTRAL EUROPE

The options and scenarios developed in the TacNuc-65 Study conducted by the Chairman's Special Studies Group represent some of the typical scenarios used by the Study Group in considering major crises in Central Europe and their command and control needs.

Military Postures and Objectives

Tactical nuclear war in Central Europe is considered in terms of three alternate defense postures:

- a. A stout non-nuclear forward defense against a major non-nuclear Soviet Bloc assault with escalation to controlled use of tactical nuclear weapons when it is clear that the non-nuclear defense is inadequate.
- b. A forward defense providing for prompt nuclear response to any but small-scale non-nuclear attacks with two options: (1) initial nuclear response is restricted to employment of weapons of 2KT or less within the engaged battle zone, or (2) initial nuclear

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

response emphasizes interdiction to neutralize all military targets as necessary within the Central European Satellite Areas.

- c. A forward, multiple option, flexible response defense which provides for the graduated application of non-nuclear and tactical nuclear weapons and which is designed to increase the survivability and recuperability of NATO forces and to minimize the risks of escalation.

Ten illustrative scenarios, consonant with the above defense postures, are presented. For each scenario, optional plans for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons are considered. The scenarios are grouped under three headings: (1) deliberate attack after force build-up, (2) non-deliberate warfare situations, and (3) deliberate attack with surprise. The central plots of the ten scenarios are sufficiently similar to present them here as a single, composite scenario.

Military rather than political objectives and approaches are stressed. The major Soviet military objective is to acquire a portion

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

of Western Europe, with its industrial resources and associated civilian population relatively intact, through the tactical use of nuclear weapons (principally MRBM/IRBM forces land in Western USSR). (The Soviets also may choose to employ chemical weapons in view of their relative superiority in this area, and their relative inferiority in nuclear weaponry.) The NATO military objective is to establish a military posture sufficient to deter Soviet aggression, to preserve NATO territorial integrity, and to maintain sea lines of communication. The U. S. military objective is to tailor the application of force both appropriate to the circumstance and sufficient to attain NATO objectives.

Chronology of Events: A typical scenario proceeds as follows:

11 Aug 65	The Soviet Bloc decides to initiate a war on 1 October and begins limited covert mobilization.
26 Aug 65	NATO is concerned over reports of mysterious USSR activity.
9 - 14 Sept	In the guise of maneuver, Soviet Bloc begins low tempo troop movements.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

15 - 27  
Sept

U. S. orders Airlift Emergency I

and begins movement of U. S.

roundout and filler personnel.

NATO declares state of Military

Vigilance.

Soviet Bloc begins rapid overt force  
movements and steps up mobilization.

U. S. begins to airlift armored  
divisions from CONUS and sends CASF  
squadrons. NATO declares Simple  
Alert. U. S. and some NATO countries  
initiate mobilization. With continued  
build-up by the Soviet Bloc, NATO  
declares Reinforced alert on 27 Sept.  
SACEUR orders limited air reconnaissance  
over Satellite countries. Two aircraft  
are shot down, USSR protests.

30 Sept

Soviet Bloc continues war preparations.  
NATO increases readiness with emphasis  
on nuclear capabilities. NATO and Warsaw  
Pact nations issue strong warnings. SACEUR  
declares State Orange.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

1 Oct

Soviet Bloc launches non-nuclear attack.

At this point, the scenarios differ depending on the options selected and the Soviet reply. Over a dozen major options are developed and some of these are successively applied in each scenario. As a result, the ten scenarios present a rich family of different levels of conflict, rates of escalation, and decision points.

Principal Issues for Presidential Decision

- a. When and to what degree should the U. S. reinforce European forces? How imminent is a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union?
- b. When and under what circumstances should authority be predelegated to unlock nuclear weapons under the PAL system? To release and employ nuclear weapons?
- c. What emergency actions should be taken, and when, relative to preparation of strategic forces in the continental U. S. ?
- d. If the Soviet Bloc initiates a non-nuclear attack with the announced intent of limiting the attack and their goals to W. Germany provided other NATO nations are not used

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

- as bases for attacks, to what extent should NATO participate (versus with some other alliance structure?)
- e. Should nuclear weapons be employed? Which option should be selected? At this point should all nuclear weapons be released? If not all, which ones? If Group B weapons are considered for release, is sufficient justification for this action provided by SACEUR/USCINCEUR? Are NATO nations in agreement?
  - f. If, in response to limited NATO employment of tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviets pre-empt by employing their IRBM/MRBMs in quantity, what actions are required? (See i, below).
  - g. If, in response to limited NATO employment of tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviets reply in kind and do not escalate, what actions can be taken to terminate the conflict and negotiate a settlement?
  - h. If, in response to limited NATO employment of tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviets choose to escalate the yield but not the perimeter of nuclear warfare, should the Soviet escalation be matched?... should NATO expand nuclear operations against interdiction targets?... to

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

include counter air operations? Depending upon NATO actions and Soviet responses to these conditions, what actions can be taken to terminate the conflict and negotiate a settlement? If the Soviets offer an armistice while still in NATO territory, what response should NATO make?

- i. If the Soviet Bloc escalates to use of all yields up to 1 or 2 MT in theater-wide counter air and interdiction operations, but avoids civil damage, should the U. S. release all nuclear weapons? Execute a SIOP option? Should NATO attack SSP and RPP targets in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland? Should NATO release all R-Hour tasks in conjunction with U. S. execution of a SIOP option?

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

PART VI

GENERAL WAR SCENARIOS

In 1963, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee completed a study on the Management and Termination of War with the Soviet Union (TS). The three scenarios in this study were considered. In addition, excursions and variations of these scenarios highlighted particular command and control needs.

1. Focus of Study. The Study presents three basic types of general war scenarios for the 1964 - 72 period:
  - a. War initiated by a Soviet massive intercontinental nation killing attack (hereafter Scenario A).
  - b. War initiated by a U. S. discriminate pre-emptive strike (hereafter Scenario B).
  - c. Limited war escalating to limited intercontinental exchange (hereafter Scenario C).
2. Decisions in Scenarios A and B. There are relatively few presidential decision points in the A and B large-scale nuclear wars. The major decision points considered in the study and the questions at issue can be summarized as follows:

Pre H-hour (Scenario B)

- a. Launch U. S. counterforce attack without U. S. warning

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

to Soviets.

- b. Launch U. S. counterforce and counter population attack without warning.
- c. Increase alert position and try to talk Soviet leaders out of launching their massive attack.

After H-hour (Scenario A)

- a. Maximum retaliatory strike against USSR, satellites and Red China.
- b. Counterforce strike only against USSR, satellites and Red China.
- c. Either of above but withholding attack on specific satellites or Red China.

In case of Soviet offer to halt intercontinental exchange

Scenarios A and B

- a. Accept it.
- b. Offer to withhold counter-city strikes on stated conditions.
- c. Reject it and, if applicable, extend option to anti-population attack.

Post-Attack (Scenarios A and B)

Both sides have delivered their maximum initial attacks and retain only small ready nuclear reserves. Damage is very

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

great in U. S. and Communist China but greater yet in NATO Europe, the satellites, and the Soviet Union. Armistice terms have been agreed upon, calling for Soviet withdrawal from Europe and destruction of remaining ICBM's and MRBM's.

Issues requiring presidential decision include:

- a. How to reestablish order in CONUS.
- b. How to enforce Soviet withdrawal from Europe.
- c. How to insure initial and continued Soviet compliance with armistice agreement.
- d. How to reorganize and build-up of U. S. forces to coerce Nth countries unwilling to cooperate with U. S. allies.

3. Decisions in Escalating, Limited General War (Scenario C)

The typical scenario C starts with Communist instigated civil war in a European NATO Country. NATO allies render conventional military assistance to their <sup>faction</sup> ~~faction~~ and Soviet Bloc countries to the Communist insurgents. Conventional war spreads to neighboring NATO and satellite countries. U. S. and Soviet bases and forces in these countries suffer collateral damage. U. S. and Soviet forces in Central Europe employ tactical nuclear weapons against military targets.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Mutual threats lead the U. S. and Soviet Union to exchange inter-continental nuclear blows. After several tit-for-tat rounds, the U. S. goes to a limited counterforce strategy. The Soviet Union now signals its willingness to back off by responding with a much smaller counterforce strike. Negotiations ensue and a truce is agreed upon. This sort of scenario presents numerous decision points. It will also afford repeated opportunities for managing the war so as to prevent further escalation or to manipulate escalation so as to enhance the probability of ending the war.

In this type of war, the need for constant central direction is great; moreover, because the belligerents' basic objectives are apt to change under the pressure of events. War objectives need to be managed in a manner commensurate with the management of escalation and termination of hostilities.

Major issues for presidential decision in this conflict include the following:

- a. Assuming Communist uprising, in Italy, for instance, should U. S. intervene at all?
- b. What should be the objective of U. S. intervention, and how can it be clearly conveyed to friend and foe?

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

c. Are intervening forces adequate to do the job? Are they so large as to provoke Soviet intervention?

d. Under what circumstances should sanctuary bases in neighboring countries be attacked?

e. If conventional forces do not suffice to turn the battle, at which point should tactical nuclear weapons be employed? How many? Against which targets?

f. Will use of tactical nuclear weapons deter direct Soviet intervention? What will U. S. do if Soviet Union retaliates with tactical nuclear weapons?

g. In case of Soviet IRBM and medium bomber strikes against NATO bases, the President may choose to:

(1) Launch ICBM strikes against Soviet MRBM and medium bomber bases.

(2) Same as (1) but use Polaris.

(3) Same as (1) but use theater tactical bombers.

(4) Send ultimatum to Soviet Union threatening destruction of certain military targets in Soviet Union unless attacks cease.

(5) Do nothing.

h. Assuming Soviet continuation of MRBM offensive, the issue for the United States is whether to make good its threat

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

and, if so, which Soviet targets to attack.

i. If the Soviet Union follows with a tit-for-tat inter-continental strike, the President must decide whether to escalate further or negotiate.

j. If negotiation seems indicated, should a settlement simply require the return to status quo ante or should other demands be made? If the latter, how much can the U. S. demand at the end of a war which brought about great destruction but did not result in a clear-cut outcome?

k. If a compromise settlement is reached which leaves the Soviet Union with large nuclear forces and considerable recuperative industrial potential, how shall terms be enforced and peace be assured?

4. Variations of General War Scenarios. Several variations of the above scenarios were considered where there were major technical and organizational malfunctions or where new strategies were adopted (and possibly employed, if necessary,) by the U. S., the Soviet Union or other nuclear capable powers.

Some of the strategic variations that were considered include:

a. The Soviets procure extensive tactical warning systems and modernize their existing systems. The new systems include

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

a Midas-like satellite borne sensor and over-the-horizon radars - both of which might give thirty-minutes or more warning of attack. In addition, the Soviet classified and open literature both stress the need for rapid, all-out response.

b. The Soviets announce a policy of "controlled response" and intra war deterrence but state that counterforce attacks are futile, difficult to distinguish, and entail inevitably high collateral damage. Instead, they state that escalation should proceed through stages of attacks on industrial capability, natural resources and urban population.

c. One or both sides pursue massive civil defense programs including nation-wide fallout shelter programs, limited blast shelter facilities in major urban areas and evacuation capabilities for periods of intense crisis.

Each of the above would affect the conduct of the war and the command and control needs. In variation (c), civil defense activities would play a greater role in management of crises and wars and, therefore, the President would require information on both SU and U. S. status of population. In variation (b), attack assessment

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

capabilities would need refinement.

The technical and organization malfunctions that were considered included:

1. Soviet Command Failure. During period of intense crisis, a small portion of Soviet Command structure launches a part of the Soviet ICBM force.

Issues for presidential decision:

- a. Why does the Soviet Union launch a surprise attack?
- b. What is the meaning of the crazy-quilt pattern of attack? What is the enemy trying to convey?
- c. What would be an appropriate response?

2. Low Performance ICBM's. Incoming Soviet ICBM's and SLBMs perform far more poorly than U. S. intelligence anticipated. (The number of aborts and duds is high and CEP's appear to be excessive.)

- a. In view of such performance, should the U. S. now change its strategy?
- b. Can U. S. convince Soviet leaders that their weapons really perform so poorly?

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

3. Ragged Soviet Attack or Response. Through command misunderstanding, faulty communications, or other technical difficulties, the Soviet Union attack is unexpectedly ragged. Part of the ICBM force gets off too soon and the remainder of of the force is launching at far too slow a rate.

Issues for presidential decision:

- a. Can the U. S. detect this situation?
- b. Should the U. S. switch to a different strategic option?
- c. Should the U. S. attempt to negotiate immediately?

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